




# THE TEACHINGS OF THE UPANISHADS



BY  
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Mewar-Mahima, etc.



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## DEDICATION

To the memory of  
the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit  
Durgā Charaṇa Sāṅkhyā Vedāntatirtha  
who was  
in his day  
the most profound scholar  
of the Vedānta  
and who in his genial temperament  
was an embodiment  
of the Vedānta  
this book is humbly  
dedicated  
as a token  
of deep gratitude  
by  
the author

## PREFACE

I read the Upaniṣads after I had finished my University education. My teacher was the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Durgā Charaṇa Sāṃkhya-Vedāntātīrtha of Calcutta, the well-known editor of the Sāṃkarabhāṣyas of the main Upaniṣads and also of the Rāmānujabhāṣya of the Brahmasūtras. He was a very erudite Sanskrit scholar but knew practically no English. The result was that I got from him the purely indigenous interpretations of the Upaniṣads, which were handed down from preceptor to disciple for thousands of years and were not affected by the modern writings of western orientalists. Subsequently I read the writings of western scholars. I noticed important points of difference between the interpretations of the modern western scholars on the one hand and the ancient Indian scholars on the other. Although on some questions, there were differences among the ancient Indian scholars,—on fundamental matters they were all unanimous. One of the doctrines held in common by all ancient scholars was that there was no contradiction between the different portions of the Vedas which include the Upaniṣads. But practically all the western scholars, proceeding on the theory of the evolution of knowledge, have asserted that there is

conflict between the Upaniṣads and the earlier Vedas. Thus for example they say that the Upaniṣads have denied the existence of the minor gods and the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. It seemed to me that the western scholars were mistaken in this respect. For it is nowhere stated in the Upaniṣads that the minor gods do not exist or that the Vedic sacrifices are inefficacious. On the other hand in practically all the important Upaniṣads there are many passages which refer to the existence of the minor gods and assert the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices in enabling the performer to attain heaven.<sup>1</sup> It seemed to me that in these respects the prejudice of the western scholars against minor gods and Vedic sacrifices was wrongly ascribed by them to the ṛsis of the Upaniṣads.

These doctrines may not be considered to be of any great inherent importance to the modern scholar. But to the Hindu they are very important. Every school of Hinduism asserts that the Vedas are absolutely true and form the basis of Hinduism. If the western scholars are right, then the Vedas are self-contradictory and Hinduism has no solid basis to stand upon. On the other hand if, as I have tried to show, the western scholars are wrong then the charge of self-contradiction brought against the Vedas falls to the ground.

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1. For relevant quotations please see Chapter II of this book.

In order to bring to the notice of the professors of the various Indian Universities what I considered to be serious defects in their present methods of teaching the Upaniṣads, I delivered lectures on this subject in different universities as stated below :—

| <b>Name of University</b> | <b>Date of Lecture</b> |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| Lucknow University        | March, 1942            |
| Benares Hindu University  | August „               |
| Madras University         | April, 1943            |
| Allahabad University      | January, 1945          |
| Nagpur University         | March, 1945            |
|                           | and October, 1945      |
| Patna University          | July, 1945             |
| Travancore University     | August, 1945           |
| Punjab University         | October, 1945          |
| Delhi University          | Do.                    |
| Calcutta University       | April, 1946            |

I also delivered lectures at the Bombay and the Calcutta branches of the former Royal Asiatic Society in March, 1944 and April, 1945 and also at the Science Institute, Bangalore. These lectures were presided over or attended by many eminent scholars among whom may be mentioned Sir S. Radhakrishnan, then Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University, Sir C. V. Raman, Nobel Laureate, Dr. K. S. Iyer, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Lucknow University, Mahāmaho-

pādhyāya P. V. Kane, M.A., B.L. of Bombay, Dr. Iswari Dutta, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Patna University, Dr. Dharendra Mohan Dutta, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Patna University, Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesh Mishra M.A. D. Lit. of the Allahabad University, Dr. Kunhan Raja, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Madras University, the late Dr. S. C. Mukherji, M.A. D.Lit. Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Benares Hindu University, Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Bidhu Sekhar Shastri, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, the late Dr. Lakshman Swarup, Principal, Oriental College, Lahore, Dr. Satkari Mukherjee, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Jogendra Nath Tarka Vedantatirtha and Dr. Satish Chandra Chatterjee of the Calcutta University, Mahāmahopādhyāya V. V. Mirashi, Principal, Morris College, Nagpur, Mr. Justice W. R. Puranik, Vice-Chancellor of the Nagpur University, Dr. N. K. Brahma M.A. ph. D. Senior Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Hārān Chandra Shastri of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, Dr. Wasudeo N. Pandit M.A., ph.D. of the Central Provinces, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Laksmidhar Shastri Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Delhi University. The presidents of most of the meetings supported my

position. In very few cases there was opposition. In no case any convincing reason was given against the views expressed by me. It therefore appeared to me that my position was on the whole correct. It is greatly to be regretted that generally the student of the modern Universities gets his knowledge of the Vedas, not from the original texts, nor from the writings of saintly scholars like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja who devoted their lives for the realization of the Vedic ideals, but from the writings of western scholars, who in spite of their vast erudition, have not in many cases been able to find the true meaning, due mainly to ignorance of Vedic tradition or prejudice against them. It is a pity that the Indian student is imbibing the mistakes of western scholars and is losing faith in the Vedas for imaginary defects in the Vedas which do not exist therein. As the Vedas are the basis of Hindu religion, those students are losing faith in their own religion. Their learning and intelligence are running to waste because of their irreligious mentality.

It has been my attempt to present in this volume a brief outline of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads which, as I have shown in the book, is also the philosophy of Hinduism. There is nothing self-contradictory or illogical in this philosophy. On the other hand it contains solutions to many problems which

are not to be found in any other system of philosophy.

In conclusion I may state that in interpreting the Upaniṣads I have generally accepted the views which were held in common by both Saṁkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya. Where these illustrious preceptors differ, I have generally given the views of both. It will be seen that in many important matters I have accepted the interpretation of Rāmānuja in preference to that of Śaṁkara.

In conclusion I add that a portion of chapter II of this book was printed in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Calcutta. (Vol XVII No. 3, 1951)

3, Sambhu Nath Pandit  
Street,  
Calcutta, July 1952

} **Basanta Kumar Chattopadhyaya**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used :—

|         |     |                     |
|---------|-----|---------------------|
| Ai      | for | Aitareya            |
| Br      | „   | Bṛhadāraṇyaka       |
| Bra Su  | „   | Brahma-Sūtra        |
| Chhā    | „   | Chhāndogya          |
| I       | „   | Īśa                 |
| Ke      | „   | Kena                |
| Ka      | „   | Kaṭha               |
| Manu    | „   | Manusamhitā         |
| Mu      | „   | Muṇḍaka             |
| Mā      | „   | Māṇḍukya            |
| Pra     | „   | Praśna              |
| Rg V S  | „   | Rg-Veda Samhitā     |
| Śwe     | „   | Śwetāśwatara        |
| Tai Bra | „   | Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa |
| Tai     | „   | Taittirīya          |
| U       | „   | Upaniṣad            |

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# ERRATA

| Page | Line          | For            | Read           |
|------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| 14   | 24            | ware           | were           |
| 37   | Foot-note (4) | Rg V S 10.90.0 | Rg V S 10.90.3 |
| 38   | 19            | Upanisads      | Vedas          |
| 48   | Foot-note     | (5)            | (1)            |
| 64   | 20            | According      | According to   |
| 73   | 15, 16        | satwa          | satva          |
| 172  | 16            | Madhava        | Madhva         |
| 173  | 17            | ect            | etc.           |
| 175  | 1             | practices      | practises      |
| 209  | 18            | gārbasthya     | bānaprastha    |
| 211  | 7             | path           | path of        |
| 232  | 15            | Buddha         | Bauddha        |
| 233  | 17            | Cāravāka       | Cārvāka        |
| 245  | 7             | realization    | realization of |
| 287  | 9             | an             | at             |
| 293  | 1             | it             | It             |
| 276  | footnote      | car            | no             |

# THE TEACHINGS OF THE UPANISHADS

OR

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF HINDUISM

### CHAPTER I

#### Introduction

It has been noticed by some modern scholars that civilizations, like human bodies, show a tendency to decay and die. Many civilizations flourished in various parts of the world at different times. But most of them have perished. Where, for example, are the civilizations which flourished in ancient Egypt, Babyloniā, Assyriā, Phoeniciā, Chaldeā, Carthage, Greece and Rome? No one remembers the gods who were worshipped in these places. The manners and customs have changed beyond recognition. The religions have disappeared. The very languages have been forgotten. The tendency of modern western civilization to utilize scientific discoveries for the production of engines of wholesale destruction have led many western thinkers to wonder whether western civilization will also perish like the ancient civilizations. Compared with other civilizations the Vedic civilization has revealed a wonderful

vitality. While Vedic civilization is at least as old as any of the civilizations mentioned above, it is still living. The Vedas which are the oldest literature in the world are still committed to heart, studied and explained. Vedic texts are still recited in the morning and evening by thousands of persons all over India. Vedic passages are also uttered when worship is conducted in temples and homes, when marriages are celebrated and when other religious ceremonies are performed. In fact the Vedas are still the foundation of Hindu religion. It is sometimes said that the Vedic religion has been replaced by a new religion which may be called the Purāṇic religion. If that were so the Vedas would have been forgotten. Take up any Purāṇa and you will find that the Vedas are mentioned as the highest authority. Vedic gods and goddesses, Vedic sacrifices and ceremonies are frequently referred to, and with the greatest veneration. In fact, as stated in the Purāṇas themselves the Purāṇas etc. were composed by Vedic scholars to present the Vedic religion in a popular form.<sup>1</sup> The growth of the Purāṇas from the Vedas is something like the growth of a tree from a seed. The ideas contained in a nut-shell in the Vedas have been elaborated and elucidated in the Purāṇas. To super-

(1) इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदार्थमुपबृंहयेत् (Mahābhārata, 1. 1. 267)

ficial observers it may appear that there are discrepancies between the two. But the discrepancies are more apparent than real. There is no reason to doubt the competence or veracity of the saintly scholars like Vyāsa and Vālmīki, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, who have all asserted the fundamental unity between the Vedas and the Purāṇas. That the Vedic civilization, which as stated above is the same as the Purāṇic civilization, is still living is proved by the appearance of saints like Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa. That he was completely free from foreign influences may be inferred from the fact that he was a practically illiterate priest. He got his religious ideas either from his parents and relatives or from saints and holy persons whom he met or from religious discourses ( कथकता ) and indigenous theatrical performances ( यात्रा ). The actual form of worship adopted by him when he first attained God-realization was Purāṇic as he worshipped Goddess Kālī. The knowledge attained by him may be called Vedic as he realized man's oneness with Brahman as laid down in the Upaniṣads which are parts of the Vedas. It may be observed that Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa was not the only saint of modern India who realized God. Rāmakṛṣṇa's name is so well-known because of the preachings of his famous disciple Swāmī

Vivekānanda. But there were others before and after him. Rāma Prasād Sen of Bengal furnished the inspiration to Rāmakṛṣṇa who used to say addressing the image of Goddess Kālī, "Mother, you revealed yourself to Rāma Prasād, why will you not reveal yourself to me?" Swāmī Bhāskarānanda and Tailanga Swāmi of Benares were almost contemporary with him. Rām Dās Kāthiā Bābā of Bṛndāban, Bijay Kṛṣṇa Goswāmī, Bāmā Kshepā, Santa Dās and Pāgal Haranāth of Bengal, Shyāmā Charan Lāhirī of Benares Swāmī Bholānanda Giri of Hardwar came after him. Raman Maharṣi is still living. It should not be supposed that it was only in the spiritual realm that Vedic civilization has produced outstanding personalities in modern times: Gandhi and Tagore are world figures in other than spiritual matters—Gandhi as a leader of men and Tagore as a poet. J. C. Bose, P. C. Roy and C. V. Raman have made their name in the world as great scientists. As regards the effect of Vedic civilization in elevating the character of the masses in general the following passage may be quoted from a speech of Mahatma Gandhi:—"I ask you to accept the testimony given by Sir Thomas Munro, and I confirm that testimony, that the masses of India are really more cultured than any in the world" (Mahatma Gandhi's speech in Madras at the sea beach on 8-4-1921). Rājā Rām Mohan Rāy said "From

- a careful survey and observation of the people and inhabitants of various parts of the country I am of opinion that the peasants or villagers who reside at a distance from large towns and head stations and courts of law are as innocent, temperate and moral in their conduct as the people of any country whatsoever" (Quoted in Mr. P. N. Bose's National Education and Modern Progress, p. 41). The quality of a civilization is not to be judged by its armament for destruction, nor its equipment for physical and intellectual enjoyment, nor even by the advancement of science, or the percentage of literacy. The elevation of the character of the masses is the true test of a civilization. It is because Vedic civilization succeeded in elevating to a remarkable degree the moral and spiritual standard of the masses that it survived much longer than other civilizations of the past. As regards the question whether the character of the Vedic civilization, as revealed in the manner and customs of the people, has materially changed we may quote the following passage from Todd's Rajasthan. What Todd has said about the Rājputs is practically true of the entire Hindu nation :—

"What nation on earth would have maintained the semblance of civilization, the spirit or the customs of their forefathers, during so many centuries of overwhelming oppression but

one of such singular character as the Rajpoots ? How did the Britons at once sink under the Romans and in vain strove to save their groves, their Druids or their altars of Bal from destruction ? To the Saxons they alike succumbed ; they, again to the Danes, and this heterogeneous to the Normans. Empire was lost or gained by a single battle, and the laws and religion of the conquered merged in those of the conquerors. Contrast with these the Rajpoots. Not an iota of their religions and customs have they lost, though many a foot of land." (Annals of Mewar, Chapter V).

From what has been said above it will appear that Vedic civilization has survived longest and has contributed in a striking degree to the moral elevation of the masses. The Vedic civilization is of course based on the Vedas. The Upaniṣads form the cream of the Vedas. Other portions of the Vedas contain mostly hymns addressed to the minor gods with occasional references to the Supreme God (Brahman). The Upaniṣads are full of references to Brahman and the means of attaining Him. The truths proclaimed in the Upaniṣads are so striking that they have evoked enthusiastic admiration from even foreign scholars of the modern age. It is well-known in what great veneration the famous German philosopher Schopenhauer held the Upaniṣads. A copy of

the book would always lie on his table and he would bow down to it daily before he retired to bed. "In the whole world", he declared, "there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣads. It has been the solace of my life. It will be the solace of my death." Max Müller quoting these words said, "If these words of Schopenhauer required any endorsement I should willingly give it as the result of my own experience". (Origin of Vedānta p. 16).

Again Schopenhauer said, referring to the conceptions of the Upaniṣads, "almost super-human conceptions whose originators can hardly be regarded as mere men".

Deussen said that the Upaniṣads anticipated the views of Kant and Schopenhauer. He also observed "Eternal philosophical truth has seldom found more decisive and striking expression than in the doctrine of the emancipating knowledge of the Ātman" (Philosophy of the Upaniṣads). Again he said that in the Upaniṣads "there are philosophical conceptions unequalled in India or perhaps anywhere else in the world".

Macdonell writes, "Brahman or the Absolute is grasped and definitely expressed for the first time in the history of human thought in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. (India's Past, p. 46).

Victor Cousin, the French philosopher, writes "When we read the poetical and philosophical monuments of the East, above all those of India,

we discover there many truths so profound and which make such a contrast with the results at which the European genius has sometimes stopped that we are constrained to bend the knee before the philosophy of the East" (quoted by Max Müller).

Frederick Schlegel, German author and scholar, writes, "Even the loftiest philosophy of the Europeans appears in comparison with the abundant light of the oriental idealism like a feeble Promethean spark in the full flood of the heavenly glory of the noonday sun,—faltering and feeble and ever ready to be extinguished."

A study of the Upaniṣads is thus of very great value, because the Upaniṣads comprise the best portions of the Vedas, which are the basis of the civilization which has survived the longest in the world and is still a living force, and also because the truths proclaimed in the Upaniṣads are more profound than those in any other system of philosophy. With these few words by way of introduction we proceed to examine the subject matter of this treatise, *viz.* the Teachings of the Upaniṣads.

---

## CHAPTER II

### A General Review of Vedic Literature

The word Upaniṣad has been derived thus :—  
 Upa + ni + sad + kvip. *Upa* and *ni* are the prefixes to the root *sad*. *Kvip* is the suffix. *Upa* means nearness or quickness. *Ni* means certainty. The root *sad* has two meanings—(i) to attain and (ii) to loosen or destroy. As such the word Upaniṣad has been interpreted in two ways. It is the knowledge by means of which the ignorance which is the cause of attachment to the world is quickly and completely destroyed. Or it is the knowledge by means of which one can quickly attain the Supreme Being, Brahman.

The Upaniṣads form a part of the Vedas. As a preliminary to the study of the Upaniṣads it is necessary to have a general idea of what the Vedas are. The Vedas are four in number :—(i) the Ṛg-Veda, (ii) the Yajur-Veda, (iii) the Sāma-Veda and (iv) the Atharva-Veda. The Ṛg-Veda consists of verses, the Yajur-Veda is in prose, the Sāma-Veda consists of songs, the Atharva-Veda contains prose, poetry and songs. Some modern scholars have said that the Atharva-Veda was not formerly regarded as a part of the

Vedas, as in some places the Vedas are referred to as the *Trayī i. e.*, consisting of three portions. This view is not correct as the Atharva-Veda is mentioned as one of the Vedas in authoritative books. Thus the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says "The Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and Atharvāṅgīra (the Atharva-Veda) are like the breath of that Supreme Being."<sup>1</sup>

The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says "The Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and the Atharva-Veda contain the *aparā vidyā* (other than the highest knowledge)."<sup>2</sup>

The Nṛsiṃha-Pūrva-Tāpanī Upaniṣad says "The Vedas are four in number, the Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and the Atharva-Veda."<sup>3</sup>

The reason why the Vedas are sometimes referred to as the *trayi* is that the entire Vedas can be divided into three portions—(i) verses, (ii) prose and (iii) songs. The Atharva-Veda, as stated above, consists partly of prose and partly of verses and songs. Hence the Atharva-Veda also is included in the term *trayi*.

The term Veda is derived from the root

(1) अस्य महती भूतस्य निःशसितमेतदयद्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वांगिरसः

Bri. U. 4. 4. 10

✓(2) तत्र अपरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः Mu. U. 1.1.

(3) ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वाणि च चत्वारो वेदाः

*vid* "to know" and means "knowledge." In particular it refers to such knowledge as cannot be obtained either through the senses or by means of inference.

"By the help of the Vedas one can know that means (of attaining knowledge) which cannot be attained either by the senses or by inference."<sup>1</sup>

Sāyaṇāchāryya says in his introduction to the commentary on the Yajur-Veda :—

"Veda is the book which teaches us the supernatural means of attaining the desired object and avoiding the undesired."<sup>2</sup>

The exact definition of the term Veda is however to be found in the aphorism of the sage Apastamba :—

"The name Veda is given to the collection of the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas".<sup>3</sup> Each of the four Vedas is divided into two portions :—(i) the Mantras and (ii) the Brāhmaṇas. The Mantra portion consists mainly of hymns addressed to

(1) प्रत्यक्षेणानुमित्या वा यस्तु पाथो न बुध्यते ।

एतं विदन्ति वेदेन तस्माद्देदस्य वेदता ॥

(2) इष्टप्राप्तानिष्टपरिहारयोरलौकिकमुपायं यो यन्वी वेदयते स वेदः ।

(3) मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोर्वेदनामधेयम् ( यज्ञपरिभाषाम्ब ) ।

Other authorities give the same definition. Thus Baudhayana says :—

मन्त्रब्राह्मणं वेद इत्याचक्षते ( गृह्यसूत्र, 3.6.2)

Kausika says :—

आम्नायः पुनः मन्त्रा ब्राह्मणानि च ( कौशिकसूत्र, 1.3)

various deities—Indra, Vāyu, Yama, Agni, etc. It is also called the *Samhitā* portion. The *Brāhmaṇa* portion mostly gives details for the performance of the Vedic ceremonies. The concluding portions of the *Brāhmaṇas* are called the *Āraṇyakas* because they contain philosophical discussions made by the hermits who retired to the forests. At the end of the *Āraṇyakas* we find the *Upaniṣads*. The *Upaniṣads* thus occur at the very end of the *Vedas*. Hence they are also called *Vedānta* which means the end of the *Vedas*. Though the *Upaniṣads* generally occur at the end of the *Brāhmaṇas*, some few *Upaniṣads* occur in the *Mantra* portion, *e. g.*, the *Isopaniṣad* which occurs in the *Vājasaneī Samhitā* one of the *mantra* portions of the *Yajur-Veda*. The *Śwetāśvatara Upaniṣad* also occurs in the *mantra* portion of the *Vedas*.

It may be mentioned here that Swamī Dayānanda, the founder of the *Ārya Samāja* is of opinion that only the *Mantra* portion should be called the *Vedas*, not the *Brāhmaṇa* portion. But his view is not supported by any ancient scholar. All ancient scholars regard both the *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas* as *Veda*. We have already quoted *Āpastamba*, *Baudhāyana* and *Kauśika*.<sup>1</sup> *Vyāsa* and *Jaimini*, *Śaṅkarāchāryya* and *Rāmānuja* have also taken

(1) Vide footnote 3 of p. 11

the same view. For in the Brahmasūtras composed by Vyāsa and the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras composed by Jaimini, passages of the Upaniṣads (which occur in the Brāhmaṇas) are referred to as Śrūti, which means Veda. Śaṅkara and Rāmānūja commenting on the former Sūtras have accepted this nomenclature.

The entire Vedas have been compared to a tree. Different portions of the Vedas have been compared to different branches (शाखा) The significance of calling them branches lies in the fact that just as a man by having recourse to a single branch of a tree can get the leaves, flowers and fruits of the tree, so also a man by the study and practice of a single branch of the Veda can attain the fourfold object of life, viz., dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. The Muktikopaniṣad mentions 1,180 sākhās or branches of the Veda, viz., 21 sākhās of the Ṛg-Veda, 109 of the Yajur-Veda, 1000 of the Sāma-Veda and 50 of the Atharva-Veda. Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, Viṣṇupurāṇa and other authoritative books mention approximately the same number. At present only a few branches<sup>1</sup> of the Vedas are available. The greater portion has been lost in the course of time. As an instance of the loss of Vedic texts mention may be made of the verses with which Upamanyu

(1) About 10 branches only.

is stated to have worshipped the twin gods Aświnī-kumāra in the Mahābhārata, Ādiparba, 3. 57. 68. These verses are not found in the Vedas now available.

As there was an Upaniṣad at the end of each branch, there ought to have been 1,180 Upaniṣads. About 108 Upaniṣads are however available at the present time.

It is the opinion of all ancient scholars that the Vedas were not composed by any human beings. This is what is meant by the term Apauruṣeya. In support of this view Sāyaṇāchāryya has quoted a passage from the Vedas in which the words of the Vedas are described as everlasting.<sup>1</sup> A distinction has been made between words and sound. Sounds come into existence and disappear. But words may remain before and after the sound. Vedic words exist for ever. When they are uttered sounds are produced. These sounds are temporary phenomena. Sāyaṇāchāryya has also quoted the following passage from the Smṛtis :—

“The Vedas consist of words without beginning or end. After creation they were first uttered by Brahmā”<sup>2</sup>

This passage has also been quoted by Śaṅkarāchāryya in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra 1.3.28. We find in the Śvetā-

(1) वाचा विरूपनित्यया (Rg-Veda, Samhita 8.75.6)

(2) अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयम्भुवा

śvataropaniṣad (6,18) that when the Supreme Being wanted to create the universe, He first created Brahmā<sup>1</sup> and imparted to him the knowledge of the Vedas.<sup>2</sup>

Afterwards the Vedas were revealed to the Ṛṣis who were engaged in austerities (*tapas*) Brahmā imparted to each Ṛṣi that portion of the Vedas to which he was entitled by virtue of the extent and intensity of his *tapas*. "The Ṛṣis saw the mantras".<sup>3</sup>

Śaṃkarāchāryya in his commentary on Brahmasūtra, 1. 3. 29 has quoted Ṛg-Veda-Saṃhitā 10.71.3 which states that Ṛṣis by virtue of good deeds became fit for the reception of (Vedic) words which existed in (other) Ṛṣis.<sup>4</sup>

The Ṛṣis did not compose any portion of the Vedas. It is true that in some places in the Vedas the Ṛṣis are referred to as 'mantrakṛt.' But the root 'kr', though it ordinarily denotes "to make or create" is not always used in this sense. Thus in the words Suvarṇakāra (goldsmith) and lohakāra (ironsmith) the root 'kr' does not mean "to create." The goldsmith and the ironsmith do not create gold or iron. They operate on gold

1. The distinction between Brahman and Brahma should be made carefully. Brahman is the Supreme Being. He created Brahma, who is the creator of the universe. \*

(2) यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणीति तस्यै ।

(3) ऋषयो मन्त्रद्रष्टारः ।

(4) यज्ञेन वाचः पदवीयमायन्तान्नन्वविन्दन्नपिषु प्रविष्टान् ।

and iron. So also the Ṛṣi who is a 'mantrakṛt' does not create verses but recites and teaches them.

As the Vedas were not composed by men they are free from the defects to which human compositions are subject, *viz.*, (i) error in judgment ( भ्रम ), (ii) error due to carelessness ( प्रमाद ), (iii) defective expressions ( कारणापटव ) and (iv) desire to mislead others ( विप्रलिप्सा ). Śaṅkarāchāryya says that the Vedas are the sources of all knowledge ; hence none but an All-knowing and Omnipotent Being could have been the source of the Vedas.<sup>1</sup> Brahmā created the various objects of the universe according to the names of these objects in the Vedas, *e.g.*, the sun, the moon, the earth gods, men and beasts. In his commentary on Brahmasūtra, 1. 3. 28 Śaṅkarāchāryya has quoted passages from both the Vedas<sup>2</sup> and Smṛtis<sup>3</sup> in support of this theory. Although Indra is created in every creation the idea conveyed by the word Indra is permanent, as Indra existed in previous creations also. Thus the word Indra and the idea conveyed by it are permanent, although the sound is not, nor the form of a particular Indra. Some other passages in support

(1) Commentary on Bra Su, 1.1.3 (शास्त्रयोनित्वात्) ।

(2) स भूरिति व्याहरत् स भूमिमसृजत (Tai Bra, 2.2.4.2)

(3) सर्वेषां च स नामानि कर्माणि च पृथक् पृथक् ।

वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ पृथक् संस्थान्य निर्ममे ॥ Manu, 1.21

of the doctrine that the Vedas came from God and are eternal are given below :—

“The Vedas and the Itihāsas disappeared at the time of universal destruction (Pralaya). After creation they were recovered through austerities (tapas) by the ṛṣis under the direction of Brahmā<sup>1</sup>

“From that Supreme Being the Ṛgveda, the Śāma Veda and the Yajurveda have originated”.<sup>2</sup>

“It is all true, the rituals which the sages saw in the Mantras”.<sup>3</sup> Here the reference is to the details regarding the Vedic ceremonies which are found in the Brāhmaṇa portions of the Vedas. The ṛṣis saw these details *i. e.*, these details were revealed to the ṛṣis, even as the *mantras* were revealed to them.

Portions of the Vedas are referred to as Kāthaka or Kalāpaka. It might be thought that Katha and Kalāpa were the authors of those portions. But the fact is that after the Vedas were divided into different branches (शाखा) these branches were entrusted to different persons by whose names those portions were known thereafter. Nowhere it is mentioned that any portions of the Vedas were composed by any men. Minutest details regarding the Vedas have been

1) युगान्तेऽन्तर्हितान् वेदान् सेतिहासान् महर्षयः ।

लेभिरे तपसा पूर्वमनुज्ञाता स्वयम्भुवा ॥

This passage has been quoted from Vedavyasa by Sankara-charyya in his commentary on Brahmasutra 1, 3, 29.

(2) तस्मादृचः समयजुंषि दीक्षा (Mu U. 1-2-6)

(3) तदेतत् सत्यं मन्त्रेषु कर्माणि कवयो यान्यपश्यन् (Mu U 1-2-1)

carefully preserved. If there were any authors, their names would have been carefully preserved. It cannot be said that in order to raise the Vedas in the estimation of the people, the myth was propagated that the Vedas were of divine origin. The Bhagavadgītā, Srimad Bhāgavatam, the Rāmāyaṇam are also held in the highest estimation. But nobody says that they were not written by human beings.

The Vedas contain the names of various persons and objects. It might be thought that those portions of the Vedas must have been composed after those persons were born and those objects came into existence. But that is not the case. The Vedas existed even before persons of those names were born or the objects came into existence. These persons and objects might have been named according to the names which occur in the Vedas as a man is now named Kalidāsa after the great poet. The anecdotes mentioned in the Vedas do not record any facts or events. They are illustrative of the meaning of the Vedas. Thus the story of Nachiketā in the Kāthopanishad is referred to as Sanātana upākhyānam (everlasting story) in the Upanishad itself.<sup>1</sup>

If we believe in the existence of an All-knowing and Omnipotent God, there is no reason to disbelieve in the revelation of the Vedas to

(1) नाचिकेतमुपाख्यानं सनातनं (Ka U 1-3-16)

Ṛṣis engaged in austerities (tapas) for the discovery of truth. Different portions of the Bible were composed by different persons. The divine origin of the Koran rests on the testimony of a single person. The case of the Vedas stand on a different footing. Nowhere can there be found an authentic statement that any portion of the Vedas was composed by any person. There is the testimony of a large number of seers that the Vedas were revealed to the Ṛṣis. Every syllable, every accent of the Vedas have been carefully preserved and handed down from preceptor to disciple in an unbroken chain. The Vedas for the first time in the world proclaimed the existence of an All-knowing and Omnipotent God. The Bible and the Koran came long afterwards. There is no religious principle in the Bible or the Koran which is not found in the Vedas. On the other hand there are many doctrines in the Vedas which are not found in the Bible or the Koran. We shall dwell at length on this aspect of the Vedas in Chapter XI.

The Vedas are very difficult to understand. One has to study the ṣaḍaṅga or six subjects in order to understand the Vedas. The six subjects are (1) Śikṣā (2) Kalpa (3) Vyākaraṇa (4) Nirukta (5) Chhandas and (6) Jyotiṣ. Śikṣā teaches the proper method of pronunciation. Kalpa gives details regarding the method of

performing Vedic sacrifices. Vyākaraṇa is grammar. Nirukta gives the derivative meanings of Vedic words. Chhandas deals with various metres. Jyotis is astronomy. Vedic sacrifices have to be performed at certain definite positions of the stars and planets. Hence the study of astronomy is necessary for understanding the Vedas. The six subjects are referred to as so many limbs of the Veda which has been conceived as a living being.

“The Chhandas are the legs (of the Veda-puruṣa), the Kalpa is his hands, the Jyotis is his eyes, the Nirukta is his ears, Śikṣa is the nose, the Vyākaraṇa is his mouth. By studying the Vedas with these six limbs one can go to Brahmaloḥka”. The Brahmin boy took the sacred thread at the age of eight and resided with his preceptor for many years. He learnt the Vedas by heart, studied the six subjects mentioned above and then learnt the meaning of the Vedas. Even then he could learn only the superficial meaning. There is a deep esoteric meaning of the Vedas which could be learnt only by austerities (tapas). That there is such a meaning of the Vedas would appear from the following passages :

(1) कन्दः पादौ तु वेदस्य हस्तौ कल्पोऽथ पञ्चते ।

ज्योतिषामयनं चतुर्निरुक्तं श्रोत्रसुच्यते ॥

शिखा घ्राणं तु वेदस्य मुखं व्याकरणं श्रुतं ।

तस्मात् सांगमधीत्येव ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥

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“All the Vedas lay down the means of attaining Brahman”.<sup>1</sup>

“One should know Me (God) with the help of all the Vedas”.<sup>2</sup>

Now it is well-known that a great part of the Vedas appears to consist of hymns to the minor gods Indra, Vāyu, Agni, etc., and of rules for the performance of Vedic sacrifices with the help of which one can attain heaven. How then can it be said that all the Vedas lay down the means of attaining Brahman? The fact is that the passages which apparently refer only to the means of attaining heaven have also a deeper significance. To the deep observer these sacrifices also are the means of attaining Brahman. For, in order to attain Brahman it is necessary to purify the mind. If the Vedic sacrifices are performed without any desire for attaining heaven they will purify the mind. In the course of performing the Vedic sacrifices the body and the mind become controlled, desire for enjoyment disappears and the mind becomes pure. As the Upaniṣads say (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4-4-12) “The Brahmins desire to know this Supreme Being by studying the Vedas, *performing sacrifices*, making gifts and undertaking

(1) सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमात्मनः (Ka U 1-2-15)

(2) वेदेय सर्वे रश्मेव वेद्यः (Gita 15-15)

austerities in a spirit of detachment." Thus it can be rightly said that all the passages of the Vedas refer to the means of attaining Brahman.<sup>2</sup> Sages like Vyāsa and Vālmīki, Manu and Yājñavalkya, by means of discipline and austerities (tapas), learned the deep meaning underlying the Vedas. In order that the common people who have no opportunities to study the Vedas in original, could learn the teachings of the Vedas the Ṛṣis composed the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata; the Purāṇas and the Codes of Manu, Yājñavalkya etc. Another reason why they wrote these books is that they could foresee that many portions of the Vedas would be lost in the course of time and so they preserved the main teachings of the Vedas by means of these books. The Mahābhārata says that one should know definitely the meaning of the Vedas with the help of the Itihāsas (i. e., the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata) and the Purāṇas and that one who has not studied these books is likely to misunderstand the Vedas.<sup>3</sup>

(1) तमेतं ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन

(Bri U 4-4-12)

(2) सर्वे वै देः खलु ब्रह्म अधिगम्यते । ननु उपनिषद्भागानां तथास्तु । इतरेषां तु कथं ब्रह्मविषयत्वमिति । उच्यते । यद्यपि इतरभागानां यागादिविषयत्वं तथापि बुद्धि—युक्तुत्पादनद्वारा वेदनसाधनत्वेन ब्रह्मविषयत्वं भविष्यति ।

Sayana's commentary on Rg Veda Samhita 1—164—39

(3) इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपब्रूयैत् ।

विभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्देवमासयं प्रहरेदिति ॥ Mahabharat 1-1-267

Kalidāsa in one of his famous similes in the Raghuvamśam has referred to the fact that the Smritis faithfully follow the Vedas.<sup>1</sup>

“Just as the Smritis follow the Vedas so the queen Sudakṣiṇā followed the divine cow” (Smṛiti is the name given collectively to all the books, viz., the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, the Purāṇas and the Codes of Manu, Yājñavalkya etc.)

As an illustration it may be said that the Vedas have enjoined that one should worship one's father as a deity.<sup>2</sup> Vālmīki has illustrated it in the Rāmāyaṇa by relating how Rāma gave up the kingdom and went to the forest to fulfil the word of his father. We find in the Rāmāyaṇa that after Laba and Kuśa had committed the Vedas to heart Vālmīki thought of teaching the Rāmāyaṇa to them so that they might understand the meaning of the Vedas.<sup>3</sup> The Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas have been called the fifth Veda because the teachings of all the four Vedas are to be found in them.<sup>4</sup> The Gītā which is a part of the Mahābhārata

(1) श्रुतेरिवाद्ये श्रुतिरन्वगच्छत् (Raghuvamśam 2-2)

(2) पित्रदेवो भव । (Tai U 1-11-1)

(3) स तु मेधाविनौ दृष्टा वेदेषु परिनिष्ठितौ ।

वेदीपत्रं ह्यणार्थाय तावद्याहृतं प्रभुः ॥ (Ramayana i-4-6)

(4) इतिहासपुराणं च पंचमो वेद उच्यते । (Bhagavatam 1-4-20)

contains the essence of all the Upaniṣads.<sup>1</sup> We find in the Manusamhita that whatever is laid down by Manu as dharma (duty) is contained in the Vedas.<sup>2</sup> The Vedas also state that whatever Manu said is like medicine.<sup>3</sup>

It will thus be seen that the entire literature consisting of the Vedas, the Purāṇas, the Rāmāyana, the Mahābhārata and the Codes of Manu, Yājñavalkya etc. propound a single system of religion and philosophy. It may be called the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, or the philosophy of the Vedas or the philosophy of the Hinduism. It is the philosophy on which are based the rules of conduct of the Hindus and their social customs. Where there appears to be a contradiction between the different books mentioned above or different portions of the same book, it should be possible to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. The methods of reconciliation have

(1) सर्वोपनिषदो गावो दीग्धा गोपालनन्दनः ।

पार्थो वत्सः सुधीर्भोक्ता दुग्धं गीतामृतं सृजत् ॥ Gita Mahatmyam

(2) यः कश्चित् कस्याचिद्धर्मो मनुना परिकीर्तितः ।

स सर्वोऽभिहितो वेदो—(Manu 2-7)

(3) यद्वै किञ्च मनुखदत् तद भेषजं ।

This passage occurs four times in the Vedas viz. Kathaka Samhita 11/5; Maitrayaniya Samhita 11-1-5; Taittiriya Samhita 2-2-10-2; Tandyā Brahmana 23-16-7. Saṃkara and Ramanuja in their commentaries on the Brahmasutras have both quoted this passage in order to prove that Manu attained supreme wisdom (Brahma Sutras 2-1-2 and 3).

been indicated by Jaimini in the Pūrvamīmāṃsa philosophy with reference to Vedic passages. The same methods are to be applied for the reconciliation of the entire Vedas and Smṛtis.<sup>1</sup>

What has been said above is the view of all the preceptors (āchāryyas) who have propounded different schools of Hinduism, e. g. Śaṅkarāchāryya, Rāmānuja, Madhwāchāryya, Nimbārkachāryya. These preceptors have no doubt got their differences. But they are all unanimous in holding that the Vedas are above the possibility of mistakes and that the meaning of the Vedas has been expounded in other Śāstras. Western scholars however do not accept this view. They are of opinion that there is mutual contradiction between different Śāstras and indeed between different portions of the Vedas themselves. Thus for example they hold that there is contradiction between the Karmakāṇḍa (the portion dealing with rituals) and the Jñānakāṇḍa (the portion dealing with knowledge) of the Vedas. We propose to examine in detail this question as illustrative of the hasty conclusions of western scholars and also because it has a

(1) Two important principles of reconciliation may be mentioned here (i) where two passages appear to be contradictory one of the passages should be interpreted in a figurative sense (ii) where different methods of performing an act are prescribed, either method may be adopted.

great bearing on the Upaniṣads, the subject matter of the present treatise.

The view that is generally held by the western scholars is that the authors of the Upaniṣads lost faith in the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices and that they realized the conception of One God discarding the conception of many gods which is to be found in the earlier Vedas. Thus Prof. Macdonald writes, "Though the Upaniṣads generally form a part of the Brāhmaṇas they really represent a new religion which is *in virtual oppositon* to the ritual or practical side." (History of Sanskrit Literature p. 215). Dr. Winternitz writes: "While the Brahmins were pursuing their barren sacrificial science, other circles were engaged upon those highest questions which were at last treated so admirably in the Upaniṣads. From these hermits who were not originally connected with the priestly caste proceeded the forest hermits and wandering ascetics." (History of Sanskrit Literature p. 237). Max Muller writes: "In these Upaniṣads the whole ritual or sacrificial system of the Vedas is not only ignored but directly rejected as useless, nay as mischievous. The ancient gods of the Vedas are no longer recognized" (Origin of Vedanta p. 16.)

Deussen writes: "The Atman doctrine (*i. e.* the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads) is fundamentally *opposed* to the Vedic cult of the gods

and the Brahmanical system of the ritual" (Religion and Philosophy of the Upaniṣads p.21). Garbe writes that the Brahmin priest is proficient only at "excogitating sacrifice after sacrifice, and hairsplitting definitions and explanations of senseless ritualistic hocus pocus. All at once lofty thought appears on the scene. A passionate desire to solve the riddle of the universe and its relation to one's own self holds the mind captive". Hertel says, "The Kṣattriyas unable to believe in the Vedic gods substituted instead the idea of nature powers and propounded a philosophy which was essentially a monism, atheistic, materialistic and morally indifferent". Dr. Robert Ernest Hume writes "No longer is worship or sacrifice or good conduct the requisite of religion in this life or of salvation in the next. Knowledge secures the latter and disapproves the former. The whole religious doctrine of different gods and of the necessity of sacrificing to the gods is seen to be a *stupendous fraud* by the man who has acquired metaphysical knowledge of the monistic unity of the self and of the world in Brahman or Atman" (The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads—p. 53). Again Dr. Hume writes, "Sacrifice and works of merit towards hypostatized divinities are, in the light of metaphysical knowledge, seen to be futile" (Ibid p. 54). Because the Upaniṣads declare that there is One God (Brahman), the western scholars have concluded that "the

authors of the Upaniṣads" did not, like themselves, believe in the existence of the minor gods. Because the Upaniṣads declare that the aim of life is the attainment of salvation through the knowledge of Brahman, the western scholars have concluded that "the authors of the Upaniṣads" did not believe in the efficacy of sacrifices in securing heaven. But both these inferences are illogical. The ideas of one supreme God and of many subsidiary gods are not contradictory. From the statement that one can attain Brahman through knowledge, it can not be concluded that one cannot attain heaven by means of Vedic sacrifices. We shall quote below some passages from the various Upaniṣads to show that the Upaniṣads also have asserted the existence of minor gods and have confirmed the efficacy of vedic sacrifices. In the Iṣopaniṣad we find the dying soul praying to god Agni (firegod) to lead the soul by a pleasant path.<sup>1</sup> In the Kenopaniṣad we find that Brahman appeared in a resplendent form before the gods, and that the god of fire (Agni) could not burn a straw nor could the god of air (Vāyu) move it, because Brahman willed it otherwise. It might perhaps be argued that this story is intended to teach us that Brahman alone exists and that the minor gods Agni, Vāyu etc. do not exist. But it cannot be so.

(1) अग्ने नय सुपथा राये अस्मान् (Iṣa U 18)

Because we find it stated a little later that the gods Indra, Vāyu and Agni surpass the other gods because they first perceived Brahman in close proximity.<sup>1</sup> If the conception of the minor gods is false, it cannot be said that some of these minor gods surpass the others. As regards the futility of the efforts of the minor gods it may be said that human efforts also are futile against the will of Supreme God and hence it would be as wrong to conclude that the minor gods do not exist as it would be to conclude that men also do not exist.

We find in the Kenopaniṣad that the rituals are the means of acquiring knowledge. "Austerities, self control and rituals are the foundation of the true knowledge contained in the Upaniṣads, the Vedas are the limbs, truth is the body."<sup>2</sup>

In the Kāthopaniṣad we find that the Brahmin boy Nachiketā first learns form Yama how to perform Vedic sacrifices and then gets his lessons in the knowledge of Brahman. "Oh Yama, you know how to worship the god Agni so that one may attain heaven. Please teach it to me. I have faith."<sup>3</sup>

(1) तन्माहा एते देवा अतितरामिवान्यान् देवान् यदग्निः वायुरिन्द्रः (Ke U 4-2)

(2) तस्यै तपो दमः कर्मेति प्रतिष्ठाः वेदाः सर्वाङ्गानि सत्यमायतनम् ।

(Ke U 4-8)

(3) स त्वमग्निं स्वर्ग्यं मध्ये वि सत्यो प्रवृद्धिं तं ब्रह्मधनाय मया

(Ka U 1-1-13)

When Nachitetā asks about Brahmajñāna, Yama says that the gods also desire to know Brahman (which shows that the conception of minor gods is not rejected in the Upaniṣads). “In the past the gods also wanted to know it.”<sup>1</sup>

Again the Kathopaniṣad says “All the minor gods exist in Him (Brahman).”<sup>2</sup>

“Out of fear of Brahman the god of fire gives heat, the Sun gives heat, Indra, Vāyu and the fifth god Yama perform their functions.”<sup>3</sup>

The Praśnopaniṣad says “Those who perform sacrifices and excavate tanks go to the heaven in the moon.”<sup>4</sup>

The Muṇḍakopaniṣad begins by saying that of all the minor gods, Brahmā first came into existence.<sup>5</sup>

The Muṇḍakopaniṣad categorically affirms the truth of the Vedic sacrifices :—

“All this is true, the rituals which were revealed to the sages and which were connected with the Vedic *mantras*.”<sup>6</sup>

(1) देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं किल (Ka U 1-1-21)

(2) तं देवाः सर्वेऽर्पिताः (Ka U 2-1-9)

(3) भयादस्याग्निपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः ।

भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च सृताधोवति पञ्चमः ॥ (Ka U 2-3-3)

(4) तद् ये ह वै ते इष्टापूर्ते कृतमितुपासते

ते चान्द्रमसमेव लोकमभिजयन्ते । (Pra U 1-9)

(5) ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सन्धमूव (Mu. U 1-1-1)

For the distinction between Brahman and Brahma see foot note (1) p. 15

(6) तदेतत् सत्यं मन्त्रेषु कर्माणि कवयो यान्यपश्यन् (Mu U 1-2-1)

The Muṇḍaka enjoins on the performance of Vedic sacrifices.

“You should constantly perform these sacrifices with the desire for attaining the ultimate truth.”<sup>1</sup>

Again the Muṇḍaka says :—

“They (those who perform sacrifices) enjoy the fruits thereof in heaven and then are born again in this world, or even in lower worlds.”<sup>2</sup>

“The minor gods were created out of the Supreme God.”<sup>3</sup>

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad enjoins on the performance of sacrifices.

“You should not neglect to perform the rites in honour of the gods and the ancestors.”<sup>4</sup> (The rites for the gods are the sacrifices. The rites for the ancestors are Srāddha and tarpaṇa).

Again the Taittirīya Upaniṣad says “Pursue the path of religion”<sup>5</sup> in explanation of which Śaṅkara writes. “So long as one does not realize one's identity with Brahman one should

(1) तान्याचरथ नियतं सत्यकामाः (Mu 1-2-I)

(2) नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुमृत्वा इमं लोकं ह्यनतरं वा विशन्ति

(Mu U 1-2-10)

(3) तस्माच्च देवा बहुधा सम्प्रमृताः (Mu U 2-1-7)

(4) देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यं (Tai U 1-11-2)

(5) धर्मे चर (Tai U 1-11-1)

carefully perform the rites laid down in the Vedas and Smṛtis.<sup>1</sup>

The Chhāndogyaopaniṣad says "The path of religion can be divided into three parts. Sacrifices, study and charity constitute the first part."<sup>2</sup>

The Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣad says :—

"It is this Brahman whom the Brahmins desire to know by the performance of sacrifices charity and austerities."<sup>3</sup>

From what has been said above it will be abundantly clear that in practically each of the principal Upaniṣads belief in the existence of the minor gods as well as in the efficacy of sacrifices has been affirmed. It may perhaps be considered that the Upaniṣads do not represent one consistent view throughout, and although the passages quoted above may support the belief in the existence of many gods and in the efficacy of sacrifices there are other passages which deny the efficacy of sacrifices. I shall therefore examine those passages which have been quoted in support of the view expressed by the western scholars. One such passage is quoted below.

(1) प्राग् ब्रह्मात्मप्रतिबोधान्नियमेन अनुष्ठेयानि श्रौतस्मार्त कर्माणि

(Samkara bhasya Tai U 1.11-1)

(2) तयो धर्मस्तन्माः यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमः (Chh U 2-23-1)

(3) तमेतं ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन

(Bri U 4-4-22)

“These sacrifices are like frail crafts. Those who hail them as best have again to fall victims to old age and death.” This passage merely states that one cannot avoid rebirth by means of sacrifices. It does not imply that one cannot go to heaven by performing sacrifices. What is meant here is that by performing sacrifices, one can attain heaven, but one cannot remain in heaven for ever; as soon as the merit acquired by performing sacrifices and other good acts is exhausted one has to leave heaven and be born again; hence the highest aim of life cannot be the attainment of heaven by the performance of sacrifices, it should be the attainment of salvation by the knowledge of Brahman. The passage quoted above occurs in the second part of the first Mundaka. The very first verse of this part affirms that the sacrifices are true and enjoins on their performance.<sup>2</sup> It will thus be seen that this passage does not discard the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. Another passage which is quoted in support of the theory that the Upaniṣads condemn sacrifices occurs in Bṛhadāraṇyaka. It states

(1) प्रवा स्येते अहदा यज्ञरूपाः अष्टादशीत्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।

एतच्छ्रेयो ये प्रवेदयन्ति मृदा जराश्रया ते पुनरेवापि यन्ति

(Mu U 1-2-7)

(2) The relevant portion of the verse has been quoted in foot note (6) p. 30.

that the man who performs sacrifices conduces to the benefit of the gods as a domestic animal is beneficial to a man.<sup>1</sup> Later on it is stated that if a man attains knowledge of Brahman he ceases to perform sacrifices, the gods do not like it as they are thereby deprived of the offerings, hence the gods try to put obstacles to a man's attempts to attain knowledge of Brahman. Surely this passage does not deny the existence of minor gods, nor does it deny the efficacy of sacrifices in attaining heaven. It harps on the central note of the Upaniṣads that the attainment of salvation is the highest aim of life and that the attainment of heaven by the performance of sacrifices is a much lower aim.

As regards the statement of Dr. Winternitz quoted above that those who discussed the philosophical questions of the Upaniṣads formed a group different from those who performed Vedic sacrifices, we may mention that the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad states that king Janaka was performing a sacrifice and that the Brahmins who assembled there discussed philosophical questions.<sup>2</sup> Similarly in the Chhândogyanopaniṣad we find that the sage Uṣasti went to the king who was performing a sacrifice and established the superiority of his philoso-

(1) यथा पशुरेव स देवानां (Bri U 8-4-10)

(2) Bri U 3rd chapter.

phical knowledge and that he was then requested by the king to officiate as priest.<sup>1</sup> It will thus be seen that the same persons both performed Vedic sacrifices and discussed philosophical questions. The statement of Dr. Winternitz is therefore not correct.

Far from the Upaniṣads revealing any disrespect for the knowledge contained in the earlier portion of the Vedas (viz the Saṃhitās) the Upaniṣads frequently quote passages from the Saṃhitās as authority for statements made in the Upaniṣads, introducing such passages with remarks like these—"Thus we find the following verse in the Vedas."<sup>2</sup> The Upaniṣads never arrogate to themselves a position superior to the Saṃhitās (or the earlier portions of the Vedas). The knowledge contained in the Upaniṣads is nowhere paraded as new discoveries. On the other hand it is expressly stated that this knowledge has been handed down from preceptor to disciple in a long chain whose first link was contemporary with the beginning of creation. Thus it is stated at the beginning of the Muṇḍakopaniṣad that the knowledge contained therein was taught by Brahmā, the creator of the universe, to his son Atharvā, Atharvā taught it to Angirā,

(1) Chha U I, 10 and 11.

(2) तदेतद्वचाऽमुक्तं (Pra U. 1.7. Mu. U. 3.2.10)

तदेवः श्लोकः (Pra U. 1.10, 4-10, 6-5)

Angirā to Satyavāha, Satyavāha taught it to Angiras, Angiras to Śaunaka. The *Isopaniṣad* also states that the knowledge contained in it was handed down from preceptor to disciple.

“We have heard this from the wise men who have taught us.”<sup>1</sup>

Again, there is no justification for the supposition that those sages who composed the *Samhitā* portion of the Vedas had no idea of one Supreme God. References to the Supreme God are to be found in many places in the *Samhitās*. In the *Nāsadīyasūkta* (*Rg Veda Samhitā* 10.129) we find the following :

“(During the time of pralaya) the Supreme God alone existed. *Māyā* remained merged in Him. There was nothing except Him.”<sup>2</sup> Again, in the same *sūkta* we find “The Supreme God who controls the entire universe remains in the transcendental region.”<sup>3</sup> In the *Hiraṇyagarbhasūkta* (*Rg Veda Samhitā* 10.121) we find the following passages :

“The commands of the Supreme God are obeyed by the minor gods.”<sup>4</sup>

“By His Majesty He (the Supreme God) was the sole king of the Universe.”<sup>5</sup>

(1) इति यजुम धीराणां येनसद्विचचच्चिरे I. (U. 10 and 13)

(2) आनौदवातं स्वधया तदेकं तस्माद्धान्यन्न परः किंचनास  
(Rg V. S. 10-129-2)

(3) योऽस्याध्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् (Rg VS 10-129-7)

(4) उपासते प्रशिष्यं यस्य देवाः (Rg VS 10-121-2)

(5) संहित्वा एक इदं राजा जगती बभूव (Rg VS 10-121-3)

“Who was the one God over all the gods.”<sup>1</sup>

The following passages occur in the Puruṣa-sūkta (Ṛg Veda Saṁhitā 10.90).

“He has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a thousand legs (*i. e.* the heads, eyes etc., of all beings are His heads, His eyes and His legs—Sāyana) He covers the entire universe and transcends the universe by the greater portion of His Being.”<sup>2</sup>

“That Being is all this universe, all that was, all that will be.”<sup>3</sup>

“The entire universe is the manifestation of His power. He is superior to all this. All beings form a fourth part of Him. His three parts are imperishable and remain in Heaven.”<sup>4</sup>

Again we find in the Ṛg Veda Saṁhitā. “It is the one Being whom the wise call by various names, Indra, Yama, Vayu”.<sup>5</sup>

The 10th Maṇḍal of the Ṛg-Veda Saṁhitā contains the following line:—

“Who is our father, creator and the maker of our destinies”.<sup>6</sup>

(1) यो देवेष्वधिदेव एक आसीत् (Ṛg VS 10-121-8)

(2) सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपादः ।

स भूमिं सर्वती इत्यात्यतिष्ठद्दृशांगुलम् ॥ (Ṛg VS 10-90-1)

(3) पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यदभूतं यच्च भव्यं । (Ṛg VS 10-90-2)

(4) एतावानस्य स हि मातो ज्यायांश्च पुरुषः ।

पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि विपादस्यामृतं दिवि ॥ Rg vs 10-90-0

(5) एकं सद्विधा बहुधा वदन्ति

इन्द्रं यमं मातरिश्वाणमाहुः । Rg V S 2-2-32

(6) यो नः पिता जनिता यो विधाता । Rg V S 10-82-3

It cannot thus be said that the "authors" of the Saṁhitā portion of the Vedas could not conceive of one Supreme God and that their power of imagination was confined to various minor deities. In fact both in the Saṁhitās and the Upaniṣads we find mention of One Supreme God as well as many minor deities, the idea being that the minor deities were created by the Supreme God. There is nothing illogical in the conception of the Supreme God having created the minor deities. The minor deities are a class of beings like men and animals—of course a much higher class of beings—on whom were conferred higher powers and greater responsibilities.

There is thus no basis for the statement of western scholars that there is mutual contradiction between the Jñānakāṇḍa and the Karmakāṇḍa of the Upaniṣads.

Western scholars who are unfamiliar with Vedic traditions may be pardoned for having misunderstood the Vedas. But it is a matter of great regret that many prominent modern scholars of India, following no doubt the lead of the western scholars, have made the same mistake in such a fundamental matter.

Thus Prof. Hirianna of the Mysore University writes, "The Upaniṣads primarily represent a spirit different from and even hostile to ritual and embody a theory of the universe

quite distinct from the one that underlies the sacrificial teaching of the Brāhmaṇas" (Indian Philosophy p. 48.)

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta of the Calcutta University writes, "The Upaniṣads are an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as indicating the path of knowledge (Jñānamārga) as *opposed* to the path of work (karmamārga). \* \* The Upaniṣads do not require the performance of any action but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality." (History of Indian Philosophy p. 28).

The path of knowledge is not opposed to the path of work. On the other hand the path of work leads to the path of knowledge. The Upaniṣads do require the performance of acts (देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम् Tai U 1-11-2 )

Prof. R. D. Ranade of the Allahabad University writes, "The spirit of Upaniṣads is on the other hand, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antagonistic to the sacrificial doctrine of the Brāhmaṇas." (Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy p. 6).

The Upaniṣads require the performance of sacrifices for the purification of the mind. What Prof. Ranade has stated to be exceptions is the general rule.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan of the Benares Hindu University writes regarding the origin of the

Upaniṣads, "Men sat down to doubt the gods they ignorantly worshipped and reflected on the mysteries of life. \* \* From primitive polytheism to systematic philosophy it is a long, long way. (Indian Philosophy p. 71-72).

The Upaniṣads refer to the Saṃhitās with great veneration and not as the product of ignorance. If the Saṃhitās are polytheistic the Upaniṣads also are polytheistic as both Saṃhitās and Upaniṣads refer to the existence of minor deities as well as the Supreme God.

Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherji of the Lucknow University writes "Indeed the Upaniṣads really expound a new religion which is *opposed* to the sacrificial ceremonial." (Hindu Civilisation ; p. 118).

The statement that there is contradiction between the Vedas and Purāṇas, or between the Vedas and Dharmaśāstras (the codes of Manu, Yājñavalkya etc.) is equally groundless. In some places words have been used in a figurative sense and hence there appears to be a contradiction which does not really exist. In some places different rules have been laid down for different circumstances. As Manu says "Where there appears to be a contradiction between two passages of the Vedas or between two passages of Smritis it should

be understood that the difference is due to difference in circumstances.”<sup>1</sup>

As regards the Upaniṣads all apparent contradictions and inconsistencies have been reconciled in the Brahmasūtras compiled by the sage Bādarayana who is stated to be the same as Vedavyāsa. The Brahmasūtras are therefore also referred to as the Vyāsasūtras. The sūtras are more than 400 in number and have been divided into 4 parts, each part being divided into 4 chapters. They deal primarily with the nature of the supreme soul and the individual soul. They contain replies to the attacks made on Vedānta philosophy by other systems (e. g., Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha, Jaina.) They point out defects in those systems. They also deal with the creation of the universe, the various adjuncts of the soul (e. g., the mind, intelligence, the organs of sense), the state of the soul after death, the means of attaining Brahman, the state of the soul after attaining Brahman. The conclusions given in the Brahmasūtras rest on the Upaniṣads. Reference is also made in the Brahmasūtras to the other portions of the Vedas and the Smritis. The preceptors of different schools of Hinduism (e. g., Śaṅkarāchāryya, Rāmānujāchāryya, Madhvāchāryya) have written commentaries on the Brahmasūtras.

(1) श्रुतेर्द्वे श्रुतेर्द्वे स्थलभेदः प्रकल्पितः ।

All the preceptors agree that the Brahmasūtras have given the correct interpretation of the Upaniṣads. Although there is some difference in the interpretations given by different preceptors, there is a great deal which is common to all of them.

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## CHAPTER III

### Different Means of Knowledge

A means of acquiring knowledge is called a Pramāṇa.<sup>1</sup> Various kinds of pramāṇa are recognized in different schools of Hindu Philosophy. The Cārvākas admit only one kind of pramāṇa *viz.* pratyakṣa or direct knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas admit two pramāṇas,—pratyakṣa and anumāna or inference. According to the Sāṅkhyas and also the Viśiṣṭadwaita school of Vedānta philosophy there are three pramāṇas, *viz.* pratyakṣa, anumāna and Śabda (*i. e.* testimony). According to the Nyāya school there are four pramāṇas, *viz.* the above three and Upamāna (comparison). The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā Philosophy recognizes five pramāṇas, *viz.* the above four and arthāpatti (*i. e.* axioms or self-evident truths). The Advaita Vedāntins recognize six pramāṇas by adding to the above five pramāṇas another, called anupalabdhi (*i. e.* non-perception).

We shall examine the above terms more fully. The acquirement of a knowledge may depend upon several things. That which contributes most to this purpose is called the pramāṇa. This

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(1) प्रतीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम् *viz.* that by means of which knowledge is acquired.

is what is meant by the statement that the pramāṇa is the karaṇa by means of which knowledge is acquired, for the word karaṇa means the most important means<sup>1</sup> Gautama the founder of the Nyāya philosophy defined pratyakṣa knowledge as that which arises from the contact of senses (indriyas) with objects (viṣayas). Gangesa Upādhyāya the founder of the Navya Nyāya school of philosophy considered the above definition defective. For if the above definition be accepted memory would be included in pratyakṣa for in memory there is contact between mind which is internal sense (antarindriya) with the object remembered. So he defines pratyakṣa knowledge to be such knowledge as is not derived from any other knowledge. In other words pratyakṣa is direct or immediate knowledge. Memory depends on a previous knowledge. So also inference. Thus memory and inference are excluded from pratyakṣa.<sup>2</sup> According to Navya Nyāya philosophy pratyakṣa is immediate knowledge derived through some sense. But Vedānta says that pratyakṣa is no doubt immediate knowledge, but it is not necessarily derived through a sense. For God has pratyakṣa knowledge of everything. But He has no sense.<sup>3</sup>

(1) साधकतमं करणम् ।

(2) The Six Ways of Knowing by Dr. D. M. Datta, M.A., Ph. D.

(3) न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते । Svetaswataropanisad.

The organs of sense can not be seen by us. Thus the organ of sight is not the eyeball. It is a fine substance located in the eyeball. Similarly the organ of hearing is a fine substance located in the ear. According to modern science when we see an object, rays of light come from the object and strike our eye producing an inverted image on the retina. According to Vedānta the organ of sight flows out from the eye and takes the shape of the object. There is no unavoidable contradiction between the two theories. In fact they may be taken to be complementary to each other. Modern science does not explain why although all images are formed on the retina of our eyes, we perceive different objects in different directions and at different distances. The theory of Vedānta explains these features. Let us state the Vedantic theory in greater details. Along with the organ of sight our mind also flows out of the body and takes the shape of the object. Caitanya (consciousness) is reflected in the mind so shaped. We then have knowledge of the object. Caitanya is in essence the same thing as knowledge. Thus the Vedantic theory explains why we have knowledge of a particular shape outside our body. It is because our knowledge (caitanya) takes that particular shape. Modern science can not explain it. As we have said before we can combine the two theories. We can then say

that if rays of light from outside strike our retina, then our organ of sight will flow out. If rays do not strike the retina, the organ will not flow out. That is why we can not see in the dark. Let us here quote from Dr. D. M. Datta's "The Six Ways of Knowing".

"The mystery of how a small inverted image of the object on the retina makes us see the physical object great or small distant or near in the external world is too great to be ignored by any enquiring unsophisticated mind. This difficulty has been realized by some idealistic thinkers of the West". (P. 44) Dr. Datta then goes on to state that the solution of this difficulty by the subjective idealist is that we do not really see anything outside us, and that what we perceive is an idea or perception. He observes that this solution is unsatisfactory for even subjectivists can not deny the fact that what we see is not a small retinal picture inside our eyes, but something quite different from it in size and quality. As stated before the solution of this difficulty may be found in the Vedāntic theory of vision.

If may appear at first sight that the Vedāntic theory of vision can not be reconciled with the phenomenon of the reflection of an object in the mirror. We see the object behind the mirror whereas the object lies in front of the mirror. How then can it be said that our sense organ

and mind go to the object and take its shape ? Physics explains the phenomenon by saying that when a ray of light is bent before it reaches our eyes the image is formed in the direction which the ray of light takes when it enters the eye. In the Vedāntic theory also it may be stated that the organ of sight as it flows out from the eye is bent like a ray of light on reaching the mirror but the organ is unconscious of the change of direction and thinks that it perceives the object behind the mirror. Such image of an object where it does not exist is called a *prātibhāṣika* object.

As stated before according to Vedānta our mind flows out with the organ of sight and takes the shape of the object and our soul or consciousness is reflected in the mind. The question arises, What is the necessity of saying that there is a mind apart from the soul and the organ of sight ? Can not the phenomenon of seeing be explained by the existence of the soul and the organ of sight without admitting the existence of a third object, *viz.* the mind ? A little consideration will show the necessity of admitting the existence of the mind apart from the soul and the organ of sight. Sometimes we are absent-minded and do not see an object remaining within our vision although our organ of sight is not defective. If the soul and organ of sight had been sufficient for perceiving the

existence of an object it can not be explained how it happens. The occurrence of such events indicates that for the purpose of perceiving an object we require not only the soul and the organ of sight but also another thing *viz.* the mind. There is the famous example of Śakuntalā. She was sitting in the hermitage lost in the contemplation of her husband living far away in the capital. The irate sage Durvāsā comes to the hermitage and, seeing that Śakuntalā does not notice him, shouts loudly announcing his presence. Śakuntalā does not hear. The sage curses her and goes away. Śakuntalā did not see nor hear the sage because her mind was far away. We are also sometimes absent-minded (though not to the same extent as Śakuntalā) and do not see objects before us. The Vedas say "My mind was elsewhere and hence I did not see; my mind was elsewhere—and hence I did not hear. One sees with the mind. One hears with the mind." It is true that western philosophers generally make no distinction between the soul and the mind. But it will appear from what has been stated above that the analysis by the Indian philosophers was more thoroughgoing. According to the Vedānta philosophy the mind is different from soul, the mind being inanimate while

(5) अन्यतमनाः अभुवन् न अदर्शन्, अन्यतमनाः अभुवन् न अश्रीषन्, मनसा एव हि पश्यति, मनसा एव हि शृणोति ।

the soul is animate. In the Gita the Lord says that the human soul is a part of God and it takes out from the Prakriti the five organs of sense *viz.* sight, hearing, touch taste and smell as well as the mind which is the sixth organ of sense.<sup>1</sup> Again while enumerating the various objects of inanimate nature the Lord mentions ten plus one organs of sense<sup>2</sup> The ten other organs referred to here are the five organs of knowledge *viz.* sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell and the five organs of action *viz.* hand, foot, speech, anus and sex. The Kathopanishad compares the various parts of the human personality with the parts of a chariot and the charioteer. The soul is like the rider of a chariot, the body is like the chariot, buddhi (the faculty of arriving at a definite conclusion) is like the charioteer; the mind is like the reins; the organs of sense are like the horses the objects of sense are like the fields.

We have so far been examining one means of knowledge, *viz.* 'pratyakṣa.' Let us now examine another means of knowledge, 'anumāna' or inference. We see smoke on a hill from

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(१) समेवांशी जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ।

मनःषष्ठान्दीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥ गीता १५।७

(२) इन्द्रियाणि दशैकं च पञ्च चेन्द्रियगोचराः । गीता १२।५

a distance and we conclude that there is fire on the hill. How do we get the knowledge that there is fire although we do not see it? It is by the process of anumāna or inference. From experience we have the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. We see the smoke on the hill. We have no doubt that there is fire on the hill. The process of inference has been examined in great detail in the Nyāya philosophy. The fineness of the analysis which can be found in the Nyāya philosophy is perhaps unique in the world.

According to Vedānta philosophy there are three links in an inference which are illustrated by the example given below :—

1. There is fire in the hill,
2. Because there is smoke on it,
3. Whatever has smoke has also fire,  
as for example, an oven.

The first is the proposition to be proved called the pratijnā, The second is the reason in support of the proposition, called the hetu. The third is the universal proposition with an example called the udāharana. The Nyāya philosophy adds two more links, viz. Upanaya "There is smoke on the hill" and Nigamana "Hence there is fire on the hill." They are practically repetitions of the second and first link mentioned above and are therefore con-

sidered to be unnecessary in the Vedānta philosophy. Dr Brojendra Nath Seal in his *Positive Sciences of the Hindus* remarks that the occurrence of the example in the Indian system of logic distinguishes it from the system of Aristotle. In order to establish the universal proposition, 'Whatever has smoke, has also fire' one may examine different cases where there is smoke and satisfy oneself that there is fire in all these cases. This is called the process of anvaya. One may also in support of the same universal proposition examine different cases and satisfy oneself that where there is no fire, there can be no smoke. This is called the process of Vyatireka.

We shall now examine a third means of knowledge *viz.* Śabda. When we hear some words, we derive a knowledge. What is the process by means of which a collection of sounds gives rise to an idea? Let us first consider how when we hear a word its meaning appears in our mind. A word is a collection of sounds uttered in a definite order. Each of these sounds produces a separate impression on our mind. When all the sounds which make up the word are heard we know the meaning. According to Nyāya philosophy we cannot remember at the same time all the sounds which make up a word in the order in which they are uttered. After

we hear all the sounds an impression is produced on us which is called 'Sphota.' From that impression we derive the meaning of the word. But according to Vedānta philosophy it is not necessary to introduce a new concept, that of Sphota, as our mind has the capacity of apprehending all the sounds in their consecutive order at the same time, and from such comprehension the meaning of the word arises in our mind. Just as our mind has the faculty of conceiving at the same time a number of men proceeding in a procession along with the order in which the men proceed, so also it can conceive at the same time a number of sounds along with the order in which the sounds occur.

Another question which has been discussed by Hindu philosophers is whether a word denotes a particular object (vyakti) or the general form of a class of objects (ākṛiti) or or the essential attributes of a class of objects (jāti). According to Sāṃkhya philosophy a word signifies a particular individual. The Jaina philosophers hold that a word denotes the general form of a class of objects (ākṛiti). But according to Vedānta philosophy a word denotes the essential attributes of a number of things (Jāti). Sometimes the form may be the most important attribute and then the word may denote the form.

Whatever may be the actual process by which we derive knowledge from sounds, the fact remains that we derive such knowledge. In some cases we have no doubt about the correctness of such knowledge. We may not have been to a foreign country. We hear many things from some body who has gone there. Thus we know many things about foreign lands. The radio announces daily events happening all over the world and from the sounds in the radio we have knowledge about these events and undoubted knowledge also.

We have mentioned above three principal sources of knowledge *viz.* pratyakṣa anumāna and Śabda. There remain three other less important sources *viz.* upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. Upamāna means similarity. There is a species of wild cow called gavaya which has not got the characteristic dewlap of the cow. When we see a gavaya in the forest we say "The gavaya is like the cow". This may be called pratyakṣa knowledge. But if we also say that "The cow is like the gavaya" it can not be said to be pratyakṣa because we do not see the cow at that time,—we see only the gavaya. The knowledge "the cow is like the gavaya" is said to be derived through the upamāna which is recognized to be a means of knowledge separate from the other three mentioned above, *viz.* pratyakṣa, anumāna and

śabda. Those schools of philosophy which do not recognize that upamāna is a different means of knowledge want to include it in some one of the pramāṇas mentioned above. Some say that it is really an example of anumāna and say that the full syllogism māy be expressed thus :—

That object to which another object is similar is also similar to the other object.

Cow is an object to which the gavaya bears similarity.

Hence the cow is similar to the gavaya.

The Advaita Vedāntin admits the correctness of this argument. But he holds that as a matter of fact people do not argue according to this formal syllogistic process. When they perceive that the gavaya is like the cow they conclude that the cow is like the gavaya. They may not have considered at all the general proposition that every object to which another object is similar is similar to that other object. Other objectors say that upamāna is really included in pratyakṣa pramāṇa. When we see a gavaya we perceive the points of similarity between a cow and a gavaya. The perception of this similarity may be expressed either by saying that the cow is like the gavaya or by saying that the gavaya is like the cow. Another group of objectors say that when on seeing a gavaya we realize that the cow is like the gavaya although at that time we do not see the cow, we derive

our knowledge of the subject from memory and that of the predicate from perception and that it is therefore unnecessary to assume an independent *pramāṇa viz. upamāna*. The Advaita Vedantists however give their replies to these objections and maintain that *upamāna* is an independent means of knowledge.

We now come to another means of knowledge *viz. Anupalabdhi*. We sit in a well-lighted room and looking round for a pot find that there is no pot in the room. What is the process by which we derive the knowledge "there is no pot in the room?" When there is a pot our organ of sense flows out of our eye, unites with the pot and we derive the knowledge, "Here is a pot." When there is no pot, no such thing happens. How then do you derive the knowledge "There is no pot in the room?" According to Advaita Vedānta, this knowledge is derived through a new *pramāṇa* called *anupalabdhi*. From the fact that we do not perceive a pot although there is light in the room and although our eyesight is normal, we derive the knowledge "There is no pot in the room." Those who do not admit the existence of a separate *pramāṇa* try to explain the perception of the non-existence of the pot from the fact of perception of the bare ground (*i.e.* ground on which there is no pot). According to them *anupalabdhi* is included in *pratyakṣa*. According to another group of objectors (*viz.*

Naiyāyikas) non-existence of the jar is not identical with the existence of the bare ground, but is an adjective of the ground which can be perceived even as other objectives like its colour, shape etc. can be perceived. These objections are not accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins who say that the nonexistence of the pot is not identical with the existence of the bare ground, because every time we perceive the bare ground we do not perceive the nonexistence of all the things which do not exist there, or again the ground may not be bare, *e. g.* there may be a cloth on the ground but not any pot. Again nonexistence of the pot can not be said to be derived from *pratyakṣa* as such nonexistence cannot be perceived by the sense. In order that an object may be perceived by the sense there should be contact of the sense with that object. There may be contact of the sense with existent objects only and not with nonexistent objects.

There remains for us to consider one more kind of *pramāna* called *arthāpatti*. The stock example of *arthāpatti* is as follows.

Devadatta is fat, he does not eat during day, therefore he eats at night.

We know a fact that Devadatta is fat. We know also that he does not eat during day. We have then no doubt that he eats at night for if he did not eat at night he

could not be fat as he does not eat during day. Arthāpatti is the process by which in order to explain a known fact we have to postulate something. This sort of reasoning cannot be reduced to anumāna in which from the existence of a sign or indication we infer the existence of the object of which it is the sign.

We have briefly indicated the nature of the six different kinds of pramāna. Of these pratyakṣa which occurs first is of constant and universal application. It may appear at first that pratyakṣa is the best means of getting infallible knowledge. If some one doubts my statement we say, "I have seen it with my own eyes". But a little reflection will show that the knowledge which we derive from pratyakṣa cannot be always relied upon. We see the sun like a plate in size. But the astronomer tells us that it extends over millions of miles. We do not see any living beings in the air or in the water in a tumbler. But the scientist says that the air and water are full of microbes. The knowledge about the size of the sun and the existence of microbes is derived from the testimony of the astronomer and the scientist. Such knowledge is Śabda pramāna. In these cases Śabda pramāna gives more correct knowledge than pratyakṣa pramāna. Due to defects or limitations of our organs of sense there may be mistakes in pratyakṣa pramāna. If

in Śabda pramāṇa the person who gives the testimony is competent and trustworthy the knowledge derived from his testimony is more reliable.

We shall now discuss how for the various kinds of pramāṇa are applicable in deriving knowledge of Brahman. Brahman cannot be seen or heard. Hence pratyakṣa pramāṇa can not ordinarily produce knowledge of Brahman. He can however be directly perceived by the mind when the mind is purified, and properly controlled, when there is no desire for enjoyment of the senses, when the mind is free from anger and passions. When the mind is free from desire it ceases to be mind and becomes one with buddhi (intelligence). Mind and buddhi are different phases of the same substance *viz.* antahkarāṇa. Saṁkalpa (desire) and vikalpa (hesitation) are the functions of the mind, while decision and determination are the functions of the buddhi. In other words when the antahkarāṇa has desire and hesitation it is called mind, when it makes a definite decision or determination it is called buddhi. As stated above when the mind is free from desire it can perceive Brahman. When the mind is free from desire it practically ceases to be mind and as the 'antahkarāṇa' has definite decision or determination (decision that God is the only reality and determination that one must attain Him) it may be called

buddhi. That is why both the statements have been made *viz.* Brahman can be perceived by the mind and Brahman can be perceived by buddhi<sup>1</sup>. It is direct perception and hence pratyakṣa. But, as stated above, the ordinary man cannot have pratyakṣa vision of God. It is only by means of prolonged discipline and practice that one becomes competent to have pratyakṣa vision of God and that is the aim of the Vedantist.

We now come to anumāna. One form of anumāna which may be used to prove the existence of Brahman is as follows.

All objects have a maker, *e. g.* a pot.

The universe is an object.

Hence the universe has a maker.

The name of this maker of the universe is Brahman. Various objections have been urged against this kind of anumāna. It has been said, why should it be assumed that all objects of the universe have the same maker? Different objects may have been created by different (minor) gods like Indra, Vāyu and Varuṇa. What is the justification for assuming that there is an Allknowing Almighty God who has created the universe? There may of course be replies to such objections. Fresh objections may be raised against such replies.

(1) मनसैर्वेदमाप्तव्यम् Ka U 4-11

दृश्यते त्वया वा बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः Ka U 3-12

This sort of argument may go on without end if the parties are clever enough. In his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2-1-11, Saṃkarāchāryya has said that by mere argument it is not possible to establish the existence of Brahman. The existence of Brahman has to be known from the words of the Vedas. With the help of arguments we can ascertain the correct meanings of the various passages of the Vedas. This is the proper scope of the use of arguments.

The Brahmasūtra referred to above (*viz.* 2-1-11) has been interpreted by Rāmānuja in a different manner. But the opinions expressed by Saṃkarāchāryya in his commentary on this Brahmasūtra have also been expressed by Rāmānuja in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 1, 1, 3. It may be urged, he says, that as God has no body, it is not possible for him to create the universe, for we do not see any instance in which one who has no body can create any thing. Nor can it be concluded that there must be a living being controlling the entire universe. For there may be inanimate objects which are not controlled by any living beings *e. g.*, a cart or a stone. In this way all arguments in favour of the existence of God can be refuted. The existence of God must be based on the authority of the Vedas. As stated above there can be no possibility

of mistake in the Vedas,—as the Vedas have not been composed by men.

So according to both these āchāryyas it is not possible to establish the existence of Brahman, far less to know Brahman, by means of anumāna or inference. The only means of knowing that Brahman exists is the words of the Vedas. The Vedas say that Brahman exists ; hence we have the knowledge that Brahman exists. The knowledge which we derive from testimony may be defective if there is any defect in the person who testifies. Such defect may arise out of incompetency of testifier to know correctly, or his desire to mislead, or his inability to express correctly. None of these defects can occur in the testimony of the Vedas. For according to one school (the Mīmāṃsīnakas) the Vedas are not the compositions of any being, while according to another school (the Vedāntists) the Vedas originated from Brahman. According to both these schools the Vedas are everlasting. They \* exist from time without beginning and will exist for time without end. If the Vedas had been composed by human beings, there would have been the possibility of mistakes. As the Vedas were not composed by any being, or were composed by Omnipotent Brahman who knows everything and is the source of all that is good, there cannot be any intentional or unintentional mistake in the

Vedas. When the Vedas say that there is Brahman, we can take it that there is no doubt that Brahman exists.

If the Vedas had been composed by any persons a tradition to that effect would have been surely handed down. The seers (ṛṣis) whose names are associated with different portions of the Vedas did not compose those portions, but were the persons to whom those portions of the Vedas had been revealed.<sup>1</sup> From the ṛṣis the Vedas have been handed down in an unbroken line of disciples, each of whom heard the Vedas from his preceptor and repeated them to the disciples. If a book is copied by hand mistakes might creep in. But no mistakes can creep in this system of oral instruction. The teacher would not be satisfied till he found that the pupil had learnt correctly and could repeat correctly. An entire class of society (*viz* the Brahmins) had practically been set apart for thus preserving the Vedas. Those who learnt the Vedas were looked upon with veneration. They were fed in religious ceremonies. Gifts were made to them. All that was possible was done to ensure that the knowledge derived from divine sources was not contaminated by contact with human beings.

There have always been some persons who

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(१) ऋषयो मन्त्रदत्तारः ।

disbelieved in the Vedas. We find in the Rāmāyaṇa that when Rāma was in the Citrakūta forest a Brahmin named Jābāli tried to persuade Rāma to return to Ayodhya by saying that life after death as laid down in the Vedas is all false, and that the Vedas were written by men who wanted to eke out a living by cheating others and making them perform sacrifices and make gifts (Vālmiki's Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa 108th Chapter). Rāma indignantly refused to accept the counsel of Jābāli and asserted that those who preached against the Vedas were never honoured in respectable society and that the Vedas were based on truth (Ibid, Chapter 109). This is also the opinion of Śrī Kṛṣṇa (Gita 16,24) as well as of Vyāsa, Vālmiki, S'aṃkarāchāryya, Rāmānujācharyya, Caitanya and other saints and scholars. Buddha and Mahāvira were probably the only saints who did not believe in the Vedas. We shall deal later with the defects in their arguments.

If the Vedas are true there cannot be any contradiction between different portions of the Vedas. The method of reconciling apparent discrepancies between different portions of the Vedas (including the Upaniṣads) has been explained in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, two out of the six systems of the philosophy of the Hindus. The former was written by

Jaimini and deals mainly with the Vedic rituals. The latter has already been referred to in chapter II p. 41. It is a comprehensive system of philosophy based on the Upaniṣads. As it deals entirely with the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta it is also known as the Vedānta philosophy. All the different schools of Hindu religion are agreed that the true meaning of the Upaniṣads has been correctly interpreted in the Uttara Mimāṃsā philosophy.

Some modern writers have expressed the view that it is a drawback of Vedānta philosophy that the authority of the Upaniṣads has been quoted in support of statements made therein. They think that the philosophy would have been more valuable if appeal had been made to reason and argument instead of to passages of the Upaniṣads. But these critics overlook the fundamental viewpoint of the Upaniṣads. According to the Upaniṣads the nature of Brahman is so difficult to understand, it is so unlike other objects, that reason and argument are of no avail in comprehending it. Unless Brahman reveals His own nature we cannot know Him. Brahman has revealed His nature through the Upaniṣads and hence in the system of philosophy dealing with Brahman appeal must be made to passages of the Upaniṣads. If attempts were made to determine the nature of Brahman by means of reason and argument without

reference to passages in the Upaniṣads they would not be successful. Practical experience shows the wisdom of the position taken up in Vedānta. While philosophers who have based their arguments on pure reason have not been able to come to any definite conclusion about the existence of God, all the different schools of Vedānta philosophy assert that Brahman does exist and He can be realized. There is also plenty of scope for difference in thinking within the limits of Vedānta philosophy which comprises scholars like Saṁkara who maintain that Brahman is without any form or attribute to saints like Caitanya who have held that Brahman possesses the most beautiful form and an infinite number of good attributes. If one goes through the philosophical writings of various schools of Vedānta one can realize that reasoning has not been cramped by the faith in the infallibility of the Upaniṣads.

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## CHAPTER IV

### Creation of the Universe

For the creation of an object two things are necessary,—a living person who creates, and an ingredient out of which the object is created. Thus for the creation of a pot we want a potter and clay. The potter is the active agent (nimitta Kāraṇa). The clay is the material (upādāna kāraṇa). If there is a potter, but no material (clay) he cannot produce a pot. On the other hand if there is clay but no potter, we can have no pot. We require both the potter and the clay; both the active agent and the ingredient.

That God is the active agent who has created the universe practically all religions which admit the existence of God agree in saying. Hinduism says so, as well as Christianity and Mahomedanism. But what is the material out of which God created the universe?

One possible hypothesis is that the universe was created out of nothing. Before creation there was God. There was nothing else. Out of this nothing, God created the universe. This seems to be the theory in Christian and Muslim theology. But the Upaniṣads contradict

this theory and assert that nothing can be created out of nothing. "In this respect some say that at first there was only nothing, and from that nothing came out the universe. But, dear one, how can that be? How can something real be created out of nothing? The fact is, dear one, at first the true thing alone existed, without a second. That thing wished, 'I shall be many.'"

The above passage contradicts not only the theory that God created the universe out of nothing but also the theory that the universe has come out of some inanimate matter without the intervention of God (as in Sāṅkhya philosophy). For the Upaniṣads say that at first He alone existed, then He wished that He would be many. It thus appears that before creation there was no inanimate matter, there was only Brahman. It cannot be maintained that in the passage quoted above the true thing was really inanimate matter and that it is only in a figurative sense that it has been said, that thing "wished" to be many; as the universe came out of the prime cause and as no living being could be seen as the active agent it appeared as if that thing itself wished to be many and thereafter

(१) तद्वैक आहुरसदेवेदमय आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं, तस्मादसतः सज्जायत । कुतस्तु खलु एव स्यादिति शीवाच, कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत् तु एव सीम्येदमय आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तदेव सत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । Cha U. 6, 2, 1, 2.

converted itself into many. For, the Upaniṣads say, "That Deity thought,—hallo, I shall enter the three objects by my soul and shall create name and form."<sup>1</sup> Here an animate being has been called the soul of the prime cause. Surely an animate being cannot be called the soul of an inanimate object. Hence the prime cause must be an animate object. It has also been said in the Upaniṣads that he who can realize the prime cause as his own self attains emancipation<sup>2</sup> and it must be admitted that no man can attain emancipation by knowing an inanimate object as his own self. It must therefore be admitted that the prime cause was an animate object.<sup>3</sup>

According to the Upaniṣads therefore at first Brahman alone existed and nothing else. The universe was created by Brahman out of Himself. At the time of universal destruction (pralaya) the universe disappears in Brahman. The material or ingredient with which Brahman created the universe is nothing but Brahman. Brahman is both the agent and the material or, in the language of the Vedānta, He is both the nimitta and

(1) सेयं देवतेष्वत इत्तं अहमिमांस्त्रिंशो देवता अनेन जीवेन आत्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि । Chh U 6-3-2

(2) तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पत्स्ये (Chh U 6-14-2)

(3) ईक्षतेनाशब्दम् । (Brahmasutra 1-1-5)

upādāna kāraṇa.<sup>1</sup> "Just as the spider creates the web and devours it, just as the plants come out of the earth, just as the hair grows out of the living body,—so the universe comes out of Brahman."<sup>2</sup> The earth does not suffer any loss or change by the growth of plants. The same particles of matter which existed inside the earth come out in the shape of plants. When plants die the same particles go back to the earth. The living body remains unaffected by the growth of the hair. So Brahman does not suffer any loss or change by the growth of the universe.

To the above doctrine that the universe was created out of Brahman it may be objected that when one object is transformed into another there is similarity between the two. Clay is transformed into pot. Pot is similar to clay, not to gold. But there is great difference between the nature of Brahman and that of the universe. Brahman is animate ; the universe is inanimate. Brahman is pure ; the universe is impure. Brahman is unalloyed joy ; the universe is a mixture of joy and sorrow. The Vedas have declared that Brahman and the universe are of opposite natures. The Vedas say

(1) प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् । (Brahmasutra 1-4-23)

(2) यद्योर्णा नाभिः सृजते नृजते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः सम्भवन्ति ।

यथा सतः पुरुषात् केशलोमानि तथाऽचरात् सम्भवतीह विश्वम् ॥

(Mu U 1-1-7)

that Brahman is knowledge, the universe is non-knowledge.<sup>1</sup> It might be replied that the universe is not inanimate. For in the Vedas we find such expressions as :—"The earth said" or "The waters said"<sup>2</sup> or "The fire thought."<sup>3</sup> From such expressions it might be thought that the earth, the waters and the fire are really animate though they appear to be inanimate. But this reply is not correct. The objects referred to in these expressions are the deities which permeate the inanimate objects. We find in the Vedas that various deities permeate different objects. Thus it is stated that the fire god assumed the form of speech and entered the mouth.<sup>4</sup> Hence the reply that the universe is animate is not correct and the objection stands. The real reply to the objection is that we find in the world that when one object is transformed into another the natures of the two sometimes differ from each other. Thus hair and nail which are inanimate objects grow out of a living body. On the other hand scorpions which are living objects grow out of cowdung, or insects out of honey. When one object is transformed into another there is

(1) विज्ञानं च अविज्ञानं च । (Tai U 2-6)

(2) सद्व्रवीत् आपोव्रवन् । (Satapatha Brahmana 6-1-3-2-4)

(3) तस्मै ज ऐषत । (Chha U 6-2-3)

(4) अग्निर्वाग् भूत्वा मुखं प्राविश्यत् । (Ait U 2-4)

no doubt some similarity between the two objects, but there is also some dissimilarity. If there was no dissimilarity they could not be called two different objects. So also between Brahman and the universe there is some similarity and there is also some dissimilarity. Brahman exists. The universe also exists. This is similarity. Brahman is animate. The universe is inanimate. This is dissimilarity. There can therefore be no objection to say that Brahman is the cause and the universe is the effect.

The substance out of which the universe is created is no doubt nothing but Brahman. But it has been given a separate name, *viz.* Māyā. Māyā is the power (śakti) of Brahman. It has been called Māyā because of its wonderful action. Where there was nothing before (except Brahman) there appear the sun, the moon, the planets, the stars; in the planets there appear hills, rivers and seas, forests and plains, men, birds and beasts. It is almost like the action of a wizard (मायावी). Other synonyms for māyā are prakriti (cause) pradhāna (main ingredient) avyakta (unmanifested) avidyā (ignorance) ajnāna (ignorance). It is called prakriti because it is the cause of the universe. It is called pradhāna or the main thing because it is the main thing in the universe. It is called avyakta or

undifferentiated because the objects of the universe come into existence when it is differentiated into various elements. It is called avidyā or ajnāna or ignorance because when knowledge dawns the objects of the universe appear to be ephemeral or unreal as compared with Brahman.

The Upaniṣads say, "Māyā is the prakṛiti (cause), God is the Lord of Māyā."<sup>1</sup>

"God is the Lord of pradhāna (*i. e.* Maya) and of the living beings. He also controls the three qualities (Satwa, rajas and tamas)."<sup>2</sup>

"Avyakta (*i. e.* Māyā) is superior to Mahat (Jīva *i. e.*) The Puruṣa (*i. e.* Brahman) is superior to Māyā."<sup>3</sup>

S'aṁkara has described Māyā as neither true nor false. Māyā is not true as (according to Śaṁkara) Brahman alone is true. Neither is Māyā altogether false. Examples of false objects are the horn of the hare, or the flower which grows in the sky, or the son of a sterile woman. They are objects which have no existence at all. Saṁkara says that the exact nature of Māyā cannot be expressed in words (anirvachaniya).

(1) मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरं (Swe U 4.10)

(2) प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गणेशः Swe U 6. 16

(3) महतः परमव्यक्तम् अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः Ka U 1.3.11.

Ramanuja says that this Mahat is jiva (soul). As the objects mentioned previously are inanimate and jiva is animate, jiva is mahat *i. e.* greater than those objects.

It is something positive (Bhāvarūpaṁ) and not mere absence of something. According to Rāmānuja it always exists, though sometimes it is manifested and sometimes it is unmanifested. As it is the power of Brahman it always remains in Brahman. When Brahman creates the universe there is manifestation of Māyā. During universal destruction (pralaya) there is no manifestation of Māyā which nevertheless exists in Brahman in the latent stage. Rāmānuja criticizes Saṁkara's conception of Māyā that it is neither true nor false. Rāmānuja says every object is either true or false and that Māyā is true, being the power of God.

Māyā consists of three qualities called *satwa*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Satwa* is the pure quality and creates attachment for pleasure and knowledge. *Rajas* gives rise to activity. *Tamas* is the cause of ignorance. At the time of pralaya these three qualities exist in the same proportion. At the time of creation this equilibrium is destroyed with the result that at some places *satwa* preponderates, at other places *rajas* or *tamas*. Every object of the universe contains all these qualities though in varying degrees. By performing religious acts we can increase the *satwa* quality in us. If we perform evil acts the *tamas* will increase. 'These qualities exist in Māyā (the power of Brahman) and in the universe. But Brahman transcends

all these qualities. He is not influenced by any of them. Hence He is called *gunātita* (existing beyond these qualities.)

The process of creation is thus stated in the Upaniṣads :—

From Brahman was created space (*ākāśa*) from space air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth.”<sup>(1)</sup> These five objects which are created at first cannot be perceived by our senses. They are fine. Sound is the quality of space; sound and touch are the qualities of air; sound touch and sight are the qualities of fire; the above three qualities and taste are the qualities of water; the above four qualities and smell are the qualities of earth. We know that sound is transmitted through air. But Vedānta philosophy conceives a finer sound which is transmitted through vacuum. Space is not mere absence of matter. It is something positive. One proof of its existence is that we cannot increase the amount of space anywhere according to our will. By air is meant anything which has only sound and touch. Other gases are included in the term air. Fire or heat is considered by modern scientists to be a particular state or manner of existence of an object in which its particles vibrate rapidly. Indian philosophy considered fire to be an independent object which is the

(1) तद्भावा एतद्भावाकाशः सञ्जातः । आकाशाद्वायुः । वायोरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अपाः पृथिवी । Tai U 2.1.1.

cause of the vibration of the particles. Water is created from fire and air. As an example we may mention that water is produced when electricity (*i. e.* fire) passes through hydrogen and oxygen (*i. e.* air). Earth or solid matter is created out of water. From these five objects two series of objects are created. In one series we have the various components of the fine body of the living being and in another series we have the five gross objects.—space, air, fire, water and earth which can be perceived by our senses.

The components of the fine body are seventeen in number, *viz*, (i-v) the five senses,—eye, ear, tongue, skin and nose (vi) intelligence (*buddhi*) (vii) mind (*manas*) (viii-xii) the five organs of action, *viz*, hand, foot, speech, anus and sex (xiii-xvii) the five kinds of air in the body (*prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *udāna*, *vyāna* and *samāna*). ✓

(i-v) The five senses are the eye, the ears the nose, the tongue and the skin. These five senses or organs are fine substances which cannot be perceived by senses. For example the organ of the eye is not the eyeball which we see but a fine thing whose seat is inside the eyeball.

Similarly the organ of hearing is not the ear which we can see, but a fine thing whose seat is the ear. The organ of hearing is created out of (fine) space. Sound is the quality of space Ear is necessary to hear the sound. It may

thus be conceived that the ear is created from space to hear the sound which is the quality of space. The organ of touch is created out of (fine) air. The organ of tongue is created out of (fine) water. The organ of smell is created out of (fine) earth. Buddhi (intelligence) is that organ by means of which we arrive at a definite conclusion. We see an object before us. From its size and shape we conclude that it is a cow. It is by means of buddhi that we arrive at this conclusion. Buddhi of an insane person is out of order. He cannot therefore arrive at definite and correct conclusions. The manas or mind is that organ from which various desires appear in us. The buddhi and the manas are created out of all the five fine elements, viz. space, air, fire water and earth. The necessity of conceiving the existence of the mind apart from the existence of the soul and the senses has been explained in chapter II. Buddhi and manas are two manifestations of the same object 'antahkarana' (internal sense.) This internal sense (antahkarana) has two functions, one by which it arrives at a definite conclusion and another by which no definite conclusion is reached. The former is called *buddhi* (intelligence) the latter *manas* (or mind).

(viii to xii) The five organs of action are speech, the hand, the foot, the anus and

the sex. These organs also are fine substances and therefore invisible. From fine space is created the organ of speech. The organ of speech produces sound which is the property of space. Hence it is reasonable to infer that speech is created out of space. From fine air is created the hand (not the limb we see, but the organ of action within it). From fine fire is created the foot. From fine water is created the anus. From fine earth is created the sex. The function of the speech is to utter sound, that of the hand is to take, that of the foot is to go, that of the anus is to expel, that of the sex is to enjoy.

(xiii to xvii) The five vāyus (air) are the prāṇa the apāna the vyāna, the udāna and the samāna. The seat of the prāṇa is the end of the nose. It moves between the nose and the navel. With the help of this organ we breathe out. The seat of the apāna is near the anus. It moves between the anus and the navel. Its function is to throw out useless matter from the body. The samāna lives in the stomach. Its function is to convert the food and drink into flesh, blood, urine, stool etc. These five vāyus are created out of the combination of all the five fine substances

✓ According to Adwaita Vedanta the soul has got five sheathes or coverings. The first sheath consists of Māyā and is called the ānandamaya

koṣa (sheath). In this sheath the soul withdraws from all outward objects and thoughts and remains only with avidyā which it cannot give up till it is liberated. In that stage it feels joy of Brahman more than in other states.

The second sheath consists of *buddhi* (intelligence) and the five organs of sense (the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin). It is called *vijnānamaya koṣa* (the sheath of knowledge). Its function is to know. It is on account of this covering that the soul thinks "I do," "I enjoy," "I am happy," "I am unhappy." The next sheath is called the *manomaya koṣa*. It consists of the *manas* (mind) and the same five organs of sense. Its function is to will. The next sheath is called the *prāṇamaya koṣa*. It consists of the five *vāyus* and the five organs of action. Its function is to do, to act. The combination of the three coverings (numbers two to four) is called the fine body (*sūkṣma śarīra*) as distinguished from the gross body of flesh and blood (*annamaya koṣa* i. e. the sheath created out of food). At the time of death the soul along with the fine body leaves the gross body and goes according to its action to heaven or hell, or is born again.

The theory of these koṣas is based on the second portion (*Brahmānanda valli*) of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* which mentions first the

annamaya ātmā, then the prānamaya ātmā, then the manomaya, the vijnānamaya and ānandamaya ātmā. ✓ The Upaniṣads use the term ātmā and not koṣa. In the Brahmasūtras the last (ānandmaya ātmā) is identified with Brahman. Śaṅkara disputes this interpretation of the Upaniṣadic text made by Vyāsa in the Brahmasūtras and says that the ānandamaya ātmā is not Brahman but a sheath of Brahman created by Māyā.

Rāmānuja accepts the interpretation of Vyāsa and says the ānandamaya ātmā is Brahman and the vijnānamaya ātmā is the jīva. Śaṅkaras theory of the five koṣas is not thus accepted by Rāmānuja who sticks to the interpretation of Vyāsa. ✓

As stated before the five gross substances (space air, fire, water and earth) are created out of fine substances of the same names mixed in various proportions. The process of creation of the gross substances is as follows. One-half part of fine ākāśa is mixed with one-eighth part of fine air, one-eighth part of fine fire, one-eighth part of fine water and one-eighth part of fine earth. This mixture is called gross ākāśa. Similarly  $\frac{1}{2}$  part of fine air, mixed with  $\frac{1}{8}$ th part of each of the other fine substances *viz.* ākāśa, fire, water and earth makes gross air. Gross fire consists of  $\frac{1}{2}$  part of fine fire and  $\frac{1}{8}$ th part of each of

the other fine substances *viz.* ākāsa, air, water and earth. Similarly for gross water and gross earth. It is these gross substances which can be perceived by our sense organs. Ākāsa can be perceived by only one organ *viz.* ear. Air can be perceived by two organs, *viz.* ear and skin. Fire can be perceived by three organs *viz.*, ear, skin and eye. Water can be perceived by four organs *viz.*, ear, skin, eye and tongue, Earth can be perceived by all the five organs *viz.*, ear skin, eye, tongue and nose. In other words ākāsa has got only one quality, *viz.* sound.<sup>12</sup> Air has got two qualities, *viz.*, sound and touch. Fire has got three, *viz.*, sound, touch and figure, Water has got four, *viz.* sound, touch, figure and taste. Earth has got five, *viz.*, sound, touch, figure, taste and smell. The gross objects of the universe are made of these five substances. But it is a mistake to suppose that according to Vedānta philosophy these were conceived as elements and that modern science has proved that the theory of Vedānta

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(12) According to modern physics sound is transmitted through air and not through vacuum. But Hindu philosophy conceives of sound as of three kinds, *viz.* para (परा) pashyantee (पश्यन्ती) and vaikharee (वैखरी). Para sound can be heard. The other sounds cannot be heard, being too fine (shorter wave length). It is the para which is transmitted by air. Pashyantee and Vaikharee are not so transmitted. They are transmitted through sky or ether.

philosophy was wrong. Elements are those which cannot be broken up into other ingredients, while compounds are those which can be so broken up. According to these definitions all the five gross substances are compounds as they can be broken up into the five fine ingredients, ākāśa, air, fire, water and earth. Each of these five fine substances can be ultimately broken up into fine ākāśa. So fine ākāśa is really the only element. Modern science has shown that the so-called elements which were formerly conceived to be unbreakable are breakable into protons and electrons out of which all elements are made up. With the progress of science therefore the former scientific theory of elements has been found to be wrong and not the Vedāntic theory. It appears as if science is approaching the Vedāntic theory according to which all objects of the universe are created out of ākāśa. It is hoped that science will one day discover that protons and electrons are made out of ākāśa and then the theory of the Vedānta will be fully confirmed. It may be observed here that ākāśa is not mere absence of substance, but some positive substance. This is clear from the fact that space has magnitude, some portion of ākāśa is greater than some other portion. We cannot create ākāśa where there is none. According to the Upaniṣads there

was no space or ākāśa at the time of pralaya and the first step in the process of creation was the creation of the space or ākāśa.

✓ The gross bodies of living beings are made up of the five gross substances,—earth, water, fire air and sky. There are four kinds of gross bodies *viz*, those born from uterus (*jarāyuja*) those born from eggs (*aṇḍaja*), those born from dirt (*śvedaja*, e. g. worms) and those born from earth (*udvijja*). According to Christianity and Mahomedanism, men alone have souls, animals and plants have no soul. According to Hinduism animals and plants also have soul. In fact, a man may be born as an animal or a plant. Shorn of all appendages the soul is pure knowledge. ✓ Animals certainly have knowledge and therefore have soul. Plants also have consciousness, and therefore soul, as the researches of Sir J. C. Bose have shown. Manu has said of plants that they have consciousness and can feel pleasure and pain.<sup>13</sup>

Poets have intuitively felt this truth. Thus Wordsworth has said,

The trees spread out their fan,  
To catch the breezy air,  
And I must think; do all I can,  
That there was pleasure there.

✓ Besides the four kinds of beings mentioned

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(13) अन्तः संज्ञाः भवन्त्येते सुखदुःखसमन्विताः ।

above there are other beings who have no gross body. One of these classes is the devas (minor deities) *e. g.* Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Yama etc. They were also created by the Supreme Being (Brahman). Persons who perform sufficiently meritorious acts are born as devas. But even they cannot exercise their power against the will of Brahman. ✓ In the Kenopaniṣad the story is told that there was a fight between the gods (*Devas*) and demons (*asuras*) in which the gods were victorious. They thought that they won because of their own power and greatness. The Omniscient Brahman knew this. He wanted to cure the gods of their pride and ignorance. He appeared before them in a very beautiful form (Yakṣa). The gods did not know who this new person was. They sent Agni (fire god) to ascertain who he was. He asked Agni what his name was and what strength he possessed. Agni said that his name was Agni, and he could burn the entire universe. The stranger kept a piece of straw before Agni and asked the latter to burn it. But Agni failed though he tried with all his might. Agni returned discomfited to the other gods. The gods then sent Vāyu (the air god) who, when asked, said he could shake the entire universe. But he was also discomfited as he could not move the straw. Then the gods deputed Indra to the stranger who disappeared

on the approach of Indra. Indra engaged himself in austerities to realize who the stranger was. At last Brahmavidyā ( Divine knowledge ) appeared before Indra in the shape of Umā the beautiful daughter of the Himālayas. Indra asked Her about the stranger. She said "He is Brahman. Your victory was due to Brahman. Due to ignorance you thought that the victory was achieved by your own prowess".

As we have stated in chapter one there are many passages in different Upaniṣads which refer to the existence of minor gods and it is wrong to argue that because the Upaniṣads refer to one Almighty God hence the Upaniṣads discard the theory of minor gods.

Bādarāyana in his Brahmasūtras has discussed the question whether the gods are entitled to study the Upaniṣads and thereby attain the knowledge of Brahman. (Brahmasūtra 1-3-26). In the comment on this aphorism, Śaṅkarāchāryya says that from the testimony of the Vedas, the Purānas, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata we learn that the gods have bodies and are therefore eligible for the study of that branch of knowledge which deals with Brahman ( *i. e.* Brahmavidyā ). It may be doubted how, if gods have bodies, they can receive gifts made simultaneously at different places by different devotees performing Vedic

sacrifices. To this objection it has been replied that the gods have the power to assume different bodies at different places at the same time and also the power to keep the bodies invisible. We find in the Upaniṣads that Indra went to Brahmā and engaged in austerities in order to learn Brahmavidyā.<sup>14</sup> Those gods who attain this knowledge become united with Brahman and are not born again. Those who cannot attain this knowledge are born again, at the time of the next creation.

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad we find mention of three kinds of devas or gods. Indra, Vayu, Agni etc. who are simply called devas or gods are of the superior kind. Lower than them are those who as a result of performing meritorious acts in this world go to heaven. They have been called karma-devas or those created as gods as a result of good acts. Still lower are the ājāna-devas *i. e.*, who are born in heaven. It is stated in this Upaniṣad that the joy of the *karma-deva* is hundred times that of an *ājāna-deva* and that the joy of a *deva* is hundred times that of a *karma-deva*. In this connection some other kinds of beings are mentioned who are higher than men inasmuch as their joy is of a higher degree. Such are the *gandharvas* and the *pitris*. The *gandharvas* were of two kinds. Human *gandharvas* and divine *gandharvas*. The

pitris also are a kind of gods. They seem to be living in their abodes till the *pralaya* or universal destruction ( Taittiriya Upaniṣad 2/8 ). These different orders of being are the forms taken by the souls of men who perform pious acts.

We have briefly indicated the process of creation. At the time of *pralaya* there was nothing. Then were created the five fine and gross substances, then the various worlds, then the fine bodies and the gross bodies of various kinds of beings. Each living being is encased in a fine body and a gross body. Both the fine and the gross bodies are inanimate, the soul alone being animate. The fine and gross bodies in which a particular soul is encased at the time of its birth are determined by the the acts performed by it in its previous birth.

It may be objected that the doctrine of Karma does not furnish a satisfactory explanation for the inequality of the lot of individual souls inasmuch as at the time of creation different souls must have been placed in unequal situations although there could not be any previous acts at that time. The reply is that just as creation was preceded by the unmanifested state ( *parlaya* ) so also the unmanifested state (*pralaya*) was preceded by another creation. In other words every creation was preceded by another creation. Creation is without beginning.

So the inequality in the environments of different souls at the time of creation can be accounted for by the inequality in the acts committed by different souls in the previous creation. This argument is contained in the following aphorism of Bādarāyana. "If it is objected that pleasure and pain cannot be determined by the past acts of the soul as at the time of creation there is no past act, the reply is that creation is without beginning"<sup>14</sup> In his commentary on this aphorism Śaṅkarāchāryya quotes the following passage from the Vedas which is repeated every day at the time of the worship of Sandhyā : "The creator (Brahmā) created the sun, the moon, the heaven, the earth and the sky—as they existed in the previous creation".<sup>15</sup>

It may be objected that it is difficult to conceive that creation is without beginning. But it is equally difficult to conceive of a first creation. A tendency for recurrence is found in all natural phenomena. The seasons recur in a definite order. Every summer was preceded by another summer with similar temperature, flowers, fruits etc. In the same way every creation was preceded by a similar creation. After all we should remember that nothing new

(14) न कर्माविभागादिति चेत् न अनादित्वात् Bra Su 2.1.35

(15) सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् दिवश्च पृथिवीश्चान्तरीक्षमथ स्रजः ।

is created in the world. The materials remain the same. When we think that a new object has appeared, really speaking there is only a change in the arrangement of the particles. The particles of which the sun, the moon, the earth etc. consist existed even before creation but in an unmanifested or potential state. After creation they appear in a manifested state. As Śrīkriṣṇa says in the Bhagavad Gīta "On the appearance of (Brahmās) day (creation) all manifested things come out of the unmanifested. At the time of (Brahmās) night (destruction or pralaya) the manifested objects merge into the unmanifested"<sup>16</sup> References to the creation and destruction of the universe are found in many places of the Vedas. Mention may be made here of Rig Veda Samhitā 10/129 ( नासदीयं सुक्तं ) and the Rātri Sukta. We give below translations of some of the passages as explained by Sāyanācharyya. "At the time of the unmanifested (pralaya) neither gross nor fine substance existed. The world did not exist, nor space (ākāśa) Only the ultimate reality (Brahman) existed". "Māyā, the power of Brahman sees in her vision all the objects of the world as they will be created by her. She then brings them into existence and sustains them."

(16) अव्यक्ताद्याक्तयः सर्वाः प्रभवन्त्याहरागमे ।

रात्रागमे प्रलीयन्ते तत्रैवाव्यक्तसंज्ञके ॥ Gita 8/18

The universal void which existed before creation contained all the objects of the universe in an unmanifested state. During the period preceding the universal void, the tendency for these objects to manifest themselves asserted again and again and caused creation again and again. It is like seed appearing as the tree, and the tree producing the seed. Just as the cycle of seed-tree-seed is without beginning, so also the cycle of creation-destruction-creation is without beginning. It is a law of nature which manifests itself in all phenomena. It is the only hypothesis which can explain the diversity in the lot of different creatures.

It may be asked, Why did God create the universe? We build a house so that we can live more comfortably. We grow a garden in order to enjoy the flowers and fruits. But God did not create the universe in order to derive any joy. He has always maximum joy. If we say that His joy can be increased by the creation of the universe, then we shall have to admit that He is imperfect, inasmuch as He has not perfect or complete joy. That God does not enjoy any object of the universe is stated in the following passage of the Upaniṣad :—"Two birds dwell in the same tree. They are united together. They are friendly towards each other. One of the birds tastes the fruits of the tree. The other

bird does not taste, but merely looks on".<sup>17</sup> If then God does not enjoy the objects of the universe, why does He take the trouble of creating them? To this question the reply is, in the first place, that for God the creation of the universe means no trouble. He has merely to wish and the objects are created. "He thought, 'I shall be many, I shall create'. He created the fire."<sup>18</sup> Just as people play, though they have no definite purpose to be fulfilled thereby, so God has created the universe though He does not thereby fulfil any want of His.<sup>19</sup>

According to the Advaita philosophy of Saṁkarāchāryya the world has no real existence ; it is due to our ignorance that the objects of the world appear to exist ; when we realize the ultimate truth, we can perceive that the world does not exist. The analogy is given of a rope mistaken for a snake. When the light is insufficient, a rope may be mistaken for a snake. The snake does not really exist. Its appearance is due to ignorance. If a bright lamp is brought in, it is found that there is no snake, it is only a piece of rope. If then there is really no world how

(17) हा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं ब्रह्म परिषस्वजाते ।

तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वादक्षि अनन्नद्रव्यो अभिचाकरोति ॥ Mu U 3.1.1.

(18) तदैक्षत बहु स्या प्रजायिय तत्त ज अमृतत । Chh U 6.3.2

(19) लोकवत्, लीलाकेवल्य । Bra Su 2.1.33

can there be creation of the world ? Sāṅkara says that although the universe has no real existence <sup>20</sup> it has a conventional existence <sup>21</sup> which persists till a man attains salvation. The creation and destruction of the universe have reference to the conventional existence of objects. So long as a man does not realise Brahman, so long as he is under the influence of Māyā, objects appear to come into existence and disappear. It is hardly necessary to say that this view is not accepted by the other schools of Vedānta Philosophy ( *e. g.* Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita). Sāṅkara's doctrine of creation is called Vivarta, while the doctrine of other schools is called Vikāra. When one object is mistaken for another it is called Vivarta, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake. When one object actually changes into another it is called Vikāra <sup>22</sup>, as when milk changes into curd.

It may be observed here that the illustrations given in the Upaniṣads to explain the process of creation are those of Vikāra ( actual transformation ) and not those of Vivarta. ✓ Thus the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says that the universe comes out of Brahman even as the

(20) पारमार्थिक सत्ता ।

(21) व्यवहारिक सत्ता ।

(22) सतत्वतोऽन्यथाप्रया विकार इत्यादाहतः ।

अतत्वतोऽन्यथाप्रया विवर्त इत्यादाहतः ॥

spider creates the web ( out of itself ), or as the plants come out of the earth, or as the hair comes out of a living person. <sup>23</sup> Again in the Chhândogya Upaniṣad the question is asked—what is that which being known everything is known,—and the reply is given,—Just as, if a lump of clay is known all things made of clay are known, <sup>24</sup> or if a nailcutter is known all objects made of steel are known, so if Brahman is known everything is known. These are all examples of Vikāra ( transformation ). The examples of a rope being mistaken as the snake, or a shell being mistaken as silver, are not found in the main Upaniṣads. Sainkarāchāryya finds support for his theory of *Vivarta* in the following observations made in the Upaniṣad in this connection. [“The transformation of clay into various objects is made by words ; they differ only in name. The truth is that they are all mere clay”. <sup>25</sup> From these remarks Sainkara concludes that here the Upaniṣad says that clay is the only truth, hence the objects made of clay are all false. In the same way Brahman is the only truth, the objects of the world into which Brahman appears to be transformed are all false.

It appears to us that the spirit of the Upani-

(23) Vide foot note 2, p. 69.

(24) यथा सीम्य एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन विज्ञातेन सर्वं मृत्तमयं विज्ञातं स्यात् ।

Chh. U 6.1.4

(25) वाचारम्भणं विकारी नामधेयं मृत्तिका इतोऽव सत्यं । Chh. 6.1.4

śads has been violated in the examples given by Śaṁkara. Let us consider how a person who has attained Brahman will look at an object, *e.g.* a tiger. According to Śaṁkara he will not perceive the tiger just as in clear light we do not see a snake where there is only a rope. But according to Rāmānuja and other preceptors even a man who has attained Brahman will see the figure of the tiger. But he will realize that Brahman has taken the shape of the tiger. He will see Brahman in the tiger which others who have not attained Brahman will fail to see. There will be a difference in the behaviour of the two persons. One who has not realized Brahman will be afraid of the tiger. But one who has realized will not be afraid. He will feel that the tiger is not a free agent to do him harm. The tiger will do him harm if Brahman wishes to do him harm. We also find in the Purāṇas that persons like Nārada who have realized Brahman perceive different objects of the world, though they no doubt also perceive that Brahman Himself has taken those shapes. It may also be observed that in the Brahmasutras it is nowhere mentioned that the objects of the world are false. Creation and destruction of the world are referred to in the Brahmasutras as actual and not imaginary events.

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## CHAPTER V

### States of Consciousness.

Referring to objects seen in a dream the Upaniṣads say, "There are neither cars, nor the equipments of cars, nor paths—then there are created cars, equipments of cars and paths" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4/3/10)<sup>1</sup>. / Śaṅkara observes that though there is some resemblance between objects seen by us in a dream and objects seen by us when we are awake, there is also a good deal of difference. The resemblance is that objects seen in a dream and objects seen while awake both appear to exist. The difference is that objects seen while awake are accompanied by necessary space, time, causation and want of contradiction. But objects seen in a dream are lacking in these conditions. When we are sleeping in a room we dream of a big temple which cannot remain in a room. Or in a dream it appears to be broad day light whereas it is really night. Though our eyes remain close during the dream it appears that we are seeing various objects. We dream of a car but on awaking we find that there is no car. Hence it should be concluded that things seen in a dream

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(1) न तत्र रथा रथयोगाः पथ्यानी भवन्ति, अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते ।  
( ब्र. उ. ४।३।१० )

have no existence of the kind which things seen while awake possess.<sup>1</sup> / Rāmānuja observes that the things seen in a dream are created by the Supreme Being and not by the individual souls. The objects seen in a dream may not be as substantial as the objects seen while awake. But objects of some sort are created. Reference to the creation of dream-objects is found in the following passage of the Upaniṣads.

“While people sleep God remains awake and creates various objects of enjoyment”.<sup>2</sup>

Rāmānuja observes that the things created during dreams are very peculiar. Only the man who dreams can see them. No one else can see them. Again those objects exist only so long as the man dreams. They disappear when the dream ends. None but God can create such wonderful things. God creates the things seen in the dreams in order to make us feel the consequences of petty acts, good or bad. The acts being petty the resulting pleasure or pain is momentary.<sup>3</sup>

When we see dreams, the organs of sight, hearing etc. remain merged in our mind. We cannot then see, hear etc. But our mind functions and we have various kinds of sensations.

(1) Samkara on Brahmasutra, 3.2.1.

(2) य एषः सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्ममाणः ।

Kathopanishad, 5.8.

(3) Ramanuja on Brahmasutra, 3.2.1.

In deep sleep when no dreams are seen (suṣupti) the mind also ceases to function and merges in the prāna vāyu. We then cease to have any desire and the prāna vāyu alone functions enabling us to breathe. At that time the individual soul merges in the Supreme Being. For this reason the individual soul feels joy when he is in deep sleep, and when he gets up he recollects the feeling and says "I was sleeping happily".<sup>1</sup> As the individual soul merges in the Supreme Soul at the time of deep sleep it might be thought that when the sleep breaks some soul other than the soul which went to sleep might come back into the body. But it is not so. The soul which awakes from deep sleep is the same soul which went into sleep. The conclusion is based on the following reasons. It is seen that a man who performs a particular act before he goes to sleep gets the fruit of the act after he wakes up. Now the soul which gets the fruit must be the same as the soul which performed the act. Again a man remembers what happened before he went to sleep. If a man were permanently united with Brahman at the time of deep sleep, then man could attain emancipation merely by falling into deep sleep, and there would be no necessity for the rules laid down in the sacred books for the attainment of emancipation.

Ajātaśatru, king of Kāshi, explaining to

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(1) सुखमहमस्वापसम् ।

Gārgya, a Brahmin, the nature of Brahman, took him to a sleeping man and shouted at the latter who however did not awake. The king then aroused the man by pushing him and said that when a man goes to sleep he withdraws into himself the organs of sense ; so long as he dreams, the soul moves about in his body through the various veins ; when he ceases to dream and falls into deep slumber (suṣupti) the soul enters the heart and is merged in the Supreme Soul (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2/1/89). That the individual soul merges into the Supreme Soul at the time of deep sleep (suṣupti) is also mentioned in other places in the Upaniṣads. Uddālaka teaching his son Śwetaketu says that when a person sleeps he becomes one with the Supreme Being, he attains his own self. Again he says that the bees collect honey from the juice of various trees and mixes them together into one taste. The different portions of honey brought from different trees cannot then be distinguished. In the same way all beings when they become one with the Supreme Being at the time of deep slumber do not know that they have become one with the Supreme Being. When they awake from slumber they again become what they were before, either a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or an insect, a fly or a mosquito ( Chhāndogya 6/9/1, 2).

The different states of consciousness have

been mentioned in the Māndukya Upaniṣad. Here Brahman has been referred to as having four kinds of manifestation, *viz*, (1) state of awakening (2) sleep with dream (3) deep sleep without dream (4) the fourth indescribable stage where all distinctions disappear and there is only one universal consciousness. Śaṅkara has said that the first three stages are the successive steps for attaining the last ; when the state of awakening is obliterated there is the state of dream ; when the state of dream is obliterated there is the state of deep sleep without dream ; beyond this third stage is the fourth (*turiya*). It is the same consciousness (Brahman) manifesting itself in the four stages. When we are awake our consciousness spreads itself over the outside world. When we dream, the outside world disappears from our consciousness which spreads over the mind, and we perceive various objects inside the mind. In the third stage the mind with various desires disappears and we have merely consciousness. But this is mere individual consciousness. The fourth stage is the all-pervading consciousness, the Supreme Soul.

The individual soul is either identical with the Supreme Soul (according to the Advaita school) or a fragment of the Supreme Soul (according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school). The substance of which the individual soul consists

is the same as the substance of which the Supreme Soul consists. It may therefore be considered strange that while the Supreme Soul is omnipotent, always full of joy and complete knowledge,—the individual soul should have so little power and should so often feel unhappy. The reason is that though the individual soul is identical or a portion of the Supreme soul, due to ignorance it identifies itself with the body or the mind. Hence it often feels unhappy. When the individual soul always thinks of Brahman, when it ceases to think of the body and the mind which are different from it and which it wrongly considers to be its own self or at any rate, part of its own self, then he is filled with joy and attains complete knowledge.

Swoon is another stage of consciousness. During swoon the organs of sense partly merge in the soul. It is different from the other stages, *viz*, awakeness, dream, deep sleep and death.<sup>5</sup> When awake, the organs of sense fully function. When dreaming, the mind functions but the organs of sense do not function. In deep sleep the mind also does not function, only the breath (Prāṇa) functions. In death, the breath (Prāṇa), the mind and the organs of sense leave the body. In swoon they do not leave the body, but they

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(5) सुषुप्तेऽहं सम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् । (Brahmasutra, 3.2.10)

do not also function as they partly merge in the soul.

Although our mind and all the organs of sense fully function only when we are awake and although we seem to be most conscious at that time, it is not the stage of pure consciousness. Because in that stage our consciousness is mixed not only with our mind but also with the organs of sense and outside objects. In order to realise consciousness in its purest form we should withdraw our organs of sense from outside objects,—we should not see anything, hear anything and so on. The Kathopanishad says that our creator has punished us by imbuing the organs of sense with the tendency to go outside our body and that for this reason we can perceive outside objects and cannot see what is within us.<sup>6</sup> The wise man realizes that immortality cannot come from outside objects. With the object of attaining immortality he withdraws his senses from outside objects and then perceives the universal soul. The wise man can go beyond the reach of sorrow by contemplating on that Supreme All-pervading Being who is our soul and who in His state of pure consciousness is beyond the stage of awokeness as well as of sleep ( because in the stages of awokeness and sleep the

(6) पराञ्चि खानि व्यदृशत् स्वयम्भूस्तस्यात् पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन । कश्चिहोः प्रत्यगात्मानमैषत् आब्रुचच्चतुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् । कठोपनिषद् २।१।२

consciousness is mixed up with the mind, the organ of sense and external objects, whereas in its pure form consciousness is not mixed up with these foreign matters ).

A man has to suffer ( to a greater or less extent ) when he is awake, as well as when he dreams or falls into swoon. Brahman is beyond all this suffering. When a man attains Brahman he also goes beyond all the sufferings of the world.

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## CHAPTER VI

### Life beyond death.

That the soul lives after death, Hinduism says as well as other religions like Christianity and Mahommedanism. But the state of the soul after death has not been so logically and accurately described in other religions as it has been in Hinduism. As regards the state of the soul before birth other religions do not seem to have bestowed much thought on it. One is naturally more concerned about what will happen to us afterwards than what happened in the past. The past seems to have been past, dead and gone. But the past leaves its impression on our mind which gives us good or bad tendencies. Every act we perform, every thought we think leaves its stamp on our mind, and determines how we react afterwards towards our environment. It is therefore necessary for us to know our past if we want to know what are the specially weak or strong points in our unconscious mind. Hinduism has therefore attached great importance to our past history. As regards our soul, Hinduism has asserted that our soul has an infinite past as it has an infinite future. Other religions like

Christianity and Mahommedanism say that our soul is created with our body. But if a thing can be created it can also be destroyed. So Hinduism has arrived at the logical conclusion that if our soul is to have an infinite future it must have an infinite past. 'That is the nature of a permanent thing. As Yama says to Nachiketā, "The soul is neither born nor does it die ; it is neither the cause nor the effect of anything ; it is without beginning ; it is everlasting ; it is not killed when the body is killed'." As regards the state of the soul after death whereas Christianity and Mahommedanism think that the heaven and hell are everlasting Hinduism has declared that heaven and hell are both finite, for nothing that is the result of finite acts can be infinite<sup>2</sup>. The acts being finite, the result must be finite. Salvation being infinite can not be the result of any acts. It is the result of knowledge, *viz.*, realization of the true nature of the everlasting soul.

Hinduism has given in detail the state of the soul after death, not to satisfy an ideal curiosity, but in order to fulfil the definite purpose of destroying our natural attachment for the things

(1) न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित् नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् ।

अजी नित्यः शान्त्वतोऽयं पुराणी न हन्वते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥

Ka U 1. 1. 8

(2) नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन । Mu U 1. 2. 12

of the world. If we know what tedious journeys we have performed in the past and what sufferings we have undergone again and again and if we know that the same tedious journeys and unending sufferings are in store for us in future unless we can attain salvation, we shall have a burning desire to attain it<sup>3</sup> and shall cease to have any hankering for the pleasures of the world which rarely descend from the realm of hope to the realm of reality.

Detailed account has been given in the Upaniṣads about the process of death and the path of the departed soul. Before death a man loses his power of speech though he can still think. At that time the organ of speech merges in his mind.<sup>4</sup> All the organs of knowledge also merge in his mind at the same time.<sup>5</sup> He fails to see, hear, smell, taste and touch. But he can still think. Gradually he loses the power to think also and can only breathe. At that time his mind merges in his prāṇa.<sup>6</sup> This prāṇa resides in the individual soul.<sup>7</sup> When the soul leaves the body, the prāṇa also leaves the body. So long as a man breathes, his soul resides in the body. When he ceases to breathe, it is to be understood

(3) गतागतेन श्रान्तीऽस्मि वाहि मां मधुसूदन ।

(4) वाङ् मनसि दर्शनाच्छ्रवणाच्च । Bra. Su. 4.2.1.

(5) अतएव च सर्वोणि अतु । Bra. Su. 4.2.2.

(6) तन्मनः प्राणे उत्तरात् । Bra. Su. 4.2.3.

(7) सीऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः । Bra. Su. 4.2.4.

that the soul has left the body. As previously observed the human body is a conglomeration of the five kinds of gross matter out of which the universe is created *viz.* earth, water, fire, air and ether. The human body also contains the five fine materials (*viz.* fine earth, fine water, fine fire, fine air and fine ether) out of which the mind, the organs of sense and the *vāyus* (*prāṇa*, *apāna* etc.) are made. When a soul is about to leave a body it gathers from that body the fine materials for the purpose of creating the body of the next birth and along with these materials leaves the previous body<sup>8</sup>. Mind and the organs of sense (eye, ear etc.) which at the time of death merge in the *prāṇa*, leave the body along with the soul.

There are two main paths which the good soul takes after death according to its acts in this life. One is called the *pitṛyāna* and the other *devayāna*. *Pitṛyāna* is the path of the soul of the person who has merely performed good acts but without sufficient contemplation and worship of God. Good acts are those which are prescribed in the scriptures<sup>9</sup>. Those who take the path of *pitṛyāna* go to heaven and are born again after enjoying the pleasures of heaven. *Devayāna* is the path of the soul of the person who has earnestly worshipped God in this life.

(8) तदनन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंजति सम्परिव्यक्तः प्रश्नरूपेणाभ्यां । Bra. Su. 3.1.1

(9) तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ Gita, 16-24.

Those who take the path of devayāna ultimately attain God and are not reborn on this earth. Those who commit sins do not follow any of these paths. They go to hell and are born again.<sup>10</sup> There is another path which is for men who neither commit sins nor perform pious acts nor worship God. Such men are born and die again and again as petty insects.<sup>11</sup>

The path taken by the departed soul has been described in the Upaniṣads in some detail. Different devatās (gods) carry the soul through different stages as persons carry the body of a man who has swooned<sup>12</sup>. The particular god who has jurisdiction over the particular stage carries the soul through that stage. The different stages in the forward journey of the Pitṛyāna are as follow ; smoke, night, black fortnight (waning moon), the six months from summer solstice to winter solstice during which the sun moves southwards along the ecliptic (dakṣiṇāyana), the region of the manes (pitṛloka), sky, the moon<sup>13</sup>. By the terms smoke night etc. are meant the deities presiding over them. The stages in the return journey are the moon, sky, air, smoke, clouds, rain and the earth.

10. Brahma Sutra 3-1-13.

11. अथैतयोः पथोः न कतरेण च तानि इमानि चूद्राणि असकृदावर्त्तन्ति भूतानि भवन्ति, जायन्ते म्रियन्ते इत्येतत् तृतीयं स्थानं तेन असौ लोकः न सम्पूर्यते ।

Chh U 5.10.8

12. Brahma Sutra 4-3-4 and 4-3-5.

13. Ramanuja's commentary on Brahma Sutra, 3-1-8.

The returning soul descends from the moon to to the clouds, it falls from the clouds to the earth along with the rain, from the earth it passes to the cereals, then to the body of the man who eats the cereals, from the body of the man it goes to the womb of the woman, from whence it is born again.<sup>14</sup>

The devayāna path leading to emancipation consists of the following stages : fire, day, waxing fortnight, the six months from the winter solstice to the summer solstice, year, air, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati, and Brahman<sup>15</sup>. By the terms fire, day, etc. are meant the deities who consider fire, day etc. as their bodies. Those who take this path shed their good and evil deeds at the time of their death.<sup>16</sup> The fine bodies which accompany their soul after death are not the result of their good and evil deeds but of their lifelong worship and devotion. The end of the journey has been called Brahmāloka<sup>17</sup>. This according to Sāṅkara is the abode of Brahmā (the creator

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14. अथ एतम् एव अध्वानं पुनः निवर्तन्ते यद्येतम् आकाशम् आकाशात् वायुः वायुर्भूत्वा मी भवति, धूमो भूत्वा अग्निं भवति अग्निं भूत्वा मेघो भवति, मेघो भूत्वा प्रवर्धति । Chh U 5-10-16

15. Brahma Sutra 4-3-2 and 4-3-3.

16. Brahma Sutra 3-3-27.

17. स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति Cha U 4-15-5.

of the universe and one of the trinity Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva)<sup>18</sup>. According to Rāmānuja it is one of the abodes created by Brahman where the departed souls attain the knowledge of Brahman so that they may ultimately attain Brahman.<sup>19</sup>

It will be observed that the pitṛyāna path ends with the moon from where the soul returns to the earth. The moon is one of the heavens where those who perform good acts enjoy the fruits thereof. It may be doubted if the moon can be a place of enjoyment. For the moon is either too cold or too hot and life is impossible there. It is true that a body of flesh and blood cannot live on the moon. But the departed soul which goes to the moon is not clothed in flesh and blood. As stated before it is accompanied by the mind and the organs of sense. As the soul in that stage is not clothed in gross matter, it is possible to remain on the surface of the moon although it is extremely cold or hot. As the mind and the organs of sense remain with the soul it is also possible for the soul to feel and to enjoy.

For the pitṛs one fortnight is equivalent to a day or a night. One month is equiva-

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18. Samkara's commentary on Bra Su. 4-3-8.

19. Ramanuja's commentary on Bra. Su. 4-3-12

lent to one day and one night of the pitrs.<sup>20</sup> Now it is wellknown that the moon completes a revolution round its axis in one month and that is why the moon always turns the same face towards the earth. Hence if there are any inhabitants on the face of the moon they would have their day in a fortnight and night in the same time. There is thus a remarkable coincidence between the statement in Manusamhitā and the astronomical phenomena.

As the soul enjoys the pleasures of heaven its store of meritorious acts is gradually exhausted. Ultimately the store is nearly finished and it is not sufficient to sustain him in heaven. We say "nearly finished" because when residence in heaven ends, a small store of acts still remains and it determines the circumstances in which he is born again. If this remnant consists of good acts he is born as a Brahmin or a Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya. If this remnant consists of evil acts he is born as a person of the lowest caste or may even be born as a dog or a pig.<sup>21</sup> Birth, on which depends so much even in countries where there is no caste system, cannot be an accident if we are to believe

(20) पितॄ रावाहनौ मासः प्रविभागस्तु पक्षयोः ।

कर्म चेष्टास्वहः कृष्णः शुक्लः स्वप्राय शर्वरो ॥ Manu, 1.66

(21) रमणीयचरणाः रमणीयां योनिमापदीरन् ब्राह्मणयोनिं वा क्षत्रिययोनिं वा वैश्ययोनिं वा, कपूयचरणाः कपूयां योनिमापदीरन् शूद्रयोनिं वा शूकरयोनिं वा चण्डाल-  
योनिं वा । Chh U 5.10.7

in the existence of a just and all-powerful God. In no other religion except Hinduism have the causes which determine birth been indicated so scientifically. Every event must have an adequate cause. There must be adequate reasons why one is born in this family and not in another ; why one is born as a man and not as a beast. These adequate reasons consist of the acts done in the previous births or rather that portion of the acts of the previous births the fruits of which were not tasted before and have to be tasted now. To regard birth as a mere accident is not consistent with the theory that God is just and almighty. All our pleasures and pains are the result of good or bad acts done either in this birth or in the previous births. Similarly we must enjoy in future the fruit of every act good or bad in the shape of pleasure and pain.<sup>22</sup> This is the well-known doctrine (act) of karma. Other religions like Christianity and Mahomedanism accept the doctrine of karma when they say that a man who commits sins goes to hell and a man who performs good acts goes to heaven. But this is only a part of the doctrine of karma. The full implication of the Law of Karma has been worked out in Hinduism which traces all our pleasures and pains to previous acts

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(22) नाभुक्तं चोयते कमं कल्पकोटि शतैरपि ।

committed by us.<sup>23</sup> As the tree is bigger than the seeds so the consequences of a particular act occupy much longer time than the time in which the act is performed. In fact it may be that a particularly good or bad act performed in a moment may be such that its consequences have to be experienced in thousands of births. This explains why the number of plants and insects is so much larger than the number of men. Each of these plants and insects has been a man in some previous birth and during his life as man has committed some acts the consequences of which he is experiencing now. It has been said in the Hindu scriptures that generally a particular soul is born for 84,00,000 (84 lacs) of times as a plant, an insect or an animal before it is born as a man. In those previous births the soul has no opportunity to attain God-realisation. Those births are merely intended to work off the *karma* (acts) which he performed as a man. Those bodies are therefore called *bhogadehas*, i. e., bodies which are intended merely for experiencing pleasure and pain. A soul has not to suffer

(23) The doctrine of Karma and rebirth is mentioned in the Kathopanishad. "Some souls are born as animals, some as trees. The form of birth depends upon the acts and upon the knowledge."

योनिमने प्रपद्यन्त शरीरत्वाय देहिनः ।

स्थाणुमनेऽनुसंयन्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥ Ka U 2.2.7

The Rig-Veda-Samhita also mentions this doctrine "Go according to your acts to earth or heaven." RV. 10.16.1 to 6

the consequences of acts performed in such bodies. A tiger has not to suffer any punishment for killing animals.

It is only a man who has to account for his acts and get the rewards or punishments therefor. There is a mountainlike accumulation of past acts in innumerable previous births of which we have yet to experience the consequences. Nothing but the grace of God can free us from the bondage of past acts. We can earn the grace of God by obeying His commands as laid down in the scriptures *viz.*, the Vedas, Puranas etc. We should act according to the injunctions in those books but without any desire for reward. We can thereby free ourselves from the bonds of previous acts and attain union with God.

The question has been discussed, Does an act itself produce the effect, or does an animate being create the effect? A man does a good act and goes to heaven. Does the act itself send the performer to heaven or does Brahman send the man to heaven? Jaimini is of opinion that the act itself produces the result; Vedic words have such power that if a man utters them and performs the prescribed acts he goes to heaven and no intervention of a living being is necessary. But Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Brahmasūtras does not accept this theory. He says that

Brahman gives us the reward or punishment for a good or bad act. Acts are inanimate. They cease to exist when they are finished. They can not make us enjoy or suffer. It is only Brahman who can make all persons enjoy or suffer the consequences of all acts committed by them.<sup>24</sup> As He is omniscient He knows all acts done by all persons. As He is omnipotent He has the power to make all men enjoy or suffer to any extent, great or small.

As regards the doctrine of karma the question has been asked, Why does God make some men do good acts and thereby enjoy happiness, while He makes others do evil acts and hence suffer in life? He is omnipotent. Why then does he not make all men do good acts and thus make all happy? No person can do an evil act unless it is the desire of God that that person should commit an evil act. Does not God reveal partiality or capriciousness by making some men do good acts and making others do evil acts? To this question Vedānta replies that it is true that God makes some persons do good acts and others do evil acts. But He does not thereby reveal either partiality or capriciousness. He does not arbitrarily and without due and sufficient reason make some men do good acts and make others do evil acts. God makes those men do good acts

(24) फलमत उपपत्तिः । Bra Su 3.2.38

who have a tendency to do good acts as a result of acts done in the past. He makes those men do evil acts who have a yearning for doing wicked acts as a result of acts done in the past. —

Acts done by us do not all yield their fruit after the same period. Every act yields its fruit at the proper time and proper place. There are some acts the time for enjoying whose fruits has arrived at the present moment. If those acts are good we get a tendency to do good acts now. If those acts are bad we get a tendency to do evil acts. Among our previous acts some are good and some are bad. If good acts preponderate we get a tendency to do good acts more often than to do bad. The fewer bad acts we do, the fewer will be the occasions on which we shall have the tendency to do evil. This conclusion is established in the following aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa.

“There is neither partiality nor cruelty in God. Because the individual soul gets pleasure or pain according to the good or bad acts done by him.”<sup>25</sup> In his commentary on this aphorism Śāṅkarāchāryya quotes the following passage from the Upaniṣads.

“It is He who makes a man do a good act whom He wants to raise to a higher world than this. It is He who makes a man

(25) वैषम्यनैर्घृण्य न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति । Bra Su 2.1.34

do a bad act whom He wants to take to a place lower than this world.”<sup>26</sup>

Most of the planets and satellites are unfit for habitation by human beings as the surfaces of those planets are either too hot or too cold. But souls encased in fine bodies can live in any planet however hot or cold it may be. After death the soul encased in a fine body leaves the gross body and goes to one of these planets to enjoy or to suffer according to the acts performed by it. As stated before the fine body includes the mind and organs of sense. The fine body is therefore capable of enjoyment and suffering. The creation of no planet or satellite is therefore without any purpose although it might appear purposeless at first thought. “Every material object has been created with a definite purpose *viz.* to enable a soul to experience the consequences of good or bad acts performed by it.”

“We have referred above to two paths, *pitryāna* or the path taken by those who perform good deeds and the *devayāna* or the path taken by those who worship Brahman. According to Rāmānuja all persons who attain Brahman must take the latter path. But Śaṅkara divides into two classes those who attain Brahman. The first class consists of persons who realize

(26) एष हीव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्ननीषते, एष हीव असाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य अधो निनीषते । Kausitaki U 39.

in this life the identity of their soul with Brahman. At the time of death they become one with Brahman. They have not to take the devayāna path which is meant for those who worship, not pure Brahman who according to Saṁkara possesses no qualities (Nirguṇa Brahma), but the lower manifestation of Brahman *e. i.* Brahman endowed with qualities (Saguna Brahman). The latter persons do not realize in this life the identity of their soul with Brahman. After death they take the devayāna path, reach Brahmaloṇa where they realize their unity with Brahman and ultimately attain Brahman. / In support of this statement Saṁkara quotes from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the passage in which it is stated that if a man has no desire his prāṇa does not go out ; he becomes Brahman and attains Brahman<sup>27</sup>. The followers of Rāmānuja interpret this passage to mean that the prāṇa does not go out of such a soul. When the soul attains Brahman, his prāṇa becomes one with Brahman. Saṁkara has quoted another passage of the Upaniṣad in his support. "The soul gives up both merit and sin, becomes free from attachment and attains supreme equanimity<sup>28</sup>." He says that the soul being free from attachment cannot go anywhere and as

(27) न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्नोति । Bri U 4.4.6

(28) पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति । Mu U 3.1.3

the ultimate goal to be attained is equanimity it would not be necessary to move from one place to another. It may however be observed that in the journey after death the gods carry the departed soul who does not move out of his own accord. Motion is therefore possible even in the absence of any attachment. The statement that equanimity is attained does not also prohibit movement. Moreover conditions in one place may be more congenial for the attainment of equanimity than conditions in another place. Saṁkara has explained Brahmasūtra 3-3-29<sup>29</sup> as supporting the doctrine that the free soul may or may not travel by the devāyana path. But his explanation of this sūtra is not as happy as that of Rāmānuja<sup>30</sup>. The very last aphorism of the Brahmasutras (4-4-22) which ought to refer to the best path refers to the devāyana path even according to Saṁkara. This seems to indicate that the devāyana path is the best path and there is no better method of attaining Brāhman without undertaking a journey by that path.

(29) गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथाहि विरोधः । Bra Su 3.3.29

(30) The words are : गतिः अर्थवत्त्वम् उभयथा । Saṁkara explains thus : गतिः अर्थवत्त्वम् existence of motion उभयथा it may be both ways ; in some cases there is motion, in some cases there is no motion. Ramanuja explains thus: गतिः अर्थवत्त्वम् there is reason for motion उभयथा if the soul sheds part of his acts at the time of death and part in the course of the journey (This is पूर्वपक्ष)

## CHAPTER VII

### God and the soul

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad describes Brahman as "That (Being) from which all beings are born by which they live and into which they finally merge".<sup>1</sup> As we have said before Brahman is not only the creator of the universe. He is also the ingredient out of which the universe was created. The universe comes out of Him at the time of the creation and merges into Him at the time of the Pralaya (or universal destruction). The nature of Brahman has been described in the above way by the sage Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Brahmasūtras in the second aphorism.<sup>2</sup> It has however been observed that this description of Brahman indicates the relation of Brahman to the universe, rather than the actual nature of Brahman. A thing can be described in two ways,—what it really is and how it is related to other things. The former has been called the Svarūpa lakṣaṇa (स्वरूप लक्षण) and the latter has been called the Tatāstha lakṣaṇa (तटस्थ लक्षण ।) The Tatāstha lakṣaṇa of Brahman is that the world comes

(1) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत् प्रयन्ति अभिसंवि-  
शन्ति । (Tai U 3-1)

(2) जन्माद्यस्य यतः (Bra!Su 1-1-2)

out of Him, is supported by Him, and merges into Him. The Svarūpa lakṣaṇa is obviously more important than the Tātastha lakṣaṇa. As to the Svarūpa lakṣaṇa of Brahman the Upaniṣads say that He is truth, knowledge and joy<sup>3</sup>. Brahman is truth as He exists always and everywhere. The objects of the universe exist in some places and for some time only. They are created and destroyed. They do not exist for ever, nor do they exist everywhere. Hence they cannot be said to be true. If an object is true, its existence should not depend on time and place. It should exist always and everywhere. The objects of the universe do not satisfy this condition. At the time of universal destruction the earth is dissolved in water, water merges into fire, fire into air, air into ether, and ether into Brahman. Brahman alone exists for ever.

The discoveries of astronomy show how wide the universe is. It extends through millions of millions of miles. Compared with that vast inconceivable expanse, the space occupied by a wordly object is infinitesimal, which is another name for zero. Thus from the point of view of the infinity the objects of the world do not exist. This is the correct point of view as it does not ignore the infinity of space. ( पारमार्थिक दृष्टि ). It is only if we ignore the infinite expanse of

space that the spaces occupied by wordly objects cease to be infinitesimal. For purposes of every day usage, we have to keep out of account the infinite expanse of space and take into account the existence of various objects of the world. ( व्यवहारिक दृष्टि )

Similarly, compared with the infinite expanse of time, millions of millions of years, the period of our life is infinitesimal. The period of time for which ordinary objects exist is also infinitesimal, or zero. In other words they do not exist. This is the real point of view. It is only if we keep out of view the infinite expanse of time that the periods of existence of ordinary objects emerge as finite. In ordinary usage we have to keep out of view the infinite expanse of time, and take into account the existence of ordinary objects.

Those who realize Brahman remember Brahman every moment of their life. They never keep out of view the infinite expanse of space and time which is filled by Brahman and also transcended by Him. For them Brahman is the only reality. All else is false. They do not care for the transitory affairs of the world which include their own personal joys and sorrows.

It may be observed that western thinkers also have affirmed the Vedāntic view of the falsity of the world. Thus Shakespeare says : "We are such stuff as dreams are made of". Carlyle

says :—"This earthly life with its riches and possessions and good and evil hap are not intrinscally a reality at all but are a shadow of realities" (Past and Present, Book II, Chapter VI) Again he says, "Brother, this planet I find is but an inconsiderable sand-grain in the continents of Being ; this planet's poor temporary interests, thy interests and my interests here, when I look fixedly into that eternal Light-sea and Flame-sea with its eternal interests, dwindle literally into nothing." (Book III Chap. XV).

So long as a person does not realize Brahman, so long as he does not realize the infinite, he can not ignore finite objects of the world. He must admit the existence of worldly objects and act according to the rules laid down in the Śāstras. He can not say "All this is false. So it does not matter how I act." Śaṅkara, the great champion of the falsity of the world, says in his commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad : "So long as a person does not realize his identity with Brahman, he must carefully perform the acts enjoined in the scriptures".<sup>4</sup>

It may be observed that the interpretation of the falsity of the world given above agrees more with the view of Rāmānuja than that

(4) Sankara's commentary on धर्मै चर (Tai Up I-11-1) प्राग्-  
ब्रह्मात्मप्रतिषेधात् नियमैर्न अनुष्ठेयानि श्रुतिश्रुतिविहितकर्माणि ।

of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja would say that a particular object exists now and here, but does not exist when viewed from the point of view of infinite space and infinite time. Śaṅkara would say that the object does not really exist even now and here, and that it is due to the influence of Māyā that it appears to exist.

The Bhagavadgīta also asserts the falsity of the world. The Lord says: "A thing which does not exist cannot come into being. Nor can a thing which exists ever cease to exist"<sup>5</sup> From the verses which follow this verse it is seen that the Lord refers to the soul as the thing which exists and that he refers to the bodies as the things which are destroyed (and therefore do not really exist). In the verse which follows this verse the Lord says "That which fills the universe can never be destroyed"<sup>6</sup>. Here he refers to the universal soul which is infinite in expanse and exists everywhere throughout the universe. This soul is referred to as 'sat', or that which truly exists, for nowhere and at no time it can be said that it does not exist. How then can it be destroyed? In the next verse the Lord says, "The universal soul is everlasting and infinite. These temporary bodies

(5) नास्त्यो विद्यते भावो नाभावी विद्यते सतः (Gita 2-16)

(6) अविनाशि तु तद्विद्मि येन सर्वमिदं ततं Gita 2-17.

belong to him?" As the bodies are destructible they have been called 'asat'. *f. Plato*

Śaṅkara's doctrine of non-existence of worldly objects is generally associated with Berkeley's Idealism. But there is a great difference between the two. According to Berkeley when we see a tree there exists only an idea of the tree in our mind, there is nothing outside the mind; the idea in our mind is real, but the tree outside is unreal. According to Śaṅkara there is no real existence (पारमार्थिक सत्ता) either of the idea in the mind or of the object outside, but there is conventional existence (व्यवहारिक सत्ता) of both; Brahman alone has real existence. All objects of the world including the bodies and the minds of men have merely conventional existence. When we see a tree we have an idea of a tree in our mind. This idea being part of the mind has only a conventional existence. The tree also has a conventional existence. According to Berkeley the idea in the mind alone has existence, there is no existence of the tree outside the mind. Advaita Vedānta is thus quite different from Berkeley's Idealism. Buddhist philosophy has a doctrine somewhat similar to Berkeley's Idealism. The doctrine in Buddhist philosophy is called Vijñānavāda विज्ञानवाद । Vijñāna means an idea. The doctrine

is that Vijñāna or idea alone exists, outside objects do not exist. This doctrine is refuted in the following Brahmasutra :

“It cannot be concluded that outside objects do not exist, because they are actually perceived.”<sup>8</sup> Commenting on this passage Śaṅkarāchāryya says that it cannot be held that the idea only is perceived ; from the fact of perception one must admit that the object perceived is different from perception ; surely no one perceives the perception itself as a pillar or a wall, everyone perceives the pillar or the wall as the object of perception<sup>9</sup>.

On this question there is no difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. In fact all schools of Vedānta philosophy accept this position.

We now come to the second epithet used regarding Brahman, *viz.* knowledge (Jñānam). All other objects besides Brahman are unconscious. Men and animals appear to be conscious. But their consciousness is due to the soul. All parts of a man besides the soul are unconscious *e. g.* the physical body, the organs of sense ( इन्द्रिय ), mind, faculty of understanding ( बुद्धि ). It is because of their association with

(8) नाभाय उपलब्धः Brahmasutra 2-2-28.

(9) उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकीऽपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः । उपलब्धेरिव । नहि कश्चित् उपलब्धमेव स्तम्भः कुदां चेत्युपलभते । उपलब्धिविषयत्वे नैवतु स्तम्भकुदादीन् सर्वं लौकिका उपलभन्ते (Samkarabhasya on Brahmasutra 2-2-28).

the consciousness or knowledge of the soul that they appear to be conscious. Brahman is essentially knowledge or consciousness. The human soul which according to Śaṅkara is identical with Brahman and according to Rāmānuja is a part of Brahman, is also essentially knowledge or consciousness. Animals also have souls. Otherwise they could not have consciousness. They have also the power of reasoning. Otherwise a cow would not have approached a man inviting it with a bundle of grass and fled from a person advancing towards it with an uplifted stick. The cow must have reasoned that this man would feed me and this other man would strike me. Of course the power of reasoning of animals is less developed than that of man. But it is a difference in degree, not in kind. Among men also there is wide divergence in the power of reasoning. The faculty of reasoning is called *buddhi* and is an adjunct of the soul. When a person dies the soul leaves the body accompanied by the power of reasoning, the mind, the organs of sense etc. In a lunatic the power of reasoning is disorganised, but knowledge remains, because the soul remains.

Inasmuch as consciousness exists in the body the materialists hold that consciousness is an attribute of the body. But this view

is not correct. Because it is sometimes found that although the body exists there is no consciousness in the body. An attribute of the body should remain as long as the body exists. But after death although there is the body there is no consciousness. Hence it must be concluded that consciousness is not an attribute of the body. In fact consciousness is an attribute of the soul which is different from the body. Let us take an example. Form is an attribute of the body. So long as the body exists, the form also exists. Other persons can perceive the form of the body. But it may happen that the body exists but there is no consciousness in it. Also the consciousness of one body cannot be perceived by another person. Hence consciousness can not be said to be an attribute of the body in the same sense as form is an attribute of the body. It is true that consciousness can be perceived in a body. But it cannot be concluded therefrom that consciousness can not be perceived outside the body. For it may be conceived that the consciousness which is perceived in a particular body may leave that body and exist in another body. This happens when there is transmigration of the soul. Yogis can also make their soul leave their body and enter another body temporarily. It is stated in the life of

Śamkarāchārya that by his Yogic power his soul left his body and entered the body of a king who had died just then. Again the materialist may be asked, "What is the nature of the thing called consciousness?" If he says that consciousness is perception of the body along with other objects, his reply would be illogical. For he has said before that consciousness is an attribute of the body. How can an attribute of the body perceive the body? An attribute of an object cannot act on itself. Power of burning which is an attribute of the fire cannot burn the fire. Hence those who hold that the thing called consciousness is perception of objects must admit that consciousness is different from the body.<sup>10</sup>

We say, "I felt thus in the past" It is clear that the author of the act of perception *viz*, the soul, existed in the past and also exists now. Though our body has changed, the soul has not changed. The soul is thus different from the body. The perception of an object depends on light. If there is light, the object is perceived. If there is no light, the object is not perceived. But for this reason it can not be said that perception is an attribute of light. In the same way even though consciousness may depend on the body

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10. Samkara's commentary on Bra. Su. 3-3-54

it cannot be said that consciousness is an attribute of the body."

The existence of the soul does not depend on any other proof. The existence of the soul is proved by itself. All other proofs depend upon the soul for their application. If any other proof were to be applied to determine the existence of the soul that proof would have also depended upon the soul for its application. Thus any proof of the existence of the soul would have to rest on the soul and at the same time would also support the soul which would be mutually contradictory. On the other hand he who asserts that the soul does not exist is himself the soul. Everyone of us feels "I am" or in other words feels the existence of the soul. We have explained above that this self cannot be an attribute of the body, for then it could not have felt the body, nor could it have left the body at the time of death. This self is the soul. Thus we all feel the existence of the soul although it may not be possible for us to prove it.

✓ We now come to the third attribute of Brahman, *viz*, infinity. Space may appear to be infinite, but it is not really so. Brahman alone is infinite. Nothing else is. It may be thought that the sky cannot be conceived as finite, for we cannot conceive that the sky is enclosed in a case

outside which there is no space or sky. But the finiteness of the sky can be conceived in another way. If a point travelling in the sky very long in a straight direction with very great speed comes back from where it started, it will prove that the sky is finite or limited.<sup>12</sup> In this way it can be conceived that space is finite. In the same way time can also be conceived to be finite. Just as day is followed by night and night by day, just as the summer is followed by the rains, autumn, winter and spring which again is followed by summer,—so in the cycle of yugas we get satya,<sup>13</sup> tretā, dvāpara and kali which is again followed by satya, tretā, dvāpara and kali. Creation is followed by destruction which again is followed by creation in which we have the same order of satya, tretā, etc. So if we start from a point of time, we again come back,—

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(12) 'Scientists now believe that if we could travel straight on through space for long enough, we should also come back to our starting point, we should have travelled round the universe. It was Einstein who first said so.' Sir James Jeans "The Stars in Their Courses." p. 141.

(13) *Satya yuga* is the perfect age. It is followed by the less perfect *treta*, which again is followed by the still less perfect *dvapara*. *Kali* is the worst age. The present age belongs to *Kali*. It is now about 5,000 years since the *Kali yuga* started. A cycle of the 4 yugas occupies 43,80,000 years. One day of Brahma equals 52, 56, 000, 00, 00, 000 years, which is the period during which creation lasts. It is followed by *pralaya* lasting for the same period. Brahma's life is 100 years, each year consisting of 365 such days. (Vide Manu I, 69-73)

after millions of years—to the same point of time, thus proving that time has exhausted itself. There is nothing infinite except Brahman.

With regard to the infinite aspect of Brahman two words have been used in the Upaniṣads. One word ananta ( अनन्त ) has been already referred to. The other word is bhūmā ( भूमा ). The Chāndogya Upaniṣad says, “There is joy only in the infinite, there is no joy in the finite”.<sup>14</sup> As to the nature of the infinite the Śrutis say, that a man has attained the infinite when he does not see or hear or know anything different from himself.<sup>15</sup> The infinite alone is immortal. The finite is mortal.<sup>16</sup> To the question as to what supports the infinite the reply is that the infinite is supported by itself<sup>17</sup>. The infinite Brahman is in front of us, behind us, to the right and to the left, below and above<sup>18</sup>. He is the I, the self. The entire universe is the self<sup>19</sup>. He who sees thus, thinks thus, feels thus delights in the self, plays with the self

(14) भूमैव सुखं नान्ये सुखमस्ति (Chh. U 7.23.1)

(15) यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यत् शृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति तद्भूमा  
(Cha. U 7.24.1)

(16) यी वै भूमा तदस्य तमय यदस्य तन्मत्तां (Cha. U 7.24.1)

(17) स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति स्व महिम्नि । (Cha. 7.24.1)

(18) ब्रह्मैवेदमस्यतं पुरस्तात् ब्रह्म पश्चात् ब्रह्म दक्षिणतश्चोत्तरेण । अधोर्ध्वं च प्रसृतं ब्रह्मैव (Mundaka 2.2.11)

(19) आत्मा एव इदं सर्वं (Cha. 7.24.2)

unites with the self, enjoys with the self<sup>20</sup>. He shines in his own true self<sup>21</sup>. He can go wherever he likes<sup>22</sup>. He who is blessed with true knowledge does not see death, nor disease, nor sorrow<sup>23</sup>. He sees everything. He attains everything<sup>24</sup>.

In order to teach that joy (ānanda) is the essence of Brahman the Upaniṣads give the story of Varuṇa and his son Bhṛgu. Bhṛgu approached his father and asked him to teach what is Brahman. Varuṇa said "Brahman is that from which all beings are born, by which they live and into which they merge"<sup>25</sup>. Bhṛgu practised austerities (tapas) as a result of which he thought that food is Brahman, for, out of food come all living beings, by means of food beings live and into food beings merge<sup>26</sup>. He again approached his father and asked for true knowledge

(20) स वा एष एषं पश्यन् एवं मन्वानः एवं विजानन् आत्मरतिरात्मक्रीडः  
आत्मसिद्धिं आत्मानन्दः Chh. 7.25.2

(21) सः स्वराड् भवति । Ibid

(22) तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति (Ibid)

(23) न पश्यी मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नीत दुःखतां Chh. 7.26.2

(24) सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति सर्वमाप्नोति सर्वशः Ibid

(25) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत् प्रयन्ति  
अभिसंविशन्ति । Tai U 3-1.

(26) i. e. to say when living beings die their bodies are decomposed and eaten by vermins, or plants grow from the decomposed substance producing food for living beings.

of Brahman. The father told him to know Brahman by again practising austerities. The son again undertook tapas. This time he thought that prāṇa (breath) is Brahman. He again approached his father and asked for true knowledge. Again the father told him to undertake tapas. In this way the son advanced step by step in his quest of true knowledge. Next he thought mind (manas) to be Brahman, then he thought intellect (or according to Rāmānuja,—knowledge) to be Brahman, finally he thought joy (ānanda) was Brahman. The fact is that we mistake various outer objects as our soul. The man who is least spiritually advanced, mistakes as his soul the material body of flesh and blood which is the form into which food taken by us is converted. He says "I am ill" or "I have become lean" mistaking his body for the soul. The next object which is mistaken for the soul is the breath which supports the gross body. When the breath (prāṇa) departs, the body dissolves and hence the breath may be mistaken for the soul. The next inner object is the mind (manas) the seat of desires. The mind is often considered by mistake as a living object because it thinks. The fact however is that the mind is inanimate, its function is to desire<sup>27</sup>; knowledge

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27. Desire is the tendency of the mind to adopt a definite configuration automatically without the willing direction of the soul.

which is in the soul reveals itself through its sheath, the mind, and it appears that the mind is animate<sup>28</sup>. The next inner object is knowledge (*vijñāna*). According to Saṁkara this knowledge (*vijñāna*) refers to intellect (*buddhi*) whose function is to decide. According to Rāmānuja *Vijñāna* means knowledge which is the substance of the soul (the *jīva*). Rāmānuja considers that intellect (*buddhi*) is included in the term mind which has been mentioned before. According to Saṁkara when Brahman or Atman is associated with *buddhi*, it is known as *jīva*. So the term *vijñāna* used here refers to *jīva* whichever interpretation is accepted. We then come to the next and innermost object which is mentioned as *ānanda* or joy by which term Brahman is referred to.

There is a difference of opinion between Saṁkara and Rāmānuja as to the relation between Brahman and joy. Saṁkara says that Brahman is identical with joy while Rāmānuja says that Brahman is full of joy. This difference in their opinion proceeds from the difference in their conception of Brahman. According to Saṁkara, Brahman has no

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28. Western philosophers have generally considered the mind to be indentical with the soul. Indian philosophers guided by the Vedas have realized thousands of years ago the distinction between the mind and the soul.

attributes, while according to Rāmānuja Brahman is full of good attributes. For Rāmānuja it is natural to say that Brahman is full of joy. But Saṁkara cannot say so, for then he would have to admit the existence of two things, Brahman and joy, which he cannot admit because according to his Advaita (monist) philosophy there is only one true object *i.e.* Brahman. So Saṁkara says that Brahman is identical with joy. It may be observed that the Upaniṣads contain both kinds of passages. In some passages Brahman is referred to as identical with joy. A few such passages are quoted below.

“He (Brahman) is joy”<sup>29</sup>.

“One who attains Brahman ( who is joy ) becomes full of joy”<sup>30</sup>.

“Who would have moved, who would have lived if this Brahman had not been joy”<sup>31</sup>?

“(He) realised that Brahman was joy”<sup>32</sup>.

“Brahman is knowledge and joy”<sup>33</sup>.

But there are also other passages in which joy is said to be a quality of Brahman or Brahman is said to be full of joy.

29. रसो वै सः Tai U 2-7-1

30. रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वा नन्दो भवति । Tai U 2-7-1

31. को ह्येवान्यात् कः प्राण्यात् यदेव आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात् । Tai U 2-7-1

32. आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । Tai U 3-6

33. विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म

“When the individual soul attains liberation it attains this joyous soul”<sup>34</sup>.

“He who knows the joy of Brahman does not fear from any thing”<sup>35</sup>.

“It is Brahman who fills others with joy”<sup>36</sup>.

According to Saṅkara the first set of passages which describe Brāhman as indentical with joy refers to Brahman as He really is while the latter set of passages refers to Brahman in conjunction with Māyā. He says, “two forms of Brahman have been mentioned in the Upaniṣads—one form in which the name, form and other adjuncts of Brahman are mentioned ; the other in which Brahman is described as free from all qualifications”<sup>37</sup>.”

Again he says “What ! Are there two Brahmanas ? One absolute and one non-absolute ? Yes. As the Praśnopaniṣad says ‘Oh Satyakāma, this Oṃkāra is both Para and Apra Brahman,’ Where all qualifications (like name and form—which are the creations of Māyā) are repudiated and Brahman is described by negative words *e. g.* not-gross, form-less,—this is Para or absolute Brahman. But when the same object is described

34. एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामति Tai U 2-8-6

35. आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन Tai U 2-9-1

36. एष ह्येवानन्दयाति Tai U 2-7-1

37. विरूपं हि ब्रह्म अयमव्ययं, नामरूप-विकारभेदीपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विपर्येतं च सर्वोपाधिवर्जितं । (Saṅkara's commentary on Bra Su 1-1-12)

by the qualifications like name and form in order that He may be worshipped, then He is Apra or non-absolute *e.g.* 'He can be attained by the mind. His body is the breath. His form is all radiance. (Chā Upa 3-14-2)<sup>38</sup>'.

According to Rāmānuja in the first set of passages Brahman is referred to as joy itself because He is full of joy. According to him Para Brahma means Brahman as He really is, *i.e.* full of the good qualities, while Apra Brahman means the lower manifestation of Brahman, *i. e.* Brahman as seen in the universe which is a manifestation of Brahman.

It is not correct to state that the individual soul comes into existence out of the Supreme Soul (Brahman) or in other words that Brahman is the cause and the Jīva is the effect. For the Vedas have said that the individual soul always exists<sup>39</sup>. According to Saṅkara, Brahman and the individual soul are essentially the same, and when Brahman is associated with ignorance it

38. किं हि ब्रह्मणौ परमपरस्वेति । वादं हि । 'एतद् सत्यकाम परञ्चापरञ्च ब्रह्म यदीदृशः' (Pra U 5-2) यत्र अविद्याकृतनामरूपादिविशेषप्रतिषेधेन अस्य लादि-शब्दे ब्रह्म उपदिश्यते तत् परं । तदेव यत्र नामरूपविशेषेण केनचिद्विशिष्टमुपासनायोप-दिश्यते 'मनीमयः प्राणशरीरी भावरूपः' (Chha U 3-14-2) तदपरं (Sanka-  
ra's commentary on Bra Su 4-3-14)

39. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् (Kathopanishad 1-2-18)

न जौषी म्रियते (Chandogyopanishad 6-11)

अजो नित्यः शान्तोऽयं पुराणः (Kathopanishad 1-2-18)

considers itself wrongly to be the individual soul. According to Rāmānuja the individual soul is a part of Brahman ; Brahman always possesses full and correct knowledge, but the knowledge of the individual soul has different degrees of manifestation ; at the time of universal destruction (pralaya) the knowledge of the individual soul contracts very much ; at the time of creation, its knowledge unfolds itself to the extent necessary to enable it to taste the fruits of the acts previously committed by it ; when it attains Brahman its knowledge unfolds itself to its fullest extent, it can then realise the true nature of its own self and also that of Brahman.

In the Brahmasūtras the sage Bādarāyana has discussed the magnitude of the individual soul. Is it infinite, finite or infinitesimal ? We find in the Upaniṣads that at the time of death the individual soul leaves the body.<sup>40</sup> Also such souls as have done pious acts go to the moon to enjoy the fruits of their acts<sup>41</sup>. Again after the enjoyment of fruits of acts the soul returns to this earth for performing further acts.<sup>42</sup> As the individual soul leaves the body, goes to another orb and returns to the earth, it must be concluded that the individual

40. स यदा अस्मात् शरीरादुत्क्रामति (Kausitaki Upanishad)

41. ये के च अस्मात् लोकात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमिव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति (Ibid 1-2)

42. तस्मात् लोकात् पुनरिति अस्मै लोकाय (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad)

soul is not infinite.<sup>43</sup> For if it were infinite it would always be present everywhere. It must therefore be either finite or infinitesimal. It might be thought that as it is perceived throughout the body its dimension should be the same as that of the body and that therefore it is finite. But such a conclusion would not be correct. The physical body of a person increases as he grows from boyhood to youth. Should his soul also vary in size with age? If it does, it cannot be everlasting for every object which changes in size is subject to decay and destruction. Again from where would the soul get the material with which its size would increase? Not from the physical body, as the soul is not a material object. The size of the soul cannot thus be the same as the size of the body.<sup>44</sup> In fact the soul cannot be finite for there are beings infinitesimally small and if the soul had been finite it would extend beyond its body and would feel objects outside its body. As the soul is neither finite nor infinite it follows that it must be infinitesimal.

It is true that in some places in the Upanishads the ātmā or soul is referred to as vast or infinite.<sup>45</sup> But at such places the Supreme Soul

43. Bra Su 2-3-19

44. Bra Su 2-2-34, 35, 36

45. स वा एष महान् अज आत्मा Bri Upa 4-4-22

आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म Tai Upa 2-1-1

is referred to.<sup>46</sup> In several places the Upaniṣads clearly state that the individual soul is infinitesimal.<sup>47</sup> To the objection that if the soul is infinitesimal how is it felt throughout the body, it may be replied that just as if a drop of sandal paste is applied at any part of the body the entire body feels cool, so also although the soul is very small it is felt throughout the body.<sup>48</sup> It may again be objected that the sandal paste has a definite location in the body, but the soul has not. The reply is that the soul also has a definite location in the body, viz, the heart.<sup>49</sup> A further objection may be raised that the sandal paste has minute particles which spread themselves throughout the body and hence the entire body feels refreshed, but surely the soul has no such particles. The reply is that the soul has a quality, namely consciousness, which spreads throughout the body. If a lamp is placed in a room the entire room is lit up because light (which is a quality of the lamp) fills the entire room. Similarly although the soul is situated at a particular

46. Bra Su 2-3-21

47. एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः (Mundakopanishad 3-1-9)

बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः

(Swe U 5-9)

48. Bra Su 2-3-23

49. हृदि हि एष आत्मा (Prasnopanishad 3-7)

स वा एष आत्मा हृदि (Chhandogyopanishad 8-3-3)

Bra Su 2-3-24

place inside the body, namely the heart, its quality (namely, consciousness) spreads throughout the body.<sup>50</sup> It must not be supposed that the quality can never remain apart from the object even as the white colour of a cloth does not remain apart from the cloth. Quality may also remain apart from the object. Thus the fragrance of a flower is perceived where the flower does not exist.<sup>51</sup> It should not be thought that consciousness is identical with the soul for it is found in the Upaniṣads that the two objects (soul and consciousness) have been mentioned separately.<sup>52</sup> It is true that in some other places the soul is referred to as consciousness.<sup>53</sup> But such references are due to the fact that consciousness is the principal quality of the soul.<sup>54</sup> In the same way Brahman is referred to at some places as joy, not

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50. Bra Su 2-3-25

51. Bra Su 2-3-26

52. प्रज्ञया शरीरं समावृत्तं शरीरेण सुखदुःखं चाप्नोति (Kausitaki Upaniṣad 3-6)

"The jiva occupies the body by means of consciousness and with the help of the body feels pleasure and pain." As the jiva and the consciousness are mentioned separately Ramanuja concludes that they cannot be identical, and hence it would be proper to conclude that consciousness is an attribute of the jiva. Bra Su 2-3-28

53. विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते (Tai U 2-5)

54. Ramanuja's commentary on Bra Su 2-3-29

because Brahman is identical with joy but because joy is the principal quality of Brahman, These conclusions have been stated by Bādarāyaṇa in Brahmasūtras 2-3-19 to 2-3-29.

It may be observed that Śaṅkarāchāryya does not accept the conclusions mentioned above. He holds that the individual soul being identical with the Supreme Soul (Brahman) the magnitude of the former is the same as that of the latter. The latter being infinite, the former (*i. e.*, the individual soul) is also infinite. According to him the so-called individual soul is the Supreme Soul as manifested in the intelligence (buddhi) of of an individual being and that as the magnitude of the intelligence is infinitesimal the individual soul has been referred to as infinitesimal in some passages of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkarācāryas' commentary on Brahma Sutra 2-3-29 is not however as satisfactory as that of Rāmānujācārya.

The individual soul has the capacity to perform acts.<sup>55</sup> It is the doer (kartā) of acts. Unless it is admitted that the individual soul can perform acts, there would be no meaning in the various injunctions of the scriptures requiring persons to perform specific acts (*e.g.* to make sacrifices, to offer gifts etc.) According

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55. Bra Su 2-3-33 to 2-3-39

to Sāṅkara the capacity to perform acts belongs really to the intelligence (buddhi) not to the soul and as intelligence is the principal quality of the soul this capacity has been attributed to the soul. But according to Rāmānuja this capacity belongs to the soul and not to intelligence. As intelligence (buddhi) is admittedly without consciousness (chetanā) Rāmānuja's view seems to be more natural. In this connection Rāmānuja observes that it is true that the Bhagavadgīta says that acts are really performed by nature (prakṛti) and not by the soul (ātmā) and that it is due to our ignorance that it appears to us that acts are performed by the soul.<sup>56</sup> But the reason why the Gīta says so is that when the individual soul performs any act it derives from the qualities (satva, rajas and tamas) the urge for performing acts and these three qualities are the components of nature (prakṛti). If nature had really been the doer of acts, all persons should suffer the consequences of all acts no matter by whom they are performed because all persons are equally related to nature which is the doer. But it is found that a man suffers the consequences of acts done by himself and not by others. Hence it must be concluded that acts are performed, not by

56. प्रकृतेः कियमाणानि कर्माणि सर्वशः ।

अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ Gita 3-27

nature, but by individual souls. Another argument is that if acts had been performed by intelligence, results of acts would have been felt by intelligence, but intelligence being inanimate cannot feel pleasure or pain; the soul which is animate has the power to feel. A carpenter prepares wooden things with the help of tools. So also the soul performs acts with the help of intelligence, organs (indriya) etc. When the carpenter wishes to prepare objects he does so. When he does not wish to act, he remains idle. So also the soul can act or remain idle according to its wish. Acts are generally performed with a desire to enjoy fruits thereof. When the soul attains emancipation it has no desire for worldly enjoyment and remains inactive.

The individual soul cannot however perform any action unless the Supreme Soul desires it to perform such action.<sup>57</sup> This fact follows from the omnipotence of God. The Upaniṣads state that it is God who makes a person perform good acts when He desires that such a person should attain higher regions (after death) and that it is the same God who makes a person perform wicked deeds when it is the desire of God that such a person should go to the lower

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57. Bra Su 2-3-40

regions.<sup>58</sup> The Bhagavadgīta also says that God dwells in the heart of all beings and makes them perform acts like puppets fixed to a machine.<sup>59</sup> It should however be borne in mind that God makes a man perform such acts as he (the man) attempts to do. The scriptures say that one who performs good acts is rewarded and that one who performs wicked acts is punished. If a man tries to perform good acts God allows him to do so and rewards him. If a man tries to perform wicked acts God allows him to do so and punishes him. The Brahmasūtras say "Brahman gives a person power to do a thing according to the efforts of that person, as otherwise the injunctions and prohibitions of the Śāstras become meaningless."<sup>60</sup> If a man has no power to do the good and avoid the bad, why do the Śāstras ask us to do the good and avoid the bad ?

According to Rāmānuja a person gets the desire to perform an act from Brahman. He quotes the following passages from the Gīta in support of this statement.

58. एष ह्येष साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यः लोकेभ्य उन्नियते । Kausitaki Upanishad 3-9

59. ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति  
भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्मातृदानी मायया । Gita 18-61

60. कृत्स्नप्रयवापेक्षन्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्ध-अवैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः Bra Su 2-3-42

“Everything moves according to my desire..”<sup>61</sup>

“I give a man such ideas as enable him to attain me.”<sup>62</sup>

Though the individual soul and the Supreme Soul both dwell inside the heart, the individual soul feels pleasure and pain but the Supreme Soul does not. This difference in their feeling is due to the difference in the powers of the individual and the Supreme Soul. As Vyāsa has said,—the Supreme Soul is not bound to taste the fruit of His acts.<sup>63</sup> The Upaniṣads also say that the individual soul tastes the fruits of his acts but the Supreme Soul does not, He merely looks on.<sup>64</sup>

It is seen in the Vedas and other Śāstras that certain acts are prescribed for a Brāhmaṇa but prohibited for a Śūdra and so on. How can such caste differences be justified if, as the Upaniṣads say, all individual souls are same in substance, being either identical with Brahman or being a part of Brahman? The justification of such differences lies in the fact that although different souls are the same in substance they are associated with different bodies of varying purity. If the body is pure

61. मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते (Gita 10-8)

62. ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते (Gita 10-10)

63. न लिप्यते कर्मफले पद्मपत्रमिवाश्रया

64. तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वादति अनन्नन्नयोऽभिचाकशीति Mu U 3-1-1

the person is qualified to perform acts requiring purity of the body. If the body is impure he is disqualified. The purity or impurity of a body depends upon the acts performed in the previous birth. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad says that a person performing good acts is born as a Brahmana or a Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya, whereas a person performing wicked acts is born as a dog or a swine or a Candāla.<sup>65</sup> The statement may at first sight appear shocking. What! A candāla mentioned in the same category with a dog and swine. But a little reflection will show that there is nothing shocking. It is because we do not realise that all beings are parts of the same Brahman that we consider some beings as decent and others as filthy. The wise man who realizes that all objects are parts of the same Brahman<sup>66</sup> does not make such a distinction. He looks upon all with the same eye. As the Gīta says, the wise man looks with equanimity on all, - the pious and learned Brahmin, the cow, the elephant, the dog and the candāla.<sup>67</sup> It does not however follow

65. रमणीयचरणाः रमणीया योनिमापदोरन् ब्राह्मणयोनिं वा क्षत्रिययोनिं वा वैश्ययोनिं वा कपूयचरणाः कपूया योनिमापदोरन् श्वयोनिं वा शूकरयोनिं वा चण्डाल-योनिं वा (Chha U 5-10-7)

66. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म । Cha U 3-14-1

67. विद्याविनयसम्पन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि ।

शुनि चैव श्वाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः ॥ Gita 5-18

from this passage of the Gīta that the wise man will behave in the same way with all creatures. However wise he may be, he will drink the cow's milk and avoid the bitch's milk, though he realises that the soul of the cow is the same substance as the soul of the dog and the bodies of both are parts of Brahman. The Vedas in their supreme wisdom realise the sameness of all souls whether they are of the Brāhmaṇa or the caṇḍāla or the dog. The Vedas also see that it is wholly due to the acts done in previous births that one soul gets a pure body like that of a Brāhmin or an impure body like that of a caṇḍāla.

Rāmānuja criticizes the Advaita doctrine by saying that if, as the Advaitist says, there is only one soul, then it should feel the consequences of all acts performed by different beings as it is the same soul in all beings. It is only if the existence of different souls is accepted that it can be explained why one being does not feel the consequences of acts done by other beings. The advaitist says that the individual souls are like the reflections of the same sun in different sheets of water; if one reflection trembles, other reflections need not tremble.<sup>68</sup>

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68. In this connection there is a Brahmasutra आभास एव च (Bra Su 2-3-50) आभास means reflection. Sankara explains

According to Rāmānuja at the time of pralaya individual souls merge in Brahman. The names and forms which distinguish individual souls from each other and from Brahman disappear at the time of pralaya. Hence it is said that at the time of pralaya individual souls can not be distinguished from Brahman. At that time the knowledge of the souls shrinks very much. When there is creation of the universe the knowledge of the souls expands to the extent sufficient to enable them to feel such pleasure and pain as are the consequences of previous acts done by them. On attaining salvation their knowledge expands to the maximum extent. Inanimate objects disappear at the time of pralaya. Not so the individual souls which vary according to the expansion or contraction of their knowledge.

The Sāṃkhya doctrine that there are many souls and that each soul is all-prevading has been criticised by the Vedāntist. If every soul is all-prevading, every soul is equally connected with a particular body, and hence every body should experience the consequences of all acts done by all souls and not only

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this sutra to mean that different individual souls are like different reflections of the same sun in different sheets of water. Ramanuja explains this aphorism to mean that the Advaitist argument that different souls are the result of different adjuncts of the same soul is only a specious one.

those done by a particular soul. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine the individual souls though many are not all-pervading but infinitesimal in extent.

Although Brahman is full of joy (or as S'aṅkara says He is joy itself) yet He does not derive any pleasure by contact with external objects in the way in which ordinary beings experience pleasure. This is expressed by a passage of the Upaniṣads which says "Brahman is pleasure, Brahman is sky"<sup>69</sup> which is further explained by a subsequent passage which states "That which is pleasure is sky, and that which is sky is pleasure"<sup>70</sup> When one hears that Brahman is joy one may think that Brahman, like ordinary beings, enjoys pleasure by contact with external objects. To remove such possible misapprehension the Upaniṣad adds that Brahman is sky *i. e.* to say He is not attached to objects of sense, even as the sky is not attached to any object. On the other hand when one hears that Brahman is like the sky one may think that Brahman is an inanimate object like the sky. To prevent such possible misapprehension the Upaniṣad says, "That which is sky is also joy," showing that Brahman is animate and full of joy.

69. कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म (Chha U 4-10-5)

70. यदाय कं तदेव खं, यदाय खं तदेव कं (Ibid)

As Brahman is Almighty it follows that He controls all objects. What is the process by which He controls all objects? He does not control from outside. He controls from inside. He permeates all objects and thus controls them from inside. The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad in this connection mentions the following objects which are permeated by Brahman and also controlled by Him: The earth, the water, the fire, the sky, the air, the heaven, the sun, the moon, the stars, darkness, light, all beings, the vital breath, speech, the eye, the ear, the mind, the skin intelligence, the semen.<sup>71</sup> The celebrated Gāyatri mantra is addressed to the Supreme God and not the Sun God as it is stated therein that the God who is addressed inspires our intelligence. This can be said of the Supreme God alone and not of the Sun God or any other God.

The Upaniṣads say that Brahman cannot be perceived by our senses. He cannot be described by words, nor even thought by the mind<sup>72</sup> He is neither short nor long, neither fat nor lean, He is not red nor oily; He does not cast any shadow; neither is He dark; He is neither air

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71. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरी यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरी यमयति एष त आत्मान्तर्हस्यतः (Bri U 2-7-3)

72. न तव चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग् गच्छति नो मनः (Kena U 1-3)

nor space ; He is without attachment ; He has neither smell nor taste. He has neither ears nor eyes nor speech<sup>73</sup> Although He has neither eyes nor ears it is not to be understood that He cannot see or hear. He can see though without eyes. He can hear though without ears.<sup>74</sup> It is due to His power that other eyes can see, other ears can hear<sup>75</sup> For this reason it has been said in the Vedas that all eyes are His eyes, all ears are His ears.<sup>76</sup>

Regarding the relation between Brahman and the soul the opinions of three sages have been mentioned in the Brahmasūtras, *viz*, Āsmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakritsna. But what exactly the opinions of these sages were it is difficult to say as their original writings are not available and S'āṅkara and Rāmānuja have given different interpretations of the relevant aphorisms. There is a passage in the Upaniṣads which says that if the ātman is known everything is known<sup>77</sup> The word ātman generally means the individual soul. But here the word

73. अथ लमनण दुस्वमदीर्घमलोहितमधो हसच्छायमतमोऽवायनाकाशमसङ्गमरस-  
मगन्धमचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनः (Bri U 2-8-8)

74. अपाणिपादौ जवनौ यद्द्वौता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः Sve U 3-19

75. श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो मनो यद्

वाचो ह वाचं स उ प्राणस्य प्राणः

चक्षुषश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीराः प्रेत्याय्माज्ञोकादमृताः भवन्ति (Kena U 1-2)

76. सहस्रशीर्षाः पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपाद (Rg. V. 10-90)

77. आत्मनि विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवात् (Bri Upa 2-4-5)

obviously refers to Brahman as otherwise it could not be said that when He is known everything is known. All the three sages have discussed the question why the word *ātman* has been used to mean, not the individual soul, but Brahman. According to S'aṅkara the sage Āśmarathya is of opinion that the individual soul is identical with Brahman. But according to Rāmānuja what Āśmarathya means is that inasmuch as the soul merges into Brahman at the time of universal destruction (*pralaya*) and comes out of it at the time of creation (*śṛṣṭi*) hence the soul is not different from Brahman, and thus it can be said that when Brahman is known everything is known.<sup>62</sup> The next sage whose opinion has been quoted is Audulomi. According to S'aṅkara it is the opinion of Audulomi that when the soul attains liberation it becomes one with Brahman. Rāmānuja says that Audulomi has criticised the doctrine of Āśmarathya because according to this doctrine the soul comes out of Brahman although the Upaniṣads say that the soul has no beginning<sup>63</sup> So Audulomi has enunciated a different doctrine to explain why, in the passage of the Upaniṣads referred to above, the word *ātman* has been used to mean Brahman. Audulomi has said that

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62. Brahmasutra 1-4-20

63. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् (Kath U 2-1-18)

such a use of the word is justified because when the soul is emancipated it becomes one with Brahman. The third sage mentioned is Kāśakṛtsna. According to Śaṅkara the sage Kāśakṛtsna says that Brahman Itself remains as the soul and hence the word ātman which usually refers to the soul has been used in this passage to mean Brahman. According to Rāmānuja the intention of Kāśakṛtsna is that Brahman remains inside the soul even as the soul remains inside the body. According to both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja it is the opinion of Kāśakṛtsna which embodies the truth and has been accepted as such by the author of the Brahmasūtras. But as stated above there is difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja as to the exact intention of Kāśakṛtsna. Śaṅkara says that Brahman Itself remains as the soul. In support of this view Śaṅkara quotes the passage of the Upaniṣads where it is stated that Brahman enters the body as the soul, who is the self of Brahman, and makes clear the names and forms of different objects<sup>64</sup>. Now this passage is quite consistent with the view of Rāmānuja that the soul is, in substance the same as Brahman, but is a part of Brahman. We shall now proceed to examine what Bādarayana himself says about the relation between Brahman and the soul.

64. अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि (Chha U 6-3-2)

Bādarāyana in his Brahmasūtras has in several places made a distinction between Brahman and the soul.

In one of the aphorisms he refers to the passages of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad in which in order to give gradually the correct idea of what the soul is, different objects are mentioned as the soul. At first the body of flesh and blood into which food is converted is mentioned as the soul. This is the gross view of persons who attach the greatest importance to the body. Then the prāṇa (the energy of life) is called the soul. Then the mind (the seat of desires) is called the soul. Then the knowledge (Vijñāna) is called the soul. Ultimately the object full of joy is called the real soul.<sup>65</sup> Bādarāyana observes that this "object full of joy" must be Brahman and gives three reasons why this object cannot be taken as the soul (Jīva).<sup>66</sup> One reason is that with reference to this object the Upaniṣad says that this object desired to be many and then created the universe.<sup>67</sup> This statement can be made with reference to Brahman ; it cannot be made with reference to the soul. Another reason given by Bādarāyana is that the Upaniṣad mentioned a distinction between this object and the individual soul<sup>68</sup> for the Upaniṣad says that this

65. Tai U Brahmananda Valli,—Sections 1-5

66. Bra Su 1-1-16, 1-1-17, 1-1-19

67. तदेकं बहु-स्यां प्रजायिष्य Tai U 2-6

68. Bra Su 1-1-17

object is joy and when the individual soul attains this object, it becomes full of joy. As the Upaniṣad mentions this object as something which can be attained by the soul, it is clear that the object must be different from the soul, and hence this object must be Brahman. A third reason urged by Bādarāyaṇa is that the Upaniṣad refers to a union between the soul and the object, and hence the object must be Brahman<sup>69</sup> Śaṅkara in his commentary on one of the aphorisms referred to above<sup>70</sup> observes that this distinction between Brahman and soul referred to by Bādarāyaṇa is not a real distinction but only an imaginary one which is due to the fact that the Jīva not realizing his own self which is identical with Brahman confounds himself with various objects like the body, organs of sense etc. As regards this observation of Śaṅkara it may be said that it does not appear from any of the aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa that he considered the distinction between Brahman and the soul as other than real.

Again the Chāndogya Upaniṣad says, "All this is Brahman, as everything comes out of Brahman, remains in Brahman and ultimately merges in Brahman. Knowing this one should keep one's mind unruffled and

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69. अभिन् अस्य च तदयोगं शान्तिं (Bra Su 1-1-19)

70. Bra Su 1-1-17

engage in worship.”<sup>71</sup> The object of worship has been described by mentioning various attributes of that object. Bādarāyaṇa observes that the object of worship is Brahman and not Jīva as the attributes mentioned belong to Brahman and not to Jīva.<sup>72</sup> The Kathopanishad says that there are two objects inside the heart, one of them eats the fruit of acts (कर्मफल) while the other makes the former eat.<sup>73</sup> Bādarāyaṇa observes that the two objects are Brahman and Jīva.<sup>74</sup> The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad says, “He who resides inside the sun, who is separate from the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body is the sun, who controls the sun from inside,—this is your soul; he controls from inside and is immortal” Bādarāyaṇa says that here the person referred to as residing inside the sun is Brahman and He is different from the sun-god.<sup>75</sup> In the words “whom the sun does not know” occurring in the above passage the word “sun” cannot refer to the inanimate orb of light as it is not possible for the inanimate orb to know anything. Here the words “the sun” must be taken to mean the sun-god and as the person referred to is different

71. सर्वे खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलान् इति शान्त उपासीत (Ohha U 3-14-1)

72. अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीरः (Bra Su 1-2-3)

73. अहं पिवन्ती सुकृतस्य लोके (Ka U 1-3-1)

74. गुहां प्रविष्टो आत्मानो हि तद्दर्शनात् (Bra Su 1-2-11)

75. Bra Su 1-2-18

from the sun-god, he can be no other than Brahman. It will thus appear that Bādarāyaṇa here makes a distinction between Brahman and Jīva (here the Jīva is the soul of the sun-god). The Muṇḍakopaniṣad says :—  
 “There are two birds who are friends and remain together, both seated on the same tree, one bird eats the fruit of the tree, the other bird does not eat, but merely looks on.”<sup>76</sup> Bādarāyaṇa observes that here one bird is the Jīva who eats and the other bird is Brahman who does not eat.<sup>77</sup> The tree is of course the body and the fruit is the result of acts done. There are two other aphorisms in the Brahmasūtras where Bādarāyaṇa refers to the distinction between Brahman and the Jīva. In the aphorism 1-3-42<sup>78</sup> he says that Brahman is mentioned as an object different from the Jīva where the Upaniṣads describe the state of deep slumber and the procees of death. In the aphorism 2-1-22<sup>79</sup> he says that Brahman is greater than the soul as the Upaniṣads say that the two are different.

There is hardly any doubt that the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa definitely support the

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76. वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिवस्रजति  
 तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वति चनश्चन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति (Mu U 3-1-1)
77. स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च (Bra Su 1-3-7)
78. सुषुप्तुत्क्रान्तयोर्भेदेन (Bra Su 1-3-42)
79. अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् (Bra Su 2-1-22)

position of Rāmānuja and not that of Śaṅkarācāryya. From the passages quoted above it would be seen that in many places Bādarāyaṇa has made a distinction between Brahman and Jīva. If it had been his intention that the distinction is unreal and the two are really identical he would have said so somewhere. But there is no aphorism in which he has said so. In the aphorism 2-3-43<sup>o</sup> he has clearly said that the Jīva is a part of Brahman, which is exactly the opinion of Rāmānuja and which can not be reconciled with the view of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara's view may be stated thus :—the Jīva is Brahman as qualified by mind and intelligence, or the Jīva is the reflexion of Brahman in the mind or intelligence of an individual ; from the point of view of absolute truth (पारमार्थिक सत्ता) the mind and intelligence are false, as Brahman is the only truth and all else is false ; hence from this point of view the Jīva is identical with Brahman ; from the point of view of every day usage (व्यवहारिक सत्ता) we have to admit the existence of the mind and intelligence, hence from this point of view the Jīva is different from Brahman. From none of the two points of view of Śaṅkara it can be said that the Jīva is a part of Brahman. Hence the aphorism of the Brahmasūtra 2-3-43

can not be reconciled with the point of view of Śaṅkara.

The Upaniṣads contain some passages in which a difference is made between Brahman and the soul. They also contain some passages in which no difference is made. Some passages in which a difference has been made have been quoted above. A few more passages are quoted below.

“The Ātma is to be seen. It is to be heard, thought about and contemplated upon (for a long time)”<sup>81</sup>

Here the Ātman to be seen is Brahman. He who sees is the soul. There must be a difference between he who sees and the object which is seen.

“He is to be sought. He is to be asked about”<sup>82</sup>

Here the soul is the enquirer. Brahman is to be enquired about. So here also there is a difference between Brahman and the soul.

“At the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with Brahman”<sup>83</sup> It follows that when the soul is awake there is difference with Brahman.

81. आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (Bri U 2-4-5)

82. सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः (Chha U 8-7-1)

83. सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नी भवति (Chha U 6-8-1)

“At the time of death Brahman is seated on the soul”<sup>84</sup>

Some passages in which no difference is made are given below.

“Thou art that”<sup>85</sup>

“All this is Brahman”<sup>86</sup>

“There is no other seer except Brahman”<sup>87</sup>

“The fisherman is Brahman, the slave is Brahman, the cheat is Brahman (*i. e.* everything is Brahman)”<sup>88</sup>

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman appears as the soul when Brahman is associated with mind, intellect etc. When these objects are separated from the soul, the soul becomes identical with Brahman. When they are not separated the two appear to be different. According to Śaṅkara this is the reason why we get both kinds of passages in the Upaniṣads, passages in which Brahman is said to be different from the soul and passages in which Brahman is said to be identical with the soul. As to this doctrine of Śaṅkara it may be observed that there is no aphorism in the Brahma Sūtras where it has been said that

84. शरीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेन आत्मनाऽन्वारुदः (Bri Up 4-3-38)

85. तत् त्वम् असि (Chha U 6-7-7)

86. सर्वं ह्येतदब्रह्म (Ma U 2)

87. नान्योऽतीऽस्ति द्रष्टा (Bri U 3-7-23)

88. ब्रह्मदाशा ब्रह्मदासा ब्रह्मकितवाः Atharva Veda quoted by Samkara in his commentary on Bra Su 2-3-43.

when Brahman is associated with the mind or intellect it appears as the soul. Rāmānuja reconciles the two sets of passages by saying that the soul is a part of Brahman. As the soul is a part of Brahman it may be said that the soul is Brahman, and it may also be said that Brahman is more than the soul, or in other words that Brahman is different from the soul. Brahman is the whole. The soul is a part. There is difference and yet no difference between the whole and the part. There is difference and yet no difference between Brahman and the soul.

Rāmānuja observes in this connection that there are three doctrines as to the relation between Brahman and the soul. The doctrine of duality (Dvaita) says that Brahman and the soul are essentially different ; Brahman is all-powerful, all-knowing, while the soul has very limited knowledge and power. The doctrine of monism (Advaita) says that Brahman and the soul are identical and that due to ignorance (Māyā) Brahman considers Himself to be a soul with limited knowledge and power. Thirdly there is the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine (qualified monism) according to which the soul is a part of Brahman. According to the doctrine of duality (Dvaita) the real intention of those passages of the Upaniṣads which say that there is no difference between Brahman and the soul is that just as Brahman

is full of joy, so the soul also is full of joy (which it can realize when it attains emancipation.) According to the doctrine of monism (Advaita) those passages of the Upaniṣads which refer to a difference between Brahman and the soul do not embody the ultimate truth, they merely refer to the popular notion that Brahman is different from the soul, the real truth being that Brahman is identical with the soul. Thus the Dvaita school cannot accept the direct or natural meaning ( मुख्य अर्थ ) of one set of passages of the Vedas viz, those passages in which it is stated that there is no difference between Brahman and the soul. It has to adopt an indirect meaning ( गौण अर्थ ) of such passages. On the other hand the Advaita school cannot accept the direct or natural meaning of another set of passages of the Vedas viz, those in which it is stated that there is difference between Brahman and the soul. It has to adopt an indirect meaning of such passages. It is the Viśiṣṭādvaita school alone which can accept the direct or natural meaning of both these sets of passages as it can reconcile these by holding that the soul is a part of Brahman and thus there is both difference and no difference. The Viśiṣṭādvaita school urges that it is not merely by inference on the above lines that we have to conclude that the soul is a part of Brahman. Bādarāyaṇa says so in the Brahmasūtras. The Vedas say so.

The Bhagavadgīta says so. Thus Bādarāyaṇa says "The soul is a part of Brahman as there is mention of difference between Brahman and the soul and there is also mention that there is no difference ; thus in one branch of the Vedas it has been stated that the fisherman is Brahman the cheat is Brahman",<sup>88</sup> In the celebrated Puruṣa Sūkta (Rg Veda-saṁhitā X-90) we find "All living beings form but a quarter of the Supreme Being—of Whom the remaining three quarters belong to the region of immortality".<sup>89</sup> In the Bhagavadgītā (whose authority is next only to that of the Vedas) we find that the Lord says,

"It is a portion of me which has become the living beings whose souls are eternal".<sup>90</sup>

Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma Sūtras refers to the above passages in support of his statement that the soul is a part of Brahman.<sup>91</sup>

It may be thought that if the soul is a part of Brahman then when the soul is unhappy Brahman also will be unhappy, just as a person feels pain if one limb of his body is hurt. But it is not so. If a crooked object is held in a beam of sunlight entering a dark room, the sun's

88. अंशो नाना व्यपदेशात् अन्यथा च अपि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके (Bra Su 2-3-43)

89. पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि विपादस्यास्यतं दिवि (Rg Veda Samhita X-90-3)

90. समैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः (Gita XV-7)

91. Br. Su. 2-3-44 and 2-3-45

rays appear to be of crooked shape, but the crookedness does not affect the sun.<sup>92</sup> The relation between Brahman and the soul is like the relation between the sun and its rays. Brahman cannot feel unhappy because a soul feels unhappy. A soul feels unhappy because it does not realize its own nature. Due to ignorance it forgets the distinction between the soul and the body and feels unhappy. Brahman can never have ignorance and can never be unhappy. In this connection Rāmānuja observes that a soul is a part of Brahman even as the rays of the sun are a part of the sun, or even as the body is a part of a man, or as the adjective is part of the noun which it qualifies.<sup>93</sup>

92. Br. Su. 2-3-46. Ramanuja in his commentary on this aphorism quotes the following passages from the Vishnupurana in which it is stated that the relation between Brahman and the universe is like the relation between the fire and the light which it emanates.

एकदेशस्थितस्याग्ने ज्योत्स्ना विस्तारिणी यथा ।

परस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिस्तथेदमखिलं जगत् ॥

93. Although Ramanuja has given these examples it should be observed that in other places he has stated that Brahman and the soul are the same in substance, as both are pure knowledge. It cannot be said in the same way that the body and the soul are the same in substance. The point of similarity lies in the fact that just as the soul controls the body, so Brahman controls the soul. From the example of the relation between the soul and the body it should not be concluded that Brahman and the soul are different in substance even as the body and the soul are.

In this connection Rāmānuja has given his interpretation of the famous saying of the Upaniṣads which is considered to be a main stronghold of the Advaita doctrine, *Tat Tvam Asi* तत् त्वम् असि (Thou art that.) The usual Advaita interpretation of this passage is as follows; *Tat* (तत्) means Brahman; *tvam* (त्वम्) refers to jīva (the individual soul); the word *asi* (असि) indicates the identity between the individual soul and Brahman. The word *tat* indicating Brahman ordinarily means knowledge (which is the substance of Brahman) combined with attributes like imperceptibility. The word *tvam* indicating the individual soul (Jīva) ordinarily mean knowledge combined with other attributes like perceptibility. But in the passage *tat tvam asi* these words are not to be understood in their natural meanings. Here the word *tat* is to be understood as pure knowledge without any attributes like imperceptibility. Similarly the word *tvam* is to be understood as pure knowledge without any attribute like perceptibility. When the words *tat* and *tvam* are thus understood in their secondary sense (Gauna vṛtti) both refer to pure knowledge and nothing else and the identity between the meaning of the two words becomes complete. As according to Rāmānuja the universal soul and the individual soul are not identical the above

explanation is not acceptable to him. He says that the word *tat* (that) refers to Brahman with his qualities like omniscience and that the word *tvam* (thou) also refers to Brahman residing within the individual soul. The expression means that the same Brahman exists in two ways, both as the repository of qualities like omnipotence, omniscience etc. and also as the controller of the individual soul.

If this interpretation of the passage "Tat Tvam Asi" does not appear satisfactory it may be held that here the soul is called Brahman because the soul is a part of Brahman.

How to reconcile the two apparently contradictory statements made by the Upanishads, one, that the soul is a part of Brahman, and the other that Brahman has no parts?<sup>94</sup> One way of reconciling these statements is this. If an object has parts then if some parts are taken away the object decreases and if too many parts are taken away then the object may be destroyed. But Brahman does not decrease even though an infinite number of individual souls come out of Brahman at the time of creation. He continues to remain infinite as before.<sup>95</sup> This is why it has been said that Brahman has no parts. On the other hand as the souls are same in substance as Brahman and as the souls merge

94. निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवयवं निरञ्जनं Sve U 6-19

95. पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ( ईशोपनिषत् )

undistinguishably in Brahman when they attain liberation, it has been said in the Vedas and in the Gītā, that the souls are parts of Brahman.

According to Śaṅkara Brahman has no attributes and it is only by association with māyā that Brahman appears to have various attributes. Brahman associated with attributes is called Īśvara. Īśvara has thus to be distinguished, according to Śaṅkara, from Brahman. As the existence of Īśvara depends upon attributes, and as attributes have no real existence, Īśvara has no real existence. Brahman alone has real existence. This is the position of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja does not of course accept the above position. Rāmānuja says Brahman does possess attributes. In fact He possesses an infinite number of good attributes and He is devoid of all evil attributes. In those passages of the Upaniṣads, Gītā etc. where it is stated that Brahman is devoid of attributes what is meant is that He is devoid of defects.<sup>96</sup> Accord-

96. Ramanuja says that the following passage of the Upanishads explains how reconciliation should be effected between those portions of the Upanishads which describe Brahman as without any attributes and those which describe him as possessing attributes : एष आत्मा अपहृतपाप्मा विजरी विमृताविशीकी विजिघ्रिस्त्रीऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः (Chha U 8-1-5) "This soul is free from sins, without decay, without death, without sorrow, without the desire to eat and drink. All of its desires and resolutions are fulfilled." Here it is stated that Brahman is free from all defects and possesses good qualities. (Ramanuja's commentary on Bra Su 1-1-1)

ing to Rāmānuja there is no distinction between Brahman and Īśvara, and it is absurd to say that Īśvara has no real existence. Rāmānuja further says that there can be no object without any attributes, or at any rate the existence of such an object cannot be established by means of any sort of evidence.<sup>97</sup> Śaṅkara says that Brahman (or Ātman) is knowledge and not knower, because a knower implies the existence of the object known and thus involves duality of conception. Rāmānuja says that the soul (and also Brahman) is both knower and knowledge.

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97. Ramanuja's commentary on Bra Su 1-1-1.

## CHAPTER VIII

### The Aim of Life.

Happiness in this life as well as in the next may in brief be described as the aim of life. The ṛṣis have defined *dharma* as that which ensures prosperity in this life as well as emancipation after death.<sup>1</sup>

The ṛṣis therefore attached due importance to prosperity in this life. It is not true (as is often said) that in Hinduism the affairs in this life have been neglected and hence Hindus have not been able to achieve worldly prosperity. When religion was more a living force in India she achieved greatness not merely in religion and philosophy but also in science and industry, art and literature, military strength and agricultural prosperity. In fact up to the 12th century A.D. India was the foremost nation in the world in all the arts and sciences. The rules of Varnāśramadharma directed the activities of the entire nation into useful channels. The great mass of the people became industrious. The particular trade of the caste was not merely its means of living but also the proper way of worshipping God. Honesty in trade and

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1. यतोऽभ्यादयनिः श्रेयसमिद्धिः सो धर्मः (Kanada)

diligence in arts and industries became wellnigh universal. The arts reached a high level of excellence. Indian manufactures were exported to distant countries. There was a perpetual flow of gold and silver into India from all countries. The wealth of India became a by-word throughout the world. Milton referred to it in his *Paradise Lost* :

“The wealth of Ormuz or of Ind.”

Due to the spread of Buddhism, Varnāśrama-dharma declined. India's military powers dwindled. India became a subject nation and suffered from many ills.

The Hindu Śāstras have divided desirable objects into four categories, dharma ( धर्म ) artha ( अर्थ ) kāma ( काम ) and mokṣa. ( मोक्ष ) Dharma is the merit obtained by the performance of good acts. Truth, non-injury, non-stealing, cleanliness of body and mind, control of the senses, obedience to parents are duties enjoined on all human beings by the performance of which they can earn *dharma*. Service to husband is the special *dharma* for women. Then there are the duties enjoined on the four castes. A person by performing the duties prescribed for his caste can earn dharma. As a result of dharma one can earn wealth and happiness in this life or heaven after death. As Vyāsa says, ‘With my hands uplifted I proclaim to the world—but no one listens to me. “You can have both wealth

and pleasure from dharma. Why then do you not serve dharma"?<sup>2</sup>

Of the four objects of desire mentioned above mokṣa or salvation is the highest. By wealth ( अर्थ ) or enjoyment ( काम ) or by heaven as a result of *dharma* we can have but transitory happiness. That the happiness in this world is fleeting is recognised in all religions. But Hinduism alone has proclaimed that heaven also is of limited duration. Other religions say that those who perform good acts go to heaven and live there forever. But the Vedas have declared that heaven cannot be everlasting. The Vedas have given good reason for this conclusion. The Upaniṣads say :—

“Just as the riches which one can earn in this life by labour decrease (when spent) so also the pleasures of heaven which one can earn by pious acts are gradually spent out.”<sup>3</sup> The acts being finite, how can the results of the acts be infinite? The infinite can not be the result of the finite.<sup>4</sup> Compared with life on this earth

2. ऊर्ध्वबाहुर्विरोध्यैष न च कश्चित्कृणीति मां ।  
धर्मादर्थस्य कामस्य स किमर्थं न सेव्यते ॥

3. तदयथा इह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवासुत पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते  
(Chha U 8-1-6)

4. नास्यकृतः कृतेन (Mu U 1-2-12)

residence in heaven is generally of much longer duration. That is why in other religions the heavens have been called everlasting. But the strictly accurate statement has been made in the Vedas. Residence in heaven can never be everlasting. How can the heavens which can be attained by acts be infinite ? Mokṣa (salvation) alone is infinite.

It may be asked ; How can salvation (mokṣa) be infinite ? Is it not also the result of acts (karma) ? The reply is that salvation is not the result of acts, but of knowledge. Ātman (the soul) and Brahman are everlasting. According to the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, the soul is identical with Brahman. According to the other schools propounded by Rāmānuja, Madhva ect., the soul is not identical with Brahman. For the present we need not enter into this controversy. According to all the schools both soul and Brahman are everlasting. This is all that we need for our present purpose. Due to ignorance man does not realize Brahman, nor the real nature of the soul. When ignorance is removed, true knowledge appears, man perceives that he is neither a lump of flesh and blood, nor a bundle of desires and sorrows. He is knowledge pure. He realises the true nature of his self. He also realises Brahman. He finds that his own self and Brahman are both everlasting. His own self as well as Brahman are sat, cit

and ānanda (truth, knowledge and joy.) This knowledge remains for ever. Hence after mokṣa a man feels perpetual joy. The joy in heaven (as in earth) depends upon the contact of our senses with external objects. Such joy by its nature can never be everlasting. As the Gīta says—

“The pleasures derived from contact of our senses with external objects are really sources of misery, because they come into existence and also cease to exist. A wise man never delights in them,”<sup>5</sup> Similarly the Upaniṣads say

“Only those who are ignorant like children go after external pleasures. They are entangled in the widespread nets of death. The wise realise the nature of immortality and never seek the everlasting in things perishable.”<sup>6</sup>

Our sufferings are due to the fact that not realizing the true nature of our self we mistake the body or the mind for our self. When the body or the mind suffers we think that we are suffering. So long as the true nature of the self is not realized it is not possible to rid ourselves permanently of such sufferings. When there is disease, medicines may give temporary

5. ये हि संस्पर्शजाः भोगाः दुःखयोनय एव ते ।  
आद्यन्तवन्तः कौन्तेय न तेषु रमते बुधः ॥ Gita 5-22

6. पराचः कामाननुयन्ति बालास्ते मृत्योर्यन्ति बिततस्य पाशं ।  
अथ धीरा अमृतत्वं विदित्वा ध्रुवमधुवेष्टिह न प्रार्थयन्ते ॥

relief, but there will be always the possibility of falling ill again. Poverty may be removed by wealth. But wealth does not remain for ever. Even when there is wealth there may be other causes of suffering. When the true nature of the self is realized by a person the sufferings of the body or the mind do not affect him, as he perceives that they are different from the soul. As the Upaniṣads say :

“If a man can know his soul and perceive “I am this soul” what (worldly) desire can he still cherish ? For what purpose will he suffer on account of the sufferings of the body ?”

Thus the only means of completely getting rid of all sufferings for ever, and being immersed in perpetual joy throughout eternity is to realize the nature of the soul as entirely distinct from the body, and also realize Brahman who is the infinite source of truth, knowledge and joy.

As stated before the Vedas have divided the aim of life into four categories, (1) dharma (2) artha, (3) kāma and (4) mokṣa. The Vedas have also laid down the means of attaining all these ends. Out of these four kinds of desirable objects, the Upaniṣads are concerned mostly with the fourth and highest aim, mokṣa. With dharma, the Upaniṣads are concerned only in so far as *dharma* is conducive towards the attain-

7. आत्मानं विद्विजानीयादयमर्थोति पुरुषः किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनु संज्वरेत् Bri U. 4-4-12

ment of mokṣa. If one practices *dharma* with the object of attaining happiness in this life and the next, one can attain such happiness. But it is of no use in his quest for Brahman or attainment of mokṣa. If however *dharma* is practised without any desire for the fruit thereof it serves to purify the mind by removing therefrom desire, anger, avarice and such other defects. The practice of *dharma* involves self-restraint. Man's natural desire for enjoyment has to be curbed if he has to abstain from injury to all beings, if he has to observe truth, if he has to obey his parents and preceptors, if he has to perform the various acts which are enjoined in the sacred books and if he has to abstain from acts prohibited therein. By practising self-control he can develop his character which is essential for success in this life. The development of character is also helpful in attaining heaven. If a man can develop his character and can at the same time give up the desire for the enjoyment to which he is entitled by reason of his higher character, he can remove all obstacles for the attainment of self-realization and divine knowledge. The main obstacle to the realization of the self is our attachment for the pleasures of the senses. Such attachment fixes our attention on the senses. We become as it were mixed up with the senses. By giving up the attachment, the soul becomes separated

from the senses. By practising dharma man can give up his attachment for the senses. This is why the Upaniṣads have said that the Brahmins desire to attain Brahman by the performance of sacrifices, making gifts and undertaking austerities.<sup>8</sup>

Śrī Kṛṣṇa has echoed this passage of the Upaniṣads in the Gīta. He says,

“Sacrifices, gifts and austerities should not be given up. They should be performed as they purify the mind. Also they should be practised without attachment and without any desire for fruit. This is my definite opinion.”<sup>9</sup>

It is sometimes complained, Why has Hinduism laid down so many regulations,—acts which should be performed, acts which are prohibited, things which may not be eaten and so on. If the aim is the attainment of liberation, do not these rules serve the opposite purpose by increasing the bonds instead of diminishing them ? The reply is that the bonds from which our soul is to be liberated consist of our desires and prejudices. The rules laid down in the Śāstras check the desires and prejudices and thus serve to set free our soul from its

8. तमेत ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन Bri. U. 4-4-22

9. यज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यं कार्यमेव तत् ।

यज्ञो दानं तपश्चैव पावनानि मनीषिणां ॥

एतान्यपि तु कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा कलानि च ।

कर्तव्यानीति मे पार्थ निश्चितं मतमुत्तमं ॥ Gita 18-5-6

bondage. The Gīta says that our wisdom is clouded by desire and aversion which are the result of our past sins. By the performance of pious acts we can get rid of the effect of our past sins, free our mind from desires and prejudices and acquire devotion to God.<sup>10</sup>

Acts have been divided into four kinds (1) nitya (2) naimittika (3) kāmya and (4) niṣiddha. Nitya acts are those which ought to be performed every day. Non-performance of such acts involves sin. Worship in the morning and evening is such an act for the Vedas have enjoined on such worship.<sup>11</sup> Naimittika acts are those which should be performed in certain circumstances. When one goes to a place of pilgrimage one should worship the ancestors. ( श्राद्ध ) This is a naimittika act. Kāmya acts are those which are performed for the fulfilment of certain desires e. g., a vedic sacrifice performed with the desire of attaining heaven. Niṣiddha acts are those which are prohibited e. g., eating meat except such as is offered in sacrifice. A person who desires to purify his mind in order to make it fit for the reception of the knowledge of Brahman should

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10. इच्छादेषसमुत्थेन इन्द्रमीहेन भारत ।  
सर्वभूतानि संमोहं सगे यान्ति परन्तप ॥  
येषामन्तगतं पापं जनानां पुण्यकर्मणां ।  
ते इन्द्रमीहनिमुक्ताः भजन्ते मां दृढव्रताः ॥ Gita 7. 27-28

11. अहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीत

perform such acts as are enjoined for daily performance (nitya) and also acts which are to be performed in definite circumstances (naimittika). Inasmuch as he has to give up all desire for enjoyment either in this life or in heaven, he should not perform any acts which are prescribed for the fulfilment of specific desires (kāmya) or he may perform such acts without any desire for their fruit. It goes without saying that he must not perform any prohibited acts (niṣiddha) for by performing such acts he would incur sin which would blur his vision.

✓ We have observed in the beginning of this chapter that happiness is the aim of life. It may be objected that this is a very selfish view of life. It would be nobler to make the removal of the miseries of humanity the aim of life. ✓ Even if this latter view be accepted it has to be considered what is the most effective way of removing the miseries of mankind. Suppose we work out a plan by which all persons will have adequate food, shelter and clothing and some amount of intellectual culture. But men will still remain subject to the pangs of bereavement and death. Will it not be conferring the greatest boon on mankind if they could be shown the way of permanently avoiding grief and attaining immortality ?

It is only by attaining Brahman that a man can permanently avoid grief and attain immortality. A man who follows that path and himself attains Brahman can best explain to others how that path is to be followed. Hence even if it is held that the highest aim of life is to make others happy, one should first try to realize God oneself so that one may best show to others how others also may have eternal bliss. ✓ Saints like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Caitanya and Tulsidāsa, Tailanga Svāmi and Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa themselves attained God and showed others how to attain Him. They are therefore the greatest benefactors of mankind. They have contributed much more towards the happiness of humanity than those whose activities were restricted to the conferment of material happiness or removal of physical suffering. ✓

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## CHAPTER IX.

### Means of realization.

Vedānta philosophy not only lays down what truth is but also states how to realize the truth. As stated before the truth is Brahman. One can realize Brahman only through the grace of Brahman. Brahman confers this grace on a person who really wants Him and constantly thinks of Him. In order that one can constantly think of Brahman it is necessary to purify the mind, by freeing it from all other desires. For the purification of the mind it is necessary to perform good acts without any attachment for those acts and also without any desire to enjoy the fruits of those acts.

As regards the knowledge of Brahman a distinction has been made between direct and indirect knowledge. That there is a God who has created the universe we all know as we have read in religious books or heard from holy persons. But this is indirect knowledge. It is not enough for the purpose of salvation. For that purpose direct knowledge or perception is necessary. The Upaniṣads speak of such direct knowledge or perception.<sup>1</sup> We also read of such

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1. वेदाहमेकं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् (Sweta U. 3-8)

direct knowledge in the life of Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa. Svāmi Vivekananda was at first an atheist. When he met any Christian missionary he would ask "You speak of God. But have you seen Him?" The ordinary preacher could not give a satisfactory reply. When he met Rāmakṛṣṇa he put the same question. Straight came the reply "Oh, yes, I have seen God and have spoken to Him, just as I am seeing you and am speaking to you". This is direct knowledge which is necessary for the purpose of salvation.

But it may be asked, "How can one see God? He has no form. The Upaniṣads have declared that He cannot be seen or described or even thought of".<sup>2</sup>

The reply is that although God cannot be perceived by the eye or any other organ of sense He can be directly perceived by a mind which is absolutely pure. "Those who can realize the fine things can see Him with the help of fine intelligence"<sup>3</sup> "That thing is to be attained by the mind. There is no difference among the objects of the world"<sup>4</sup> "The wise men can with their mind see on all sides that object whose form is joy, which is immortal and which

2. न तत्र चतुर्गच्छति, न वाग् गच्छति नो मनः (Kena U 1-3)

3. दृश्यते त्वयाया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः Ka U 1-3-12

4. मनसैर्विदमाप्तव्यं नेह नानास्ति किंचन Ka U 2-2-11

shines forth"<sup>5</sup> Although God has no form which can be perceived by the ordinary eye, He can assume a form to satisfy the yearning of the devotee, and He can confer special power on a devotee enabling him to see that form. That Brahman can attain a definite form is mentioned in the Kenopanishad where we read that He appeared in a beautiful form before the gods in order to humble their pride<sup>6</sup>. In the Gīta we find that when Arjuna wanted to see God in the form in which He permeated the entire universe, God conferred on Arjuna the special power enabling Arjuna to see that form. (Gita 11th Chapter). Śrīkṛṣṇa also told Arjuna in the Gita that in whatever way a devotee may worship God in that way God reveals Himself to the devotee<sup>7</sup>. In the Brahma-sūtras it has been stated on the authority of the Vedas and the Purāṇas that it is possible to see God in a particular form by worshipping Him<sup>8</sup>.

As stated before, one can see God only through His grace. Learning or intelligence is of no avail in attaining His Grace. Devotion

5. तद्विज्ञानेन परिपश्यन्ति धीरा आनन्दरूपममृतं यद्विभाति Mu U 2-2-8

6. Kenopanishad 3-1-2. Reference to वामनावतार is found in the following passage of the Vedas. इदं विश्वविचक्रमे वेधा निदधेपदं (R. V.) वराह अवतार is referred to in the passage वराहेण पृथिवी संविदाना यूकराय विजोहिते मृगाय (Ath. Veda 12-1-48)

7. ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तां सद्यैव भजाम्यहं Gita 4-11

8. अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां Bra Su 3-2-23

is the only thing which counts. There is a misapprehension that the Upaniṣads speak only of knowledge and not of devotion. In Kathopaniṣad 1-2-22 it is stated that Brahman cannot be attained by good speeches, or by learning, and that Brahman can be attained by him who is favoured by Brahman.<sup>9</sup> There are also other passages—"He should be worshipped as the object which is deserving of worship"<sup>10</sup> "Those wise persons who without any desire worship a person who knows God, can go beyond rebirth."<sup>11</sup> "God makes the breath flow in the body upwards and downwards. He resides in the middle, all the gods in the world worship Him."<sup>12</sup> The Upaniṣads no doubt deal mostly with the knowledge of Brahman, how one feels when one has direct knowledge of Brahman. But it should be noticed that for attaining such knowledge, devotion is necessary. One cannot attain that knowledge by mere learning or argument. The fact that devotion is not mentioned in a large number of passages of the Upaniṣads is immaterial. The truth of a statement does not

9. नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन  
यमेवैष व्रणते तेन लभ्य स्तस्यैष आत्मा  
विव्रणते तन् स्वां Ka U 1-2-22

10. तदनमितापासितव्यम् (Ke Up 4-6)

11. उपासते पुरुषं ये शकामास्ते युक्तेतदतिवर्तन्ति घोराः Mu Up 3-2-1

12. ऊर्ध्वं प्राणमुन्नयति अपानं प्रत्यगस्थति ।

नम्ये वामनम् आसीनं विश्वे देवा उपासते ॥ (Ka Up 2-5-3)

depend on the number of times it is asserted. Devotion is, according to the Upaniṣads, an essential link in the chain of God-realization. One form of devotion to Brahman is constant recollection of Him. The Upaniṣads say that one can attain Brahman if one thinks of Him in every thought.<sup>13</sup> The Gīta also says that if a person has no other desire in his mind, and constantly thinks of Brahman, he can easily attain Brahman.<sup>14</sup> In another passage describing the process in some detail the Upaniṣads set down direct perception of Brahman as the aim of life and observe that with a view to attain this aim one has first to hear about Brahman from competent teachers, then to think about Him and finally to be wrapt in meditation on Him.<sup>15</sup> Explaining the necessity of intense meditation Rāmānuja says that just as when oil is poured from one vessel to another the successive drops form one continuous line, there is no break between the successive drops, so also when one is engaged in meditation on God there should not be any break in the successive acts of meditation.<sup>16</sup> Śaṅkara gives the illustration of

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13. प्रतिबोधविदितं मतस्तत्त्वं हि विन्दते (Ke Up 2-4)

14. अनन्यचेताः सततं यो मां स्मरति नित्यशः ।

तस्याहं सुलभः पार्थ नित्ययुक्तस्य योगिनः ॥ (Gita 8-14)

15. आत्मा वा अरि दृष्टव्यः शीतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (Bri Up 4-5-6)

16. ध्यानं च तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नश्रुतिसन्तानरूपा ध्वान्श्रुतिः (Ramanuja's commentary on Bra Su 1-1-1), This is the idea underlying the counting of beads.

a devoted wife lost in meditation about her absent husband.<sup>17</sup>

It is difficult to engage ourselves in continuous and uninterrupted meditation of Brahman for a sufficiently long time. Even if we resolve to think of Brahman and of nothing else say for half an hour, our mind wanders to other objects again and again inspite of our resolution to the contrary. Why can we not keep our mind fixed? The reason is that in this and in previous lives we have done improper acts which have left their impression (saṁskāra) over the mind. Such impression persists in subsequent births and gives rise to undue attachment for worldly objects which forcibly deflects our mind from the contemplation of Brahman. The attachment for worldly objects constitutes the impurity of the mind which interrupts continuous meditation. The impurity of mind which arises from improper acts can only be removed by good acts properly done. It is not possible to remove it in any other way. That is why the Upaniṣads lay great stress on the performance of good acts. In Vedic literature the Vedic rituals hold a very prominent place among good acts. As shown by me on pages 28 to 32 of this volume the Upaniṣads do require the performance of Vedic sacrifices. Although it is popularly

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17. Sankara's commentary on Bra Su 4-1-1

believed that the Upaniṣads are based on a revolt against Vedic rituals. the Upaniṣads lay greater stress on the performance of rituals than on theoretical knowledge. That is because by performing rituals one can purify the mind and without the purification of the mind theoretical knowledge may be worse than useless. In verses 9 and 11 of the Iṣopaniṣad<sup>18</sup> it is stated that one who performs rituals but neglects knowledge enters blinding darkness, while one who attends to knowledge but neglects rituals enters still more darkness, and that one who attends to rituals as well as knowledge, crosses death by means of rituals and attains immortality by means of knowledge. This is how Rāmānuja explains this passage. Śaṅkara says that here worship of minor gods is referred to, and what the Upaniṣads say is that in the course of such worship the ceremonials should be performed and contemplation should also be practised of the minor god who is worshipped and then the worshipper can attain that god. According to Śaṅkara the word amṛta used in this passage does not refer to mokṣa or emanci-

18. अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते ।

ततो भूय इष ते तमो यं च विद्यायां रताः ॥ Iṣopaniṣad 9

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विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्विदोभयं स ह ।

अविद्यायां सत्यं तोत्वा विद्यायां मृतमश्नुते ॥ Iṣopaniṣad 11

pation but to residence in heaven which is for a much longer period than life on earth. Rāmānuja's interpretation seems to be better as he refers to the means of attaining emancipation which is much more important than the means of attaining a minor god, and also because he interprets the word amṛta in its ordinary sense. At any rate it is clear that in the passage the Upaniṣads lay greater stress on the performance of rituals than on theoretical knowledge.

In the Gītā also it is stated at several places that performance of karma is better than renunciation of karma<sup>19</sup> and that karma purifies the mind.<sup>20</sup> This is the principle of Karma Yoga which is elucidated in the Gītā. The basis of Karma Yoga (as of all doctrines in the Gītā) is in the Upaniṣads. Karma Yoga or right action involves two questions—what to do and how to do. (As regards the question 'what to do', the reply is that every man should do his duty as laid down in the Vedas and other scriptures<sup>21</sup> As regards the question 'how to do', the reply is that we should not have any

19. कर्म ज्ये यो ह्यकर्मणः । Gita 3-8

तयोस्तु कर्मसंन्यासात् कर्मयोगो विशिष्यते । Gita 5-2

20. यज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यं कार्यं मे वतत् ।

यज्ञो दानं तपश्चैव पावनानि मनीषिणाम् ॥ Gita 18-5

21. तच्चात् शास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ (Gita 16-24)

attachment for the acts, nor any desire to enjoy the fruits thereof<sup>22</sup> It may be objected, why should we act according to the Śāstras and not according to our conscience? Is not conscience the voice of God? The reply is that conscience is not the voice of God. Conscience is merely our own judgment. As we have not attained perfection our judgment is liable to be wrong. Our judgment should be superseded by the judgment of Brahman as recorded in the Vedas and interpreted by the Ṛṣis in the other Śāstras.

If conscience had been the voice of God then the conscience of all men would have agreed. But we find wide divergence. To take an example. Many persons consider meat-eating to be a sin while many others do not think so. God is no doubt living inside our heart. But His voice is drowned in the tumult of our passions. He who can control his passions completely can hear the voice of God. He then perceives that the voice of God is the same as that of the Śāstras. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Caitanya and Rāmakṛṣṇa were such men.

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad says "Perform the *dharma*."<sup>23</sup> Commenting on this passage

22. तस्मादसक्तः सततं कार्ये कर्म समाचर (Gita 3-19)

23. धर्मे चर (Tai U 1-11-1)

चोदनालक्षणीऽर्थो धर्मः (Jaimini Sutra 1-1-2)

Saṁkara writes<sup>24</sup> that so long as one does not perceive one's identity with Brahman one should carefully perform all that is enjoined in the Śrutis and Smṛitis which constitute the Śāstras. Thus the Upaniṣads agree with the Gīta that one should perform the acts laid down in the Śāstras.

In performing Vedic acts various Vedic passages have to be recited. One should know the meaning of the passages which he recites. But even if one does not know the meaning of those passages, performance of the acts is efficacious. The performance of Vedic acts involves self-control. One has to spend money, bathe, fast, utter long passages. All these help in loosening the attachment for the pleasures of the senses and in developing self-control. If the acts are performed with a knowledge of the meaning of the passages the efficacy is of course greater.<sup>25</sup>

Ordinarily Vedic ceremonies have to be performed with various objects. An altar has to be constructed with bricks etc., the fire has to be lighted by rubbing together pieces of wood, offerings have to be made to the fire and so on. But the Vedas also mention performance

24. प्राग् ब्रह्मात्मप्रतिबोधान्नियमेनानुष्ठेयानि श्रुतिस्मृति विहितकर्माणि ।

(Saṁkara on Tai U 1-11-1)

25. यदेव विद्यया करोति यज्या उपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति Chh Up. 1-1-20 यत् एव विद्यया इति हि Bra Su 4-1-18

of sacrifices with imaginary objects. That is to say instead of collecting bricks, lighting fire etc one can think in his mind that one is collecting bricks, lighting fire etc. The functions of the mind itself may be conceived as fire (*vide* Brahmasūtrā 3-3-44 and S'āṅkara's commentary thereon). The Gītā also says that sacrifices by means of mere knowledge are more efficacious than sacrifices with the help of various objects (Gita 4-33)<sup>26</sup>. But it is more difficult to perform sacrifices merely with the help of the mind than with the help of various objects. One should begin by performing sacrifices with the objects specified. One can then ultimately attain the power to perform sacrifices merely with the help of the mind.

It is unnecessary to examine the difference between the injunctions of the Hindu scriptures and those of the scriptures of other religions. Suffice it to say that the Upaniṣads insist on the performance of the acts enjoined in the Hindu scriptures as necessary for purifying the mind and rendering it fit for the reception of divine knowledge.

Keith, in his Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, observes, "The defect of the Upanishads is that they render morality in the ultimate issue valueless and meaningless" (Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas Chap. 28 p. 596). He

26. श्रियां द्रव्यमयादयस्त्राज्ज्ञानयज्ञः परन्तप Gita 4-33

has not quoted any definite passage from the Upaniṣads in support of his statement. But it seems that he has argued that inasmuch as according to the philosophy of the Upaniṣads as expounded by Śaṅkarācāryya the world is false, hence right conduct and wrong conduct are both false, in other words there is no distinction between right and wrong conduct, and thus morality is meaningless. It is not Keith alone who has arrived at this conclusion. Other scholars have made the same statement following apparently the same line of argument. Thus Hertel says that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is essentially a monism which is "atheistic, materialistic and *morally indifferent*". Dr. Robert Ernest Hume describing the mentality of the Vedāntist observes. "No longer is worship or sacrifice or *good conduct* the requisite of religion in this life or of salvation in the next. Knowledge secures the latter and disapproves the former" (The Thirteen Principal Upanishads p. 53). Dr. S. N. Das Gupta writing somewhat in the same strain observes "The Upaniṣads do not require the performance of any action but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality" (History of Indian philosophy p. 29). If the Upaniṣads do not require the performance of any *action*, they do not require the performance of any good act nor does it discourage the performance of

evil acts and hence there is no basis of morality.

This view though held by some eminent scholars is however entirely wrong. There are clear statements to the contrary in the Upaniṣads themselves. The Kathopaniṣad, for example, contains many passages where a clear distinction is made between moral and immoral conduct. It says "One who does not desist from evil conduct cannot attain Brahman"<sup>27</sup> It makes a distinction between the good path and the path of pleasure and says that one who takes the path of pleasure cannot attain the aim of life<sup>28</sup>. The story of Yama and Nachiketā in the same Upaniṣad illustrates the necessity of giving up all desire for enjoyment in order to attain Brahman. When Nachiketā wanted to know what Brahman was, Yama at first tried to dissuade him and promised him various objects of pleasure. But Nachiketā refused all these offers and stuck to his point. Ultimately Yama had to yield. He said "I think, Nachiketā, you really desire to attain true knowledge. Desire for various

27. नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशन्ती नासमाहितः ।

नाशान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात् ॥ Ka Upa 1-2-23

28. अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रियस्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः ।

तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु भवति ह्रीयतेऽर्थाद्युत प्रेयो वृणाते ॥

enjoyments did not allure you".<sup>29</sup> In the same Upaniṣad the body of a man has been compared to a chariot and the sense-organs have been compared to horses and it has been stated that just as a charioteer cannot attain his destination if the horses are not under his control, so one cannot attain Brahman unless one's sense organs are controlled.<sup>30</sup> The necessity of controlling the organs of sense implies a distinction between moral and immoral conduct. The eleventh chapter of the first section of the Taittirīyopaniṣad contains the famous convocation address in which the preceptor gives his parting instructions to the pupil. "Tell the truth. Follow the path of religion. Worship your mother, your father, your preceptor and your guest. Perform the good act, not the bad. Where our conduct is good follow us ; not, where it is otherwise. Make gifts with respect"<sup>31</sup> The Kenopaniṣad says, that the foundation of the Upaniṣad is austerity self-control and action.<sup>32</sup> The Muṇḍakopaniṣad

29. विद्याभीप्सिनं नचिकेतसं मन्ये ।

न त्वा कामा वहवोऽलीलुपन्त ॥ Ka U 1-2-4

30. आत्मानं रयिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु ।

etc. Ka U 1-3-3 to 9

31. सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । मातृदेवी भव । पितृदेवी भव । आचार्यदेवी भव । अतिथिदेवी भव । यान्यनवद्यानि कर्माणि तानि त्वया सेवितव्यानि नो इतराणि । यान्यन्माकं सुचरितानि तानि त्वयोपास्यानि । नो इतराणि । यज्ञया दियं । अयज्ञया-  
अदेयम् । Tai Upa 1-11

32. तस्यै तपो दमः कर्मेति प्रतिष्ठा Kena Upa 4-5

good or bad acts. If he performs bad acts he will suffer pain. If he performs good acts he will ordinarily enjoy pleasure. If he performs good acts without any attachment and without any desire for enjoyment, his mind will be purified and rendered fit for the realisation of Brahman. S'amkarācāryya makes a distinction between absolute and conventional reality. Absolute reality belongs to Brahman. Objects of the world have conventional reality. So long as a person does not realize Brahman the objects of the world appear to him in definite forms.<sup>38</sup> He must make a distinction between good and bad conduct. S'amkarācāryya therefore does make a clear distinction between moral and immoral conduct, and western scholars, and their eastern followers, have absolutely no justification for holding that in the Upaniṣads themselves, or in the interpretation thereof by S'amkara, morality has been rendered valueless and meaningless. Commenting on the Brahmasūtras S'amkara observes that before a person is entitled to receive instructions from a preceptor regarding Brahman he must renounce all desire for enjoyment both in this life and in heaven, and control his organs of sense.<sup>39</sup> No one can therefore

38. प्राक् तु ब्रह्मात्मदर्शनादियदादिप्रपञ्चो व्यवस्थितरूपी भवति । Samkara's commentary on Brahma Sutra 3-2-4

39. Samkara's commentary on Brahmasutra 1-1-1.

have any doubt about the views of S'aṅkara regarding the desirability of moral conduct. It may also be observed that S'aṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads is not the only interpretation thereof and that other ancient scholars like Rāmānuja, Madhva etc. do not hold that the world is a delusion. If one follows the interpretation of the Upaniṣads by these scholars the question of obliterating the distinction between moral and immoral conduct can not arise. Finally it may be observed that the Upaniṣads are primarily concerned with knowledge of Brahman and not the correct code of conduct which has been dealt with in other portions of the Vedas and in the Rāmāyaṇa, Manusamhitā etc. and that the code of morality contained in these books should be regarded as a part of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, or the philosophy of the Veda.

We shall now briefly review what acts should be performed for purifying the mind. Details regarding the acts are found in books like the code of Manu etc. It should be borne in mind that all that is laid down in Manu is in accordance with the Vedas.<sup>40</sup> Some of them may not be found in the extant Vedas. But that is because many portions

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40. यः कश्चिद् कस्यचिद्धर्मो मनुना परिकीर्तितः ।  
स सर्वोऽभिहितो वेदे **Manu** 2-7

of the Vedas have been lost.<sup>41</sup> Manu has divided good acts into two classes, those which all men should do and those which are prescribed for special groups. In the first category may be mentioned non-injury, truth, non-stealing, cleanliness, control of the senses, worship of ancestors, hospitality, gifts, abstaining from adultery<sup>42</sup> obedience to parents and teachers. All these acts are helpful in controlling our passions and desires. In the second category are included the acts prescribed separately for the four castes, the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣhattriya, the Vaiśya and the S'ūdra. There is some prejudice prevalent against the caste system. As it is a custom supported by the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and as it is the basis of Hindu social organization a brief review of the system is being given here. The caste system is in brief a system of hereditary division of labour. As regards the origin of the caste system the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (1-4-11) states that Brahman at first created the Brāhmāṇa caste only. But the Brāhmāṇas by themselves did not flourish, so the Kṣathriyas were created. These two castes also did not flourish. So the Vaiśyas

41. Vide Chap. II p. 13

42. अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः  
( शाल कर्मातिथियं च दानमस्तेयमार्जवम् ।  
प्रजनं स्वेष्टु दारिद्र्यं तथा चैवानुसृतम् ॥ )  
एतं सामासिकं धर्मं चातुर्वर्ण्येऽनुरोधेनः Manu 10-63

were created, and then the S'ūdras. The Puruṣa-sūkta of the Ṛg Veda Samhitā (10—90) mentions the four castes as the four limbs of the Supreme Being, *viz.* the mouth, the arms, the thigh and the legs. Just as the four limbs of a man, perform different functions but are all actuated by the common purpose of welfare of the entire body, so although the four castes perform different functions they are all actuated by the common desire of welfare for the entire society. For the all round well-being of a society it is necessary to have men of four principal types, the priest and teacher type, the warrior type, the trade and agriculture type and the labourer type. Isolation of each caste is intended to promote the special characteristics of that caste. While performing the duty allotted to his caste a man should think that he is in that way worshipping Brahman who permeates the entire universe. He can thereby attain Brahman <sup>43</sup> Summing up the conclusion of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads Rāmānuja says at the end of his commentary on the Brahmasūtras :—  
“One should perform daily the duties of one's caste. That is the form of worship which pleases Brahman who then removes the formidable accumulation of our sins of previous births which takes the form of ignorance preventing

43. यतः प्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येन सर्वमिदं ततः ।

स्वकर्मणा तथैवैव सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥ Gita 18-4-6

us from realizing Brahman. When the sin is removed the devotee feels the true nature of Brahman, attains infinite joy and is not born again.”<sup>44</sup>

Bādarāyaṇa in the Brahmasūtras says that all acts prescribed in the Śāstras help in the realisation of Brahman.<sup>45</sup> He refers to the passage in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which says that the Brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by performing sacrifices, making gifts and undertaking austerities.<sup>46</sup> While performing the prescribed acts one should try to free the mind from all desire, control the organs of sense, dissociate the mind from external objects, be indifferent towards pleasure or pain, and concentrate the mind on Brahman.<sup>47</sup> The devotee should observe the rules regarding food as laid down in the Śāstras. He can violate these rules only when he cannot otherwise save his life.<sup>48</sup> The Upaniṣads say that when the food is pure the mind is pure, when the mind is pure one can constantly

44. एवमहरहरनुष्ठेयमानवर्णाश्रमधर्मानुगृहीततदुपासनरूपतत्समाराधनप्रौढी  
उपासीनान् अनादिकालप्रवृत्तानन्तदुस्तरकर्मसंख्यरूपाविद्यां विनिवर्त्तयि स्वाध्यायानुभवा-  
रूपानवधिकातिशयानन्दं प्राप्य पुनर्नावर्त्तयति । Bra Su 4-4-22 Sree Bhasya

45. सर्वापेक्षा हि यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्वत् Bra Su 3-4-26

46. तमेतं ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन Bri U 4-4-22

47. तद्धादेवचित् शान्ती दान्त उपरतस्मितित्तुः Bri Upa 6-4-30

48. सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणालये तद्दर्शनात् Bra Su 3-4-28

remember Brahman.<sup>49</sup> The Vedas prohibit the drinking of wine.<sup>50</sup>

Ordinarily only those who follow the duties of their caste can realize Brahman. But it cannot be said that those who do not follow the duties of their caste can never attain Brahman. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad mentions one Raikva who had attained the knowledge of Brahman although he did not perform the duties of a Brāhmaṇa.<sup>51</sup> The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad mentions Gārgī Vācaknavī, a lady who had attained Brahman.<sup>52</sup> The Mahābhārata mentions Bhīṣma who attained Brahman although he did not belong to any particular āśrama (one of the four regular stages of life). The fact is that although it is not possible for every one to purify the mind by studying the Vedas and performing sacrifices, all can perform such acts as repeating a name of Brahman (japam), making gifts (dānam) and observing fasts. These acts also purify the mind and render it fit for the reception of divine knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

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49. आहारयद्वा सत्वयद्धिः सत्वयद्वा ध्रुवा मृतिः Chha U 7-26-2

50. तस्यात् ब्राह्मणो सुरां न पिबेत् Sruti quoted in Samkara bhasya on Bra Su 3-4-31

51. Chha Upa 4-1

52. Bri Upa 3-9

53. Bra Su 3-4-38

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says that the Brāhmaṇa who wants to attain Brahman should study the sacred books, but avoid the pride of learning remaining simple like a child ; after acquiring knowledge and simplicity he should meditate quietly, he can then attain Brahman.<sup>54</sup>

The Śāstras prescribe four stages in the life of a Brāhmaṇa (a) student life (Brahmacaryya) (b) life of a householder (Gṛhastha) (c) life of an anchorite (Bānaprastha) living in the forest (d) ascetic (sanyāsī). Knowledge of Brahman is generally attained in the last stage (sanyāsī). But it can also be attained in the other three stages provided one puts forth sufficient efforts for attaining such knowledge.<sup>55</sup>

The question may be asked, when one adopts the prescribed means for attaining divine knowledge, is such knowledge attained in this birth or in the next ? The reply is that one can attain the knowledge in this birth if there are no serious obstacles. The obstacles are the results of improper acts previously done which can be removed by performing good acts. If the obstacles can not be completely removed in this birth one

54. तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्यं बालीं तिष्ठसीत् पाण्डित्यं च बाल्यं च निर्विद्यं अथ मुनिः यमौनश्च मौनश्च निर्विद्यं अथ ब्राह्मणः (Bri U 3-5-1)

55. Bra Su 3-4-48

has to wait till the next birth for the attainment of divine knowledge.<sup>56</sup>

Various methods of worshipping Brahman have been prescribed in the Upaniṣads as means of attaining Him. He can be worshipped as seated inside the sun, or in the eye,<sup>57</sup> or inside the heart<sup>58</sup>. The figure of Brahman which is to be conceived at the time of worship has been indicated in some detail. Thus inside the sun He is to be conceived as possessing a golden image, with golden beard and golden hair, all golden right up to the end of the nails<sup>59</sup>. Different images have to be conceived in different forms of worship. One form of worship is to consider the entire universe as the body of Brahman. It is called Vaiśvānara.<sup>60</sup> One sage worshipped Brahman as the heaven ; another as the sun ; another as air and so on. They were not satisfied with these methods of worship and went to king Aśvapati who was reputed to have known Brahman. The king said you

56. Bra Su 3-4-51, 52

57. तत् यत् सत्यम् असौ स आदित्यः

य एषः एतस्मिन् मण्डले पुरुषः

यः च अयं दक्षिणे अक्षन् पुरुषः

तौ एतौ अन्योन्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितौ Bri Upa 5-5-2

58. अथ यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेष्टम दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशः तस्मिन् यद् अन्तः तदन्येष्टव्यं तद् वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यम् Chha Upa 8-1-1

59. अथ य एषोऽन्तरादितो पुरुषो दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश आपणखात् सर्व एव सुवर्णः Chha Upa 3-6-6

60. Chha Upa 5-11

are worshipping different parts of Brahman and are considering the objects of worship as different from the self. The entire universe should be considered as Brahman. The heaven is His head, the sun is His eye, the air is His breath and so on. The figure and attributes mentioned in connection with one method of worship are to be considered as appropriate for that particular method only.

The question may be asked, If Brahman is really without any form, why do the Upaniṣads say that He should be worshipped in certain definite forms ?

The reply is that it is not possible for the great majority of people to worship Brahman as He really is. He is infinite, and cannot be perceived by the organs of sense. He cannot even be thought by the mind. A definite form and a location are necessary in order that we may worship Him. The Upaniṣads mention some forms in which Brahman may be worshipped and some places where He may be conceived to have His location. This method of worship has been developed into image worship in the Purāṇas. Brahman who is omnipotent can take a form when He desires to do so. As stated before, the Kenopaniṣad says that Brahman took a beautiful form (Yakṣa) in order to teach a lesson to the gods. He takes the form of Brahmā for creating the universe, of Viṣṇu for

the preservation of the universe, of Śiva for the purpose of destroying the universe. Reference to Brahmā the creator of the universe is found in the S'vetāśvataropaniṣad<sup>61</sup> Reference to Viṣṇu is found in Rigveda Saṁhitā 1-154<sup>62</sup> (Viṣṇu Sūkta) Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, etc.—Reference to Śiva or Rudra is found in S'uklayajurveda 16th Chapter, S'vetāśvataropaniṣad etc.<sup>63</sup> Images of Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Śiva or their incarnations are prepared and worshipped as Brahman. From the fact that the Upaniṣads describe Brahman as formless it can not be concluded that the Upaniṣads are against image worship. The Kenopaniṣad no doubt says that Brahman is not that which is worshipped.<sup>64</sup> This passage indicates the real nature of Brahman and cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the worship of Brahman in definite forms in the face of other passages which prescribe such worship. It is wellknown that S'aṁkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva etc who regarded the Upaniṣads as of the highest authority and devoted their lives for the realization and propagation of the truths contained in the Upaniṣads, worshipped images. They

61. यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं Sve U 6-18

62. विष्णोर्नृकं वीर्याणि प्रवोचम् R V S 1-154

63. रुद्र यत्ते दक्षिणं मुखं तेन मां पाहि नित्यं Sve U 4-21

64. नेदं यदिदमुपासते Ke U 1-4

could not have done so if image-worship had been against the spirit of the Upaniṣads<sup>65</sup>.

A distinction has to be made between image worship and symbol worship. Symbol worship has been called *Pratīka upāsanā* in the *Brahma-sūtras* where it has been said that those who perform *pratīka upāsanā* cannot attain Brahman by the *devayāna* way<sup>66</sup>. Examples of symbol worship are the worship of the sun or the mind as Brahman. The distinction between image-worship and symbol worship is that in image-worship a form taken by Brahman is worshipped. But such is not the case in symbol worship. Hence although one may not attain Brahman by means of symbol worship, one can attain Brahman by means of image-worship. If according to Vedānta image-worship had stood in the way of the attainment of Brahman the great Vedāntists Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja would not have worshipped images. Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa of recent times also attained Brahman through image worship. About 50 years earlier than Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa,

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65. अल्पत्वे अपि तादात्म्यदर्शनं शास्त्रात्कर्तव्यं प्रतिमादि ध्रुव विष्णादिदर्शन-  
मिति चेत् Samkarabhāṣya on Bra Su 4-1-3

शालयामि यथा विष्णुः सन्निहितः

Samkarabhāṣya on Bra Su 1-3-14

66. अप्रतीकालम्बान् नयतीति वादरायणः उभयथाऽदीष्टात् तत्कृत्य Bra Su  
4-3-15

a famous Bengali devotee Rāma Prasāda Sen also attained Brahman through image worship.

With reference to the worship of Brahman in the various methods mentioned in the Upaniṣads it has been observed that it will suffice if Brahman is worshipped in any one only of these methods. In the case of the various Vedic sacrifices there is a difference in results between the performance of one sacrifice and of several sacrifices. If one performs several sacrifices one can live in heaven for a longer time than if he performs a single sacrifice, or one can attain a higher heaven,—there being different heavens with varying degrees of happiness. But if a person worships Brahman by different methods he does not attain any better result than one who worships Brahman by one method only. For by worshipping Brahman by a single method one can attain Brahman. Attainment of Brahman is the highest state of existence. There is nothing higher which a person can attain by worshipping Brahman by different methods. On the other hand, it is better to worship Brahman by one method only than to worship Brahman by different methods. By worshipping Brahman by only one method it is easier to attain concentration of mind than by worshipping Brahman by different methods. Incidentally it may be observed that this is the reason why in some Purāṇas Viṣṇu is

mentioned as the highest deity while in others Śiva is so mentioned. The former Purāṇas are intended for those who worship Viṣṇu as Brahman while the latter are meant for those who worship Śiva as Brahman. Whether a person should worship Viṣṇu as Brahman or Śiva as Brahman depends upon his mentality. The appropriate method should be indicated by the preceptor.

Study of the Upaniṣads is helpful in the attainment of Brahman. But it is necessary to avoid a spirit of arrogance and tendency to display one's learning. The Upaniṣads say that the Brāhmaṇa should attain learning and remain like a boy, he should then practice the vow of silence, he can then attain Brahman.<sup>67</sup> When observing silence he should contemplate about Brahman. According to Śaṅkara this observance of the vow of silence is meant only for the Sanyāsī who has renounced the world. According to Rāmānuja it is meant for all.<sup>68</sup>

In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad it is stated that

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67. तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्यं बाल्येन तिष्ठसेत् बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्यं अथ मुनिः अमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्यं अथ ब्राह्मणः ( Bri U 3-5-1 )

68. Vide commentaries of Saṅkara and Ramanuja on Bra Su 3-4-47 and 3-4-50. The seeker of truth should remain like a boy avoiding all pride. But he should not like a boy eat whatever he likes for the Upaniṣads say that by observing the restrictions regarding food one can acquire purity of mind. आहारयज्ञो सत्वयज्ञिः Cha U 7-26-2

after the period of Brahmacharya one should enter the order of gārhaṣṭhya (householder). He should then acquire knowledge of Brahman and attain emancipation.<sup>69</sup> The question arises why does the Upaniṣad mention here the gārhaṣṭhya āśrama alone and not the saṇnyāsa as well? Surely one can attain emancipation from the saṇnyāsa āśrama as well as from the gārhaṣṭhya. Śaṅkara says that the reason is that many laborious duties are necessary in the gārhaṣṭhya stage, hence the gārhaṣṭhya stage is mentioned; it is well known that emancipation can be attained through the order of the saṇnyāsa; no arduous work is involved in this āśrama; hence it is not mentioned specifically. Rāmānuja says that it is well known that emancipation can be obtained from the other orders of life (āśramas) viz the brahmacharya, the gārhaṣṭhya and the saṇnyāsa. There could be some doubt whether it can be obtained in the gārhaṣṭhya āśrama; hence this āśrama is specifically mentioned. The idea is that emancipation can be obtained from every āśrama.

The Brahmasūtras say that while worshipping Brahman one should sit in an erect attitude.<sup>70</sup> If one stands, his mind is likely to be diverted. If he lies down he is likely to fall asleep. Sitting is the only congenial position. As

69. Cha U 8-15-1

70. आसीनः सन्नवात् Bra Su 4-1-7

regards other details (whether one should sit in a cave or on the bank of a river, which direction he should face, etc) the general rule is that the environment should be such as to promote concentration of the mind.)

(According to Śaṅkara it is not the idea that the worship which enables one to attain Brahman should be practised throughout life, it is not necessary to practise it after one can perceive Brahman) which is possible during the course of this life. Only such worship as enables one to attain heaven should be practised throughout life. But Rāmānuja says that the method of worship which enables one to attain Brahman should be practised during the whole life.) He quotes a passage that one who worships in the this way throughout life attains the region of Brahmā after death and is not born again<sup>71</sup>.

It is a fundamental principle of Vedāntā philosophy that one must reap the fruit of previous acts good or bad.<sup>72</sup> The total accumulation of our acts done in innumerable previous births is formidable and would, it might be thought, prevent the attainment of emancipation. (The Upaniṣads say that when one attains the

71. स खलु एव वर्तयन् यावदायुषं ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्पद्यते न च पुनरावर्तते (Cha U 8-15-1) Vide Saṅkara's and Ramanuja's commentaries on Bra Su 4-1-12 (आप्रयाणात् तव अपि हि दृष्टम्)

72. नाभुक्तं जीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि (Brahma Vaivarta Purana Prakiti Khanda 26-70)

knowledge of Brahman the past sins are destroyed, while future sins do not stick to him.<sup>73</sup>) As regards his good acts he enjoys the fruits thereof so long as he is alive. On his death these merits also disappear and he is left without any acts of which he has still to reap the fruits. There is nothing to stand in the path his emancipation.

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73. तदधिगमे उत्तरपूर्वयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तदव्यपदेशात् (Bra Su 4-1-13)  
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टेपरावरे (Mu U 2-1-28)  
इतरस्यापि एवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु (Bra Su 4-1-14)

## CHAPTER X

### Salvation.

Among the finest passages in the Upaniṣads are those which describe the nature of Brahman and the realization of Brahman. "When one attains supreme knowledge and all the world becomes one's own self, in that state of perception of unity how can there be ignorance or grief?" "Brahman gives the ear the power of hearing, He gives the mind the power of thinking, He gives the tongue the power of speaking, He is the breath of our breath ; the wise separate Him from all objects and thus realizing Him attain immortality when they depart from this world". "He is very difficult to be seen, He penetrates all objects and lies hidden in them. He lives in the heart and in the midst of all the passions. He is the eternal thing ; the wise man contemplates on Him by concentrating the mind on the self and passes beyond the reach of pleasure or grief<sup>3</sup>". "He is

1. यस्मिन् सर्वानि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।  
तव की मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥ Isa Upa 7
2. श्रौतस्य श्रौतं मनसो मनो यत् । वाची ह वाचं स उ प्राणस्य प्राणः ।  
चक्षुषश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीराः प्रेत्याख्याल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति । Kena Upa 1-2
3. तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।  
अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥

Katha Upa 1-2-12

finer than the finest object, yet is He bigger than the biggest". "He is one without an equal, He controls the whole universe, He is the inner soul of all beings, He creates many out of one, those who can see Him inside their self can get everlasting happiness—not others". "Brahman lies in front, Brahman lies behind, Brahman is to the right, Brahman is to the left, Brahman is below and above, this universe is Brahman, it is indeed very grand". "The sages on attaining Him become satisfied with their knowledge. They realize their self. They cease to have any desire for worldly objects, they attain tranquillity, they fully attain the all-pervading Brahman, they become united with Him and penetrate all objects". "There the sun does not shine, nor the moon, nor stars. Lightnings do not flash there. What to speak of the fire? He shines and all objects shine after Him. By His light all the universe

4. अणोरणीयान् महतो महोद्यानात्मास्य जन्तो निहिती गुहायां ।

Katha Upa 1-2-20

5. एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति ।  
तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शश्वतं नेतरेषां ॥

Katha Upa 2-2-12

6. ब्रह्मैवेदमसृतं पुरस्ताद् ब्रह्म पश्चात् ब्रह्म दक्षिणतश्चोत्तरेण ।  
अधोर्ध्वं च मसृतं ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठं ॥ Mundaka Upa

7. संप्राप्यैनसृषयो ज्ञानवृत्ताः ।

कृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशान्ताः ।

ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीराः

युक्तात्मानो सर्वमेवाविशन्ति Mu U 3-2-5

becomes manifest<sup>8</sup>". "When one knows Him one knows everything<sup>9</sup>". "When two different objects appear to exist, then one of them can see or smell or hear or salute or think or know the other, but when everything becomes the self, what indeed can be seen or smelt, or heard or saluted or thought about or known and by means of what? That by which all this is known, by what can that be known<sup>10</sup>?" "If a man knows his self—This is what I am—then with what wish, to fulfil what desire, will he suffer along with his body<sup>11</sup>". "What, oh Yājñavalkya, is the innermost thing?" "That which superpasses hunger and thirst, grief, ignorance, old age and death. The Brāhmaṇas by knowing that object as the self rise beyond the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for the heavens, and live

8. न तव सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विदुती भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।  
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥

Mundaka U 2-2-11

9. कश्चिद्ब्रु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति ॥ Mundaka 1-1-3  
10. यव हैतमिष भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति.....यव तु  
भस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं जिघ्रेत् तत् केन कं पश्येत्.....येन  
इदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ।

Bri Upa 2-4-14

11. आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः ।  
किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ Bri Upa 4-4-12

by begging<sup>12</sup>". "He who is without any desire, from whom all desires have been eliminated, he who has attained all desires, whose desires are contained in his self,—his breath does not go out, he becomes Brahman, and attains Brahman<sup>13</sup>".

There are two kinds of passages in the Upaniṣads describing the nature of the emancipated soul. From some passages it appears that the emancipated soul does not see or hear anything, does not enjoy any pleasure. "When everything becomes the self, what indeed can be seen and by what."<sup>14</sup> But in some other passages it is stated that the emancipated soul enjoys all pleasures according to his will. "He goes about eating, playing enjoying with women or conveyances"<sup>15</sup> "If he wants to see his departed forefathers they appear before him merely by his wish<sup>16</sup>" Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahmasūtras quotes passages of the latter kind in describing the nature

12. कतसो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्वान्तरी योऽशनायापिपासं शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पूर्वेषणायाश्च वित्तेषणायाश्च लोकेषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाश्च भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति । Bri Upa 3-5-1

13. अथ अकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकामो आत्मकामो । न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति ॥ Bri Upa 4-4-6

14. यत्र तु सर्वमात्मैवाभूद तत् केन कं पश्येत् Bri 2-4-14

15. स तत्र पश्येति जघनं कौडन् रममाणं स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा

Chha Upa 8-12-3

16. स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति संकल्पादेवास्त्र पितरः समुपतिष्ठन्ति

Chha Upa 8-2-1

of the emancipated soul.<sup>17</sup> He does not indicate how the former passages are to be interpreted so as to reconcile them with the latter passages. Śaṅkara says that there are two kinds of emancipation, one higher and one lower. Those who worship Brahman without any attributes as, according to Śaṅkara, Brahman really is, become one with Brahman. They attain the higher form of emancipation. They do not see or hear, they do not enjoy any pleasure. Those who worship Brahman as endowed with many qualities attain the lower form of emancipation. They attain some of the qualities of Brahman, but do not become one with Brahman. According to Śaṅkara in the former set of passages, where it is stated that the emancipated soul does not see or hear, the higher form of emancipation is referred to and in the latter set of passages, where it is stated that the emancipated soul goes about enjoying all sorts of pleasures, the lower form of emancipation is referred to. But Bādarāyaṇa does not refer to two kinds of emancipation. It appears that he talks of only one kind of emancipation, what Śaṅkara calls the lower kind. Apparently it is the intention of Bādarāyaṇa that in the first set of passages also the same sort of emancipation is referred to. Rāmānuja is also apparently of the same

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17. Brahmasutras 4-4-1 to 4-4-8

view. Let us consider whether the first set of passages can be reconciled with the second set.

“When every thing becomes the self, what indeed can be seen and by what?” Ordinarily we see an object which is different from us. But when the soul of a person is emancipated everything becomes his self. He does not see anything as different from him. For that reason it may be said that he does not see anything. But he perceives the object much more than one who merely sees it. One who sees an object merely knows the form of the object. The emancipated soul knows its form as well as all its other qualities as he realizes the object as his own self. The knowledge of the emancipated soul is much greater than the knowledge of the ordinary soul. If the emancipated soul could not know even the forms of objects then his knowledge would be less than the knowledge of an ordinary soul. That could never be. The emancipated soul knows the object as his ownself. That is much more than seeing it.

It may be objected that things do not really exist, and that it is due to the influence of Māyā or ignorance that they appear to exist, and that when the soul is emancipated he goes beyond the influence of Māyā and hence all things cease to exist so far as he is concerned ; he does not see any

thing. To this objection it may be replied that the free soul may realize that the object is false, but he should also realize how ordinary people think about the object. We should also remember that when objects of the world are said to be false the intention merely is that the objects are ephemeral.

It would thus appear that the two sets of passages can be reconciled and that the intention of the Upaniṣads is that the free soul realizes all objects of the world as his own self. Objects of pleasure appear before him by mere wish. He may also enjoy them if he desires to do so. He may not also have any desire for enjoying those objects. The word *ātmakāma* has been used in the Upaniṣads with reference to the free soul. This word indicates that the objects of desire are part of his self. An ordinary man enjoys the objects of the world as different from himself. The free soul enjoys them as part of his own self.

A distinction should be made between the enjoyment of a soul in bondage and the enjoyment of a liberated soul. A soul in bondage enjoys external objects so long as they are available to him. When he loses them he suffers. Hence in the *Gītā* Śrīkṛṣṇa says "When the organs of sense come in contact with outside objects we feel hot or cold, pleasure or pain. Such contacts have their beginning and end.

They are inconstant. You should have no desire for them."<sup>18</sup> But the objects which a liberated soul enjoys are a part of his self. He gets those objects whenever he desires. In fact those objects are not gross material objects. They are made of the same fine stuff of which the soul is made. In other words these objects are made of knowledge. There is no possibility of their being destroyed, or of the free soul being rendered incapable of perceiving or enjoying them. Those objects of the world which are enjoyed by souls in bondage are subject to destruction. Or the object may exist but the soul may lose the power of perceiving or enjoying them. If we have attachment for those objects we are bound to suffer. Hence a wise man should have no attachment for objects of the world. But the objects which are enjoyed by the free soul are not liable to destruction as they are made of knowledge. Nor is there any possibility of the free soul losing the power to perceive and enjoy them because he perceives them as his own self. He can have them whenever he desires.<sup>19</sup> In the case of an ordinary man enjoying things of the world, there is the possibility, nay certainty, of his coming to grief because of his being unable to enjoy them although he

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18. मातास्यर्शास्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णसुखदुःखदाः  
आगमापायिनो नित्यास्तास्तितिचक्ष्व भारत ॥ Gita 2-14
19. संकल्पादेवास्य पितरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति Chha Upa 8-2-1

may desire to do so. But in the case of the liberated soul there is no such possibility. Hence there is no reason why he should not desire to enjoy them. There can be no objection to enjoyment as such. In fact the free soul is full of supreme joy.

We can now understand the following passage of the Upanishads describing the possible methods of enjoyment of the free soul.

“If he wishes to see his fathers of this and previous births they arise by his mere wish, he is glorified in their company. If he wishes to see his mothers or brothers or sisters, or friends, they arise by his mere wish, he is glorified in their company. If he wishes to enjoy scents or garlands, food or drink, songs or music, or women, they arise by his mere wish, he is glorified being in possession of them. Whatever desire he may have, arises by his mere wish. He is glorified being in possession of it.

“These are true desires covered by the false. Of these true desires the covering is false. Whosoever departs this life cannot be seen again in this world. But (if a soul attains emancipation) all those who are alive or dead, whatever he desires in this world but does not attain,—when he goes there (attains emancipation) he attains every thing, the true desires are there, they are covered by the false. It is like this. If there is a store of gold buried under the

ground, those who are ignorant walk above the ground but do not know it. Even so all beings daily attain Brahman but do not know it. They are covered by falsehood. This soul is in the heart. Hence its derivation—*hridi* (in the heart) *ayam* (this thing). He who knows it daily attains Brahman. The soul arises from the body, attains ultimate light, and assumes its own true form. This is its own self. It is immortal. It is without fear. It is Brahman. The name of this Brahman is truth (Satyam). It consists of three letters—*Sat—ti—yam*. That which is *Sat* is immortal: That which is *ti* is mortal. By means of *yam* both (immortal and mortal) are controlled. He who knows it attains Brahman daily". Chândogya Upaniṣad 8-2 and 8-3.

When we come across an object of desire we consider it as different from us. We try to attain it by the organs of sense. This is the wrong method of approach as it is sure to end in grief. Either the object will be destroyed or we shall lose the power to enjoy it. The correct approach is to consider it as part of Brahman and hence as part of our own self. We then get at the true nature of the object which is not gross but made of pure knowledge. Gross objects are liable to be converted into the ingredients of which they consist. Hence they are liable to be destroyed. But objects which consist of pure knowledge can never

be destroyed as there are no ingredients of which pure knowledge is made. Further when objects of desire are realised as pure knowledge they can be attained more completely than gross objects. Gross objects are attained by means of the eye, the ear etc. We know only their form, sound etc. We can not fully know them. But objects which consist of mere knowledge can be fully attained as such objects become a part of our self. Of course it is possible to attain objects as pure knowledge only when we have no desire for the enjoyment of external objects, *i. e.*, when we become fit for emancipation.

The form which the soul takes on emancipation is no new form acquired by it. It is its own form. Hence the Upaniṣad has used in this connection the word 'sva' (one's own). The soul is then freed from the bondage of of the body. The Upaniṣads say, "So long as there is bondage of the body the soul cannot be free from occasional happiness and unhappiness"<sup>20</sup> As the emancipated soul is always happy it follows that it must be free from all bondage. Knowledge and joy are qualities inherent in the soul.<sup>21</sup> Due to improper acts done before, these qualities do not manifest themselves. When the soul is emancipa-

20. न वै सुशरीरस्य सुतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहृतिरस्ति Cha U 8-12-1

21. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म Tai U 2-1-1 आनन्दो ब्रह्म इति व्यजानात् Tai U 3-6-1

ted it acquires its own form and these qualities appear.

There is no line of demarcation between Brahman and the emancipated soul. Brahman is pure knowledge. Soul is also pure knowledge. So there can not be any demarcation. But are the two identical? Śaṅkara says they are identical. Rāmānuja says the soul is a part of Brahman. We have already discussed the question in Chapter VII (God and the Soul).

Bādarāyaṇa in the last but five aphorism (4-4-17) says that the emancipated soul attains all the powers of Brahman except the power of creating the universe because in those passages where the creation of the universe is referred to there is mention of Brahman, and there is no near mention of the free soul <sup>22</sup> S'āṅkara says that here Bādarāyaṇa refers to the worshipper of the lower form of Brahman, (*viz.* Brahman endowed with various qualities) and not to the worshipper of the higher form of Brahman, *viz.* Brahman without any qualities. S'āṅkara says that the worshipper of the lower form does not, when emancipated, realize his identity with Brahman though he attains some of the qualities of Brahman (*e. g.* knowledge of everything). For him there is the limitation that he cannot create the universe. The worshipper of the higher form becomes identical with Brahman; for

22. जगद्वापारयर्जे प्रकरणात् असन्निहितत्वात् च Bra Su 4-4-17

him there cannot be any limitation. If this view is accepted then it will have to be said that from this aphorism right up to the end of the Brahmasūtras, Bādarāyaṇa refers only to the worshipper of the lower form of Brahman. It would be strange if Bādarāyaṇa did not refer to the worship of the higher form of Brahman and the higher form of emancipation at the end of his treatise. According to S'aṁkara there is reference to the higher form of emancipation in an earlier portion of the Brahmasūtras, *viz.* first section of the fourth chapter. The only aphorism in this section which may be said to refer to the identity of the soul with Brahman is the third one<sup>23</sup> which says that Brahman should be worshipped as the Ātman (self). In his commentary on this aphorism S'aṁkara says that Brahman is without vice, but the soul is not so, hence the two might appear to be different and it might be considered that although Brahman is not the soul, yet Brahman is to be worshipped as the soul, even as the image is to be worshipped as Viṣṇu although the image is not Viṣṇu ; but (S'aṁkara observes) such is not the intention of this aphorism ; the soul appears to be different from Brahman because of the influence of Māyā which is false ; really the soul is identical with Brahman. Rāmānuja in his commentary on this aphorism (4-1-3) says that the relation of

23. आत्मा इति तु उपगच्छन्ति यादृयन्ति च (Bra Su 4-1-3)

Brahman to the soul is like the relation of the soul to the body. Brahman is the soul of the soul,—Ātman of ātman,—hence called paramātmā. The relation between Brahman and the soul is according to Rāmānuja clearly expressed in the following passage of the Upaniṣads. “He (Brahman) who resides in the soul and is separate from the soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body the soul is, who controls the soul from inside,—He is your soul, the controller from inside and immortal”<sup>24</sup>

The aphorism 4-1-3 quoted above should be interpreted so as not to clash with the aphorisms. (4-4-17 to 4-4-22). Rāmānuja’s interpretation of Brahmasūtra 4-1-3 is quite reasonable. There is nothing here to justify the conclusion that here Bādarāyaṇa refers to a stage of emancipation which is higher than the stage of emancipation described in the last section (Brahmasūtra 4-4) In fact the last section is the section describing emancipation, whereas the 1st section of the 4th chapter is concerned with the method of worship. In particular the aphorism 4-1-3 says nothing about the state of emancipation.

The Upaniṣads contain both sorts of passages. In some passages it has been said that Brahman

24. यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् विज्ञानादन्तरी, यम् विज्ञानं न वेद,  
यस्य विज्ञानम् शरीरं, य विज्ञानमन्तरी  
यमयति, एष त आत्माऽन्तर्यामिमतः (Bri Upa 3-7-22)

should be worshipped as the soul<sup>25</sup> while in others it has been said that the soul and its master are different.<sup>26</sup> Rāmānuja says that both kinds of passages can be reconciled by saying that Brahman is the soul of the soul. It would not do to accept one set of passages and reject the other set as not strictly true.

S'āṅkara holds that in the last section there is mention of two states of emancipation. But from the general trend of the aphorisms it does not appear to be so. The only aphorism which might suggest identity between Brahman and the soul is the fourth aphorism of the fourth section of the fourth chapter. "The emancipated soul remains without any distinction from Brahman."<sup>27</sup> But even if the soul is a part of Brahman there is no distinction between the soul and Brahman, as there is no distinction between a drop of water and the ocean in which the drop is thrown. There is also of course no distinction if the two are identical. But in the face of other aphorisms<sup>28</sup> where it is clearly laid down that Brahman is greater than the soul, it cannot be concluded that by the word "non-division" (अविभाग) Bādarāyaṇa

25. आत्मा इत्येष उपासीत Bri U 6-5-7

26. पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा Sva U 1-6

27. अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् Bra Su 4-4-4

28. अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् Bra Su 2-1-22

अधिकोपदेशात् तु बादरायणः Bra Su 3-4-8

means identity. If as stated by Śaṅkara there is reference to two states of emancipation in the last section of the Brahmasūtras, then the lower state would have been mentioned first and then the higher state. But in the concluding portion of this section what Śaṅkara calls the lower state is undoubtedly referred to. This consideration also precludes the possibility of Bādarāyaṇa having in his mind two different states of emancipation—a conclusion which is warranted by other considerations also mentioned above.

Hence it can be definitely stated that there is no aphorism which shows that according to Bādarāyaṇa there is a state of emancipation higher than that described in the last section, or in other words according to Bādarāyaṇa there is no state of emancipation in which the soul becomes identical with Brahman.

About the nature of the emancipated soul different opinions are held by different scholars. According to Jaimini<sup>29</sup> the nature of the emancipated soul is the same as that of Brahman. As Brahman is all-knowing, as all desires of Brahman are fulfilled, so the soul also is all-knowing, all the desires of the emancipated soul are fulfilled. According to Oudulomi the nature of the emancipated soul is pure knowledge.<sup>30</sup>

29. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिः उपन्यासादिभ्यः (Bra Su 4-4-5)

30. चित्तिमात्रेण तदात्मकत्वात् इत्यौडुलोमिः (Bra Su 4-4-6)

But even if the latter view is accepted there is no contradiction with the former view. In other words although the soul may be pure knowledge it may be all-knowing, its desires may be all fulfilled. Śaṅkara holds that the soul is pure knowledge. It is not knower. But Rāmānuja says that the Upaniṣads no doubt say with regard to the emancipated soul that its form is that of pure knowledge,<sup>31</sup> but the intention is not that the soul is not knower as well. The intention is that no portion of the soul depends on anything else for being perceived. Material objects cannot be perceived without the help of a lamp. But a lamp can be perceived without the help of anything else. In the same way the soul can be perceived without the help of anything else.

The word Svaraj or Swaraj which is very frequently met with in political literature has been borrowed from the Upaniṣads which use it in connection with the emancipated soul. The free soul has no other master.<sup>32</sup> If the soul had any other master it could not attain whatever it wants. But does not the free soul remain under the control of Brahman? Śaṅkara's reply to this question is simple. As the free soul is identical with Brahman the question of its being under the control of Brahman does not arise.

31. प्रज्ञानघन एव

32. अत एव च अनन्याधिपतिः Bra Su 4-4-9

But of course Rāmānuja would have to give a different reply. According to Rāmānuja Brahman is the soul of the individual soul. Hence although the emancipated soul is under the control of Brahman, it cannot be said that the individual soul is under the control of anything else, as Brahman, being the soul of the individual soul, cannot be said to be "anything else".

That the emancipated soul possesses a mind there cannot be any doubt. For with reference to the individual soul it has been said that if he desires to see his departed relatives, they appear before him. Desire is a function of the mind. Without mind there cannot be any desire. Thus the emancipated soul surely possessed a mind. But what about other objects? Does the individual soul possess organs of sense, a fine body, and so on. The sage Bādari holds that the individual soul does not possess these objects<sup>33</sup> It possesses a mind and nothing else. For the Upaniṣads say that the emancipated soul sees the objects of desires with its mind and is satisfied.<sup>34</sup> If the individual soul had the organ of sight it would have seen the objects of desire with the help of the organ of sight and not with the mind. But Jaimini holds that the emancipated soul is accompanied by a fine body (which

33. 'अभाव' वादस्तिह हि एव' (Rra Su 4-4-10)

34. मनसा एतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते (Chha Upa 5-12-5)

includes the organ of sight)<sup>35</sup> for the Upaniṣads say that such a soul can assume several forms. The soul itself is one. Unless the soul possessed a fine body how could it be said that it could assume several forms? The conclusion of Bādarāyaṇa is that if the emancipated soul desires to have one or more fine bodies it can have them. But if it does not so desire, it will have none.<sup>36</sup> The fine body which we possess and which accompanies our soul after death is determined by the acts, good or bad, done by us. The existence and the form of such a fine body does not depend upon our will. With the help of that body we may feel pleasure or we may suffer pain. But the existence of the fine body of the emancipated soul does not depend on his acts. It depends entirely upon his will. With the help of that body he always enjoys happiness.

As observed before the statement that the free soul always possesses a mind, and can also possess organs of sense if it so desires implies that the free soul does not become identical with Brahman. Śaṅkara would explain it by saying that it does not refer to the highest stage of emancipation but to such stage as may be attained by one who worships Brahman with attributes, the highest stage being attained by one who contemplates

35. भाव' जैमिनिः विकल्पामननात् (Bra Su 4-4-11)

36. बादशाहयत् उभयविधं बादरायणः अतः (Bra Su 4-4-12)

on Brahman without attributes. But as stated before such a distinction between two stages of emancipation does not appear to be the intention of the author of the Brahmasūtras. It appears that in this treatise there is reference to one stage only, *viz.* what S'āṅkara considers to be the lower stage.

It may be asked, if the free soul can remain without a fine body, how can it in that state enjoy various objects of desire as mentioned in the passages of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad quoted above.<sup>37</sup> The reply is that the free soul can enjoy objects of desire without a fine body, even as a person can enjoy various objects in his dream.<sup>38</sup> When a man dreams, his eyes do not see, yet he sees various objects by means of his mind. The emancipated soul has got a mind and with that mind it can see all objects which it desires to see. Rāmānujā observes that the objects which the emancipated soul desires to enjoy are created by Brahman even as the objects seen in the dream are also created by Brahman. If the emancipated soul possesses a fine body (including the organ of sight etc) then it can see the objects of desire with the organ of sight even as one sees objects when one is awake.

37. स तव पर्येति जघनं क्रीडन् रममाणः (Chha Upa 8-12-3)

38. तन्वभावे स्वप्नदुपपद्यते हि (Bra Su 4-4-13)

## CHAPTER XI

### Other Schools of Indian Philosophy

The different schools of philosophy which had their origin in India may be divided into two classes (i) the āstika and (ii) the nāstika systems. The āstika systems are those which do not challenge the authority of the Vedas and the nāstika systems are those which challenge that authority. The main āstika systems are six in member, *viz.* (i) Nyāya system of Gotama, (ii) Vaiśeṣika system of Kanāda, (iii) Sāṃkhya system of Kapila (iv) Yoga system of Patañjali (v) Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini and (vi) Uttara Mīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa. Among the nāstika systems may be mentioned (i) cārvāka system (ii) Buddha system and (iii) Jaina system. There are a few other systems of comparatively less importance.

We shall begin with the cārvāka system. The following are in brief the doctrines of this system. We can have no knowledge unless we perceive an object through our senses. As the soul can not be perceived by the senses it does not exist. Consciousness is a property of the body. The Vedas were written by persons who wanted to deceive others. The

aim of life is the enjoyment of the senses in this world. The system is as illogical as it is debasing. There are hardly any decent men who declare their allegiance to this system. If a man goes out of his house—say to the market—surely his wife and children are not to conclude that he does not exist because he cannot be seen. In practical life we cannot get on unless we take the help of inference and believe in the testimony of reliable persons.

It may be stated here that there is a tradition that the Cārvāka system of philosophy was propounded by the sage Bṛhaspati in order to deceive the asuras. Many of the arguments of modern materialistic philosophers are contained in the cāravāka philosophy and have been effectively replied to by the followers of the Nyāya School.

### **Buddhist Philosophy**

We now come to the systems of Buddhist philosophy.

There are several systems of Buddhist philosophy. According to all these systems objects of the world are created in one instant, they exist during the next instant and are destroyed in the next following instant. One system of Buddhist philosophy admits the existence of external objects. There is

another system which states that external objects do not exist, and it is only ideas of those objects which exist in our mind. This system is called Vijñānavāda and somewhat resembles Berkeley's Idealism. The third system states that neither do external objects exist, nor do ideas of those objects exist in our mind. The existence of God is not admitted in any of these systems. The first of these systems of philosophy states that external objects consist of atoms of various kinds which assemble together and form the universe. But how can they assemble together to form this beautiful and orderly universe unless there is an animate God who controls them all? Moreover how can they assemble if they are destroyed the very next instant after they come into existence? There are two other mutually contradictory theories in the systems of Buddhist philosophy. According to these systems every instant produces the next instant, and the previous instant is destroyed when the next instant comes into being. If the previous instant disappears as soon as it is created, how does it get the opportunity to create the next instant? The two instants ought to exist simultaneously in order that one might produce the other. But Buddhist philosophy states that they do not exist

simultaneously and still maintains that one produces the other.<sup>2</sup> According to Buddhism everything is transient. Both the subject and the object are transient. But according to the Vedānta philosophy the subject can never be transient as it remembers past events.<sup>3</sup> The subject can never remember past events unless it existed when the event happened and also exists now. According to Buddhism when two objects are related as the cause and the effect, the cause is first destroyed and then the effect appears; the seed of a fig tree is first destroyed and then the germ of a fig tree appears. Vedānta observes that when the seed is destroyed, there is nothing and hence, according to Buddhist philosophy, the fig tree comes out of nothing. But if "nothing" can produce a fig tree, why does it not produce an apple tree? The fig tree and the apple tree are related equally to "nothing." According to Vedānta, the germ existed in the seed even before it appeared; the germ is only a rearrangement of the particles in the seed. Then the second school of Buddhist philosophy is criticized. This school says that external objects do not exist,—it is only our

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2. Brahma Sutra 2-2-20, 2-2-21.

3. Brahma Sutra 2-2-25

4. Brahma Sutra 2-2-26

ideas of those objects which exist. According to Vedānta, this theory is contradicted by our personal experience. We do feel the existence of outside objects. When we perceive a wall or a post, it is an outside object which we feel, and not an idea inside our mind.<sup>5</sup> Buddhism says that objects seen by us when awake are like objects seen in a dream. But this analogy is wrong. When we awake from sleep we perceive that the objects seen in the dream do not exist. But objects seen when awake do not similarly disappear.<sup>6</sup> To the question if external objects do not exist what is the object of our desire,—Buddhism says that there is an object called 'idea of receptacle' (ālaya vijñāna) which is the object of desire.<sup>7</sup> Vedānta criticises this theory and says how can such momentary ideas be the objects of desire? The third school of Buddhism which denies the existence of outside objects as well as of ideas of those objects is rejected as altogether untenable.<sup>8</sup>

It might appear strange that though Hinduism considers Buddha to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu, yet it holds that many of his doctrines are false. Thus the Śrīmad-bhāgavatam while enumerating the incarnations

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5. Brahma Sutra 2-2-28 Vide pp 123, 124

6. Brahma Sutra 2-2-29

7. Brahma Sutra 2-2-31

8. Brahma Sutra 2-2-32

of Viṣṇu mentions Buddha between Kṛṣṇa and Kalki and says that Viṣṇu took this incarnation in order to cloud the intellect of wicked persons.<sup>9</sup> The Padmapurāṇa says that Viṣṇu incarnated as Buddha and created the evil Buddhist scriptures for the destruction of the wicked.<sup>10</sup> As an example of the paradoxical nature of his teachings it may be mentioned that although he condemned the slaughter of animals in Vedic sacrifices, he permitted meat-eating (when the animals were slain by others). The result has been that in Buddhist countries (like Burma, China and Japan) thousands of animals are daily slaughtered for food, while much fewer animals are killed for the food of Hindus although animals are sacrificed in Hindu religious ceremonies. The reason is that the Hindu scriptures say that the man who eats meat shares the sin of killing the animal even as the man who actually kills the animal<sup>11</sup> while according to Buddhism only the man who kills incurs sin, the man who eats does not necessarily incur

9. ततः कलौ संप्रवृत्ते संमोहाय सुरक्षिषाम् ।

बुद्धी नास्माऽजनसुतः कौकटेषु भविष्यति ॥

Srimadbhagabatam 1-3-24

10. Padmapuranam, Uttarakhanda, 236.

11. अनुमन्ता विशसिता निहन्ता क्रयविक्रयी ।

संस्कर्ता चोपहृता च खादक्येति घातकाः ॥ Manu 5-51

स्वमांसं परमांसिनो यो बर्हयितुमिच्छति ।

अनभ्यर्च्य पितृन् देवान् ततोऽन्यो नाव्यपुण्यकृत् ॥ Manu 5-52

sin. Again belief in the existence of God who rewards or punishes us during life or after death according to our acts is one of the most potent factors in restraining evil conduct. Hence no mention of God in the teachings of the Buddha must be admitted to be a glaring defect in his religion. Hindu preceptors while unequivocally condemning the defects in the teachings of the Buddha have however paid the highest compliment to his personal character by recognising him as an incarnation of God. It must be considered to be an indication of the great liberality of Hindus which contrasts favourably with the intolerance displayed by the followers of other religions.

If it is urged that it is improper for God to lead men in a wrong path, it may be replied that even apart from the Hindu theory regarding the Buddha it must be admitted that God does sometimes lead men in a wrong path. For God controls all the affairs of the world. How then can a man take the wrong path if God did not allow him to do so, or to put it more pointedly unless God guided his intelligence to take the wrong path? That God guides the intellect of all persons must be admitted by all theists. The famous Gāyatrī mantram says so<sup>12</sup>. There are passages

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12. "We contemplate the adorable energy of the creator of the universe who guides our intellect" Rg Veda 3-62-10 ; Yajurveda 36-3 ; Sama Veda 6-3-10-1

in the Upaniṣads which also repeat it.<sup>13</sup> In fact the conclusion is irresistible in every religion which maintains that God is omnipotent. It may be observed that in this matter the Hindu theory is more satisfactory than the theories of other religions. Other religions can not explain why God leads the intellect of some in the right path and of others in the wrong path. Hinduism has said that it is true that God leads the intellect of some in the right path and the intellect of some in the wrong path, but it is not to be inferred that God is partial. He considers the acts done by each man, the desire of each man and guides his intellect accordingly in the right or the wrong path. If men perform good acts, their intellect is guided in the right path. If they perform evil acts their intellect is guided in the wrong path. Because we sometimes perform good acts and sometimes perform evil acts, our intellect is sometimes guided in the right path and sometimes in the wrong path.

To the question, if God also can give a wrong lead how to distinguish between the correct and the incorrect lead, Hinduism replies that the correct lead is in the Vedas which are eternal and infallible and which are correctly interpreted

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13. केनेषितं पतति प्रेषितं मनः (Kena U 1-1) एष ह्येव असाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः अधो निनीयते (Kausitaki U 3-9)

in the Purāṇās and other accepted treatises. Nothing which is against the Vedas can be accepted as correct. If it comes from man we say he is mistaken. If it comes from an incarnation of God *e.g.* the Buddha, we say that God wants to mislead some men because of their improper acts. It has been said that many wicked persons wanted to perform Vedic sacrifices in order to attain heaven. In order to dissuade them from performing Vedic sacrifices he preached that Vedic sacrifices should not be performed as they involve the killing of animals, which is a sin. As it was not his intention to prevent them from committing sins he did not preach that it was also a sin to eat meat even when the animals are killed by others.

### Jaina Philosophy

Vedānta philosophy has also criticised Jainism which admits the existence of the soul but not of God. According to Jaina philosophy the world consists of the following seven objects :—

1. the individual souls (which enjoy pleasure or pain),
2. the objects of the world which cause pleasure or pain to the souls,
3. the desire to enjoy,

4. renunciation,
5. that which wears away sin,
6. the cause of bondage (karma), and
7. emancipation.

It has been further said that the nature of all objects is as follows :—perhaps it exists ; perhaps it does not exist ; perhaps it does and does not exist ; perhaps it is inexpressible ; perhaps it exists but is inexpressible ; perhaps it does not exist and is inexpressible. But (observes Bādarāyaṇa) many of these qualities are contradictory and it is impossible that they should exist simultaneously in the same object.<sup>14</sup>

Then, according to Jainism, the size of the soul is equal to that of the body. As the size of the body changes, it follows that, according to this philosophy, the size of the soul will also have to change. The soul then being changeful cannot be everlasting. Moreover from whence the soul derives the particles with which it increases in size ? It cannot get them from the material objects, earth, air etc. as the soul is not material. Moreover, according to Jain philosophy, the soul attains a definite size when it is emancipated. That must be the real size of the soul. As the soul is everlasting its size should always remain what it becomes after

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14. Brahmasutras 2-2-34 to 2-2-36

emancipation and it is illogical to hold that the size of the soul changes with that of the body.<sup>15</sup>

### The Astika Systems of Philosophy

The systems of philosophy referred to above challenge the authority of the Vedas and are therefore called *nāstika* systems of philosophy. The other systems of philosophy do not challenge the authority of the Vedas and are therefore called *āstika*. They are six in number *viz* *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya*, *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pūrva mīmāṃsā* and *Uttaramīmāṃsā*. The first four systems mainly rest on arguments; passages from the Vedas are occasionally quoted for reference. But the main conclusions of these systems are based on arguments used independently of the Vedas. For this reason these four systems are called *Smārta* as distinguished from the remaining two systems which are called *śrauta* (*śruti* = *Veda*). These latter two systems rest entirely on the Vedas. Arguments are used mainly for the purpose of elucidation of the meaning of the Vedas, and rarely in an independent manner. Each proposition is generally supported by reference to passages in the Vedas, (or *Śrutis*). Passages from the *smṛtis* are also sometimes referred to in as much as the *smṛtis* are supposed to have been written in order to elucidate the meaning of the Vedas.

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15. न एकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् (Brahmasutra 2-2-33)

The authors of these six systems of āstika philosophy are Kanāda, Gotama, Patañjali, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa (or Vyāsa). Everyone of them is a ṛṣi *i.e.* a person to whom the truth was revealed. How is it then that there are discrepancies between these six systems of philosophy? In many cases conflicting views are expressed in different philosophies. Where there is conflict of opinions one of the opinions must be wrong. If ṛṣis knew the truth why did they give wrong opinions in their philosophies? In other words can the six āstika systems of philosophy be reconciled?

It has been said that the six āstika systems of philosophy are intended to lead gradually to the realization of truth by a man immersed in the affairs of the world and addicted to the pleasures of the senses. If to such a man it is said he should give up all these pleasures and try to realize Brahman who is without form, without qualities, it will make no effect on him. The truth has to be gradually revealed to him. The process is known as Arundhati-nyāya. Arundhati is a small star which can be seen with difficulty by the naked eye. A big star in the neighbourhood of Arundhati is pointed out saying, "Look, below this branch of the tree, there is a bright star. Can you see it?" When the

observer has correctedly spotted it, he is asked to find out another star less bright than the former, but nearer to Arundhati. In this way the learner has to proceed three or four stages till the faint little star which is the real Arundhati is perceived by him. In this way the ṛṣis who want to reveal the whole truth to the worldly man proceed to do so by stages. First comes Gotama with his Nyāya system of philosophy. A man who wants to know the truth must first learn to argue correctly, and avoid the fallacies which are apt to creep imperceptibly into our methods of argument. Then comes Kanāda with the Vaiśeṣika system. "You are fond" he says "of the objects of the world. But are not all worldly objects mere dust? Will not all of them be ultimately reduced to atoms? Is it wise to hanker after worldly objects." Then comes Kapila with the Sāmkhya system. "Learn" he says "to distinguish between the living soul and inanimate matter. Your body is inanimate matter. Leave it aside and find out your soul. Otherwise you will suffer in ignorance." Then comes Patañjali who teaches us how to practice concentration of the mind so that we can perceive fine objects like the soul. Jaimini comes next with his Pūrva mīmāṃsā philosophy. "The Vedas", he declares, "are infallible as they are not man-made. They

are the source of true knowledge. Know the Vedas and know the truth." Finally comes Vyāsa. "Know that there is a Being of infinite power and infinite goodness and that Being is the soul of your soul." Thus by gradual steps the six systems of philosophy lead to the realization ultimate truth.

### Nyaya Philosophy

A great portion of Nyāya philosophy is taken up by discussion on the methods of correct arguing, or anumāna which have been referred to in the second chapter of this volume. As in other systems of āstika philosophy the aim of life is stated in the Nyāya philosophy to be emancipation from the miseries of life. The Nyāya philosophy proceeds in the following way to trace the ultimate cause of the miseries of life. We suffer from these miseries because we are born. We are born because we perform good and bad acts, and have to suffer the consequences of acts performed by us in our previous lives, or rather those acts the fruits of which have not been tasted before either in the earth or in heaven or hell. We perform acts because of our attachments and prejudices, our likes and dislikes. Our likes and dislikes are due to our wrong or incorrect ideas. Our incorrect ideas are mostly due to the

confusion made by us between the animate soul and the inanimate body.<sup>16</sup> As to this analysis made by Nyāya philosophy of the cause of the miseries of life Vedānta has little to object. Nyāya philosophy then proceeds to enumerate the various objects of the world a correct knowledge of which would enable us to distinguish between the soul and the body.

The method followed by Nyāya philosophy has been divided into three parts, (1) mention of the object (2) mention of the characteristics of the object and (3) examination if the characteristics are correct.<sup>17</sup> First, the object is mentioned by name, then the characteristics which distinguish that object from all other objects are enumerated, and finally it is properly examined whether they are the

16. दुःख-जन्म-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-निव्याजानानाम् उत्तरोत्तरापायि तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः-  
न्यायसूत्र १।१।२

17. त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशः, लक्षणं परीक्षा च । अथ नामधेयिन  
पदार्थमावस्य अभिधानमुद्देशः । उद्दिष्टस्य तत्त्वव्यवस्थापको धर्मः लक्षणम् । लक्षितस्य  
यथालक्षणमुपपद्यते न वा इति प्रमाणैरवधारणम् परीक्षा । ( वात्स्यायन भाष्य )

"This Śāstra proceeds in three stages, *vis.*, the mention of the object, its indications and examination. The first part consists in merely naming the object; the second part gives the characteristics which distinguish it from other objects; the third part consists of the examination whether the characteristics really distinguish it from other objects." (Vatsyana's commentary on the Nyaya aphorisms).

The method indicated above is also followed in other systems of philosophy.

real characteristics. As stated in chapter III above, the Nyāya philosophy recognizes four different means of acquiring knowledge *viz.* (1) perception by the senses (प्रत्यक्ष) (2) inference (अनुमान) (3) comparison (उपमान) and (4) reliable testimony (आगम). The objects of knowledge are according to the Nyāya philosophy twelve in number *viz.* (1) the soul, (2) the body (3) the organs of sense (4) the objects of the senses (5) definite knowledge (बुद्धि) (6) mind (7) tendency to act (प्रवृत्ति) (8) fault (दोष) (9) existence after death (प्रेत्यभाव) (10) the fruits of acts (11) suffering and (12) emancipation.<sup>18</sup> The Nyāya philosophy has tried to establish the existence of the soul by means of arguments. Although the soul cannot be perceived by the senses, its existence can be inferred from its attributes, *viz.*, desire, prejudice etc. Just as the existence of the charioteer (who can not be seen from a distance) can be inferred from the regulated movements of the chariot, so also the existence of the soul can be inferred from the activities of the inanimate body which cannot act of itself unless it is regulated by a living and conscious object.<sup>19</sup> The organs

18. आत्मा-शरीर-इन्द्रियार्थ-बुद्धि-मनः-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-प्रेत्यभाव-फल-दुःखापवर्गाः तु प्रमेयम् (न्यायसूत्र २।१।८)

19. प्रवृत्त्याद्यनुमेयोऽयं रथगत्येव सारथिः । (विश्वनाथ)

of sense cannot be our soul, for there are various organs but there is one thing which perceives through the different organs. I who see through the eyes is the same I who perceive through touch. The body cannot be the soul. If the body be the soul when the body is burnt nothing remains to reap the fruits of the good and bad acts done during life. The concepts of virtue and vice, heaven and hell all become meaningless unless there is a soul which exists after the body is destroyed.

According to Nyāya philosophy an object cannot be perceived merely by means of the senses. If objects could be perceived merely through the senses, without the intervention of the mind, then we would have simultaneous knowledge of numerous objects through our various organs of sense, for there is simultaneous contact of various objects with various senses. But we have one knowledge at a time, *viz* that produced by the object and the sense which are for the time being associated with the mind. The apparent simultaneous perception of several objects is really successive perception at very small intervals. To the question whether the mind is one or many, Nyāya philosophy says that mind is really one but appears to be many due to many functions of the mind, even as a single crystal

appears to be many crystals of different hues due to contact with different objects.

Fault (दोष) is of three kinds, attachment prejudice and ignorance. It is due to the influence of these faults that men do various kinds of acts.<sup>20</sup>

Existence after death (प्रेत्यभावः) includes residence in heaven or hell as well as rebirth.

According to Nyāya philosophy emancipation is complete and permanent freedom from pain. There is no joy of the soul at that time. The soul remains, when emancipated, like a piece of stone, without any feeling, without any change. This of course is not the view of Vedānta. The philosopher-poet Śrīharṣa in his epic 'Naiṣadha-charita' has ridiculed Nyāya philosophy for this defect. "He who has propounded a philosophy in order to show that the soul when emancipated becomes like stone is really Go-tama."<sup>21</sup> Here there is a pun on the word Gotama. Gotama is the name of the author of the Nyāya philosophy. Again 'Go' means a cow, and 'tama' is the superlative suffix. So 'Gotama' can mean 'a cow par excellence.'

The mind cannot be the soul. In order that there may be knowledge, two things

20. तत् वैराग्यं रागद्वेषमोहान्तरभाषात् । न्यायसूत्र ४।१।३

21. मुक्तये य शिलालाय शास्त्रमाह सचेतसाम् ।  
गोतमं तमवेत्यैव यथा वित्य तथैव सः ॥

are necessary, one who knows (*viz.* the soul) and the other, the means by which one knows (*viz.* the mind). If mind is conceived to be the knowing soul, the existence of another object must be presumed by means of which the mind knows. That object may be called by another name. So instead of the soul and the mind, we shall have the mind and another hypothetical object.<sup>22</sup>

So then according to Nyāya philosophy our sufferings are due to our ignorance. We mistake the inanimate body as our real self (the soul) and perform various acts, good and bad, for the pleasure of our body. For our evil acts we have to suffer in this life or in hell or in the next birth. If we have true knowledge, we perceive the difference between the body and the soul; the sufferings of the body do not touch the soul, and we have emancipation. As stated before, some of the conclusions of the Nyāya philosophy are accepted in Vedānta philosophy while others are not accepted. The Nyāya philosophy paves the way for the realisation of the complete truth in the Vedānta philosophy. The special contribution of Nyāya lies in the exposition of the methods of correct reasoning which have been applied by subsequent scholars<sup>23</sup>

22. ज्ञातृज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तिः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् । न्यायसूत्र २।१।१७

23. Vide कुसुमाञ्जलि by उदयनाचार्य ।

to expose the defects of Cārvāka and other materialistic philosophers. Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahmasūtras does not make any adverse comment on the Nyāya philosophy.

### Vaisesika Philosophy

The founder of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is the sage Kanāda also called Uluka. It is said that he lived on the grains picked up from the fields after the harvest was gathered therefrom. It may be observed that this means of living has been commended by Manu and other lawgivers as the highest means suitable for a Brahmin, because it involves no deprivation or discomfort to other beings.<sup>24</sup> Pleased by his austerities, Lord Śiva gave him knowledge and asked him to write the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. At one time this philosophy was greatly in vogue as is testified by the fairly large number of books written on it, many of which have been lost. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems form one group. Whereas the Nyāya system admits four kinds of proof or means of knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika

24. ऋतामृताभ्यां जीवेत् ऋतेन प्रसूतेन वा ।

सत्यामृताभ्यामपि वा न श्रद्धया कदाचन ॥ मनु ४।४

A Brahmin should live on gleanings from the harvested fields, or on alms received without or on asking, or by cultivation, or by trade, but never by personal service. (Here the various means of living are mentioned according to the order of descending merit).

system admits only two kinds of proof, *viz.* perception and inference. As in other systems of philosophy, according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, salvation depends upon true knowledge. But unlike some other systems, Nyāya says that true knowledge can be realized only in the pure mind, and mind is purified by the performance of religious acts without any desire for the fruit thereof. As stated before, Vedānta philosophy also maintains that true knowledge can be realized only in pure mind and mind is purified by the performance of religious acts without desire for the fruit thereof. This is an important point of similarity between Vedānta philosophy and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, —a point which distinguishes these systems of philosophy from other systems. The word used by Kanāda to indicate religious acts performed without a desire for the fruit thereof is Dharmaviśeṣa.<sup>25</sup> The word Dharma has been defined by Kanāda as that which leads to prosperity in this life and emancipation in the next.<sup>26</sup> This is an important contribution to Vedic philosophy made by Kanāda which has been accepted by the Vedāntic school. It is a recognized principle that the Vedic injunctions not only enable a person to attain heaven and immortality but also contribute to worldly

25. धर्मविशेषप्रसूतात् तत्त्वज्ञानात् निःश्रेयसम् । ( कनादसूत्र १।१।४ )

26. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ( कनादसूत्र १।१।२ )

prosperity. It is also admitted that if these injunctions are followed without desire for any reward they purify the mind and render it fit to receive true knowledge as stated by Kanāda. The principle of doing one's duty without desire of any reward is also one of the main teachings of the Bhagavadgīta.<sup>27</sup>

Kanāda has discussed the nature of time and space. Time, he says, is a thing which always exists (नित्य) which has really no parts (अखण्ड) but in which the existence of parts is conceived due to the motion of some object (*e.g.* the sun). It is due to the existence of time that some objects are called older than others, that events are said to happen either simultaneously or slowly or quickly.<sup>28</sup> Space has also been considered to be one and indivisible. Space is popularly conceived to be divided into parts due to its association with other objects (उपाधि). As to the existence of the soul Kanāda says that no attribute can exist without an object; knowledge is an attribute, it must exist in an object, that object is the soul; knowledge cannot exist in the body as the ingredients of a body (*e.g.* earth, water) have no knowledge, and also parts of

27. कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन । गीता १।४७

कार्यमित्येव यत् कर्म नियतं क्रियतेऽर्जुन ।

संगं त्यक्त्वा फलं चैव स त्यागः सात्त्विको मतः ॥ गीता १८।८

28. अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपत् चिरं क्षिप्रमिति काललिङ्गानि । ( कनादसूत्र २।२।८ )

a body (like hands and feet) have no knowledge. It is due to the existence of the soul that we breathe in and breathe out, that we open and close the eyelids, that we live, that our mind moves from one object to another, that the action of one sense leads to action of another sense (*e.g.* on seeing a beautiful flower we go near it or pluck it), that we feel pleasure and pain, desire and prejudice, that we make various efforts.<sup>29</sup> According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies there are eight attributes of Paramātmā (God) *viz.* unity, greatness, distinction from all other objects, contact with all objects, division, knowledge, wish and effort.<sup>30</sup> While the Jīvātmā (soul) can be perceived directly in the feelings "I am happy or sorry," the Paramātmā can be known only through inference (अनुमान). The inference used in Nyāya philosophy is like this: The world consisting of objects like the earth, seeds etc. must have a maker; because they are objects which are producible, and all objects which are producible have a maker.<sup>31</sup> As to the existence of an object called the mind the argument has been put forth that sometimes an object is not perceived even when the sense and the object

29. प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतौन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छादिषमयवा-  
यात्मनो लिंगानि । ( कनाद ३।२।४ )

30. संख्यादयः पंच बुद्धिरिच्छा यवोऽपि चेश्वरे । ( विश्वनाथ )

31. चित्त्यं कुरादि जगत् सकलं कं, कार्यत्वात् घटादिवत् ।

are present, which shows that for the perception of an object something more is necessary besides the object, the sense and the soul. This other thing is the mind<sup>32</sup>. This argument of Vaiśeṣika philosophy has, as we have seen before (pp. 47, 48), been accepted by Vedānta.

There are according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy nine kinds of drabyas ( द्रव्य ) *i.e.* objects which have attributes and which are capable of action.<sup>33</sup> They are earth, water, fire, air, space, direction, time, soul and mind. Earth, water, fire, air and space are constituents of material objects and are called bhūtas. Space is neither created nor destroyed. It is everlasting ( नित्य ). The four other bhūtas (*viz.* earth, water, fire and air) are each of two kinds, gross and fine. Those which are gross can be perceived by the senses and are subject to creation and destruction. Those which are fine cannot be so perceived. They are everlasting and not subject to creation or destruction. They are not produced from any other objects and hence they are indestructible.<sup>34</sup> They cannot be divided into smaller particles.

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32. आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे ज्ञानस्य भावाभावी मनसो लिङ्गम् ।

( कनादसूत्र ३।१।८ )

33. Sri Gopal Mallik fellowship lecture by Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Durga Charan Samkhya Vedantatirtha Part II p 195

34. सत् अकारणवत् नित्यम् ( कनाद ४।१।१ ) कारणभावात् कार्यभावोऽनित्यः ( कनाद ४।१।३ )

If an object like pot or cloth is broken up into pieces, those pieces into still smaller pieces and so on, we ultimately come to a stage where the pieces cannot be further broken up. They are the atoms (परमाणु). In this way the existence of atoms can be inferred although they cannot be perceived by the sense. Although atoms exist they can not be seen. In order that an object may be capable of being seen it should have a considerable size (mahatva) and a visible form.<sup>35</sup> Atoms have neither greatness nor visible form. Hence they cannot be seen. The world has been created by the association of the four kinds of atoms referred to above. Motion first originates in the atoms of air. This happens due to the previous good or bad acts of the infinite number of beings or souls. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy, like the Vedānta philosophy, states that the world has been created so that all beings may get the fruits of the good or bad acts done by them. The process of creation is thus explained in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. At first two atoms unite and form a dvaṇuka (द्वणुक). The dvaṇuka is a fine substance like the paramaṇu and cannot be perceived by the senses. When a dvaṇuka unites with a paramaṇu they form a tryasareṇu (त्रयसरेणु). The tryasareṇu is the first gross substance and is the component of the gross world. The objects of the world can

35. महत्यनेकद्रव्यत्वात् रूपाद्योपलब्धिः । ( कनाद ४।१।८ )

be divided into three classes, śarira (शरीर) indriya (इन्द्रिय) and viṣaya (विषय). The śarīras are the seats of the feelings—pleasure and pain. The indriyas are the instruments of those feelings. The viṣayas are the objects of those feelings. The śarīras of this world are made of earth (pṛthivī). In other worlds as in the moon there are śarīras made of water.<sup>36</sup> There may also be śarīras made of fire (as in the sun) or of air (as in the sky).

To sum up. The highest aim of life according to Kanāda is emancipation (मोक्ष) and the means thereof is dharma (धर्म). Kanāda admits that the Vedas alone are the authority for determining what is dharma. Renunciation (वैराग्य) is necessary for advancing along the path of emancipation; for renunciation it is necessary to distinguish between true and false values (विवेक). Such distinction cannot be made without correct thinking. The soul is eternal, indivisible and all-pervading. When desire for enjoyment disappears the mind turns towards the soul; all previous acts cease to

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36. This is accepted in the Vedānta philosophy. Thus Saṃkara says in his commentary on the Chandogya Upaniṣad तेषां यदम्भयं शरीरं चन्द्रमसि उपभोगाय आरब्धं तदुपभोगश्चयदर्शनशीकाग्नि-सम्पर्कात् प्रविलीयते (The watery bodies which were assumed by them for enjoyment melts at the touch of the fire of regret which arises when they find that their enjoyment has come to an end).

produce pleasure or pain ; there is nothing to connect the body with the soul which becomes free from all bondage.

In the Brahmasūtras, Bādarāyaṇa has criticized the Vaiśeṣika system. The Vaiśeṣika says that the world cannot be created out of Brahman for the world is inanimate while Brahman is animate ; the cause and effect should be of similar nature ; they should be either both animate or both inanimate. So according to Vaiśeṣika theory the inanimate world is created out of inanimate atoms. But (observes Bādarāyaṇa) the Vaiśeṣika theory is open to the same objection as has been raised by the Vaiśeṣika against the Vedāntā theory. For, according to the Vaiśeṣika, when two atoms ( परमाणु ) unite they form a dvaṇuka ( द्वणुक ) ; when a dvaṇuka unites with another paramaṇu, there is formed a tryasareṇu ( त्रयसरेणु ), when a tryasareṇu unites with another paramaṇu there is formed a chaturaṇu ( चतुरणु ). Now a paramaṇu is infinitesimal ( परिमण्डल ) in magnitude and a dvaṇuka is small ( ह्रस्व ), but a chaturaṇu is big ( महत् ) and long ( दीर्घ ). If cause and effect have to be of the same nature, a chaturaṇu should also be infinitesimal or small, how can it be big ? If out of infinitesimal paramaṇus can be produced a big chaturaṇu, it must be admitted that the effect may be different in nature from the cause ;

then inanimate world can also be produced by animate Brahman.<sup>37</sup> Then according to the Vaiśeṣika at the beginning of creation the paramāṇus of Vayu (air) begin to move and their motion is due to adṛṣṭa (अदृष्ट) i.e. the after-effects of the past acts of the jīvas (souls). Now it may be asked where does the adṛṣṭa remain? If it remains in the jīvas how can it move the paramāṇus? Or if it can move the paramāṇus, it will always move the paramāṇus and there can never be pralaya.<sup>38</sup> Again the Vaiśeṣika says that the paramāṇus of earth have smell, those of water have taste, and so on. We find that everything which has smell or taste is liable to destruction. So then the paramāṇus of earth, water etc. should be liable to destruction. But the Vaiśeṣika says that they are everlasting and not liable to destruction.<sup>39</sup> Again the Vaiśeṣika will have to say either that the paramāṇu of the earth has four qualities, viz. smell, taste, figure and touch, or that it has only one quality viz. smell. In the former case he will have to say that the paramāṇu of the water has three qualities, viz. taste, figure and touch, thereby admitting that the paramāṇu of

37. महद्दीर्घवत् वा द्रव्यपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् (Bra Su 2-2-4)

38. उभयथा अपि न कर्म अतः तदभावः (Bra Su 2-2-12)

39. रूपादिमत्वात् तु विपर्ययो दर्शनात् (Bra Su 2-2-15)

water is finer than the paramāṇu of the earth. But he cannot say so as he started by saying that all paramāṇus are finest. On the other hand if, to avoid this difficulty, he says that the paramāṇu of the earth has only one quality, *viz.* smell, then he goes against the wellknown fact that earth has not only smell but also taste, figure and touch.<sup>40</sup> Finally Bādarāyaṇa disposes of this system of philosophy by saying that unlike Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies which have been accepted in part by sages like Manu, the Vaiśeṣika philosophy has not been accepted even partially by any such sage.<sup>41</sup>

### Samkhya Philosophy.

The Sāṃkhya philosophy was promulgated by the sage Kapila. The name of Kapila has been eulogized in the Purāṇas and Itihāsas.<sup>42</sup> The Vedas also refer to the greatness of the wisdom of Kapila.<sup>43</sup> Saṃkarācārya has however

40. उभयथा च दीषात् (Bra Su 2-4-16)

41. अपरित्यक्तात् च अत्यन्तम् अनपेक्षी (Bra Su 2-2-17)

42. कपिलर्षिर्भगवतः सर्वभूतस्य वै किल ।

विष्णोरंशो जगन्मोहनाशाय समुपागतः ॥

The sage Kapila who was a part of Bhagavan Visnu came for destroying the ignorance of the world.

43. ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमये ।

ज्ञानैर्विमर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ॥ श्वेताश्वतरोपनियत् ६।२

Who (Brahman) gave the sage Kapila knowledge and who saw him born.

questioned whether the sage Kapila who has been eulogized in the Vedas and Purāṇas is the same as the Kapila who was the author of Sāṃkhya.<sup>44</sup> In the Śrīmadbhāgavatam there is an account of Kapila who was the son of the sage Kardama and his wife Devahūti, and who gave his mother a discourse on true knowledge. Vijñānabhikṣu the celebrated commentator of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, is however definite that Kapila the son of Devahūti is the author of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The Sāṃkhya philosophy has come down from Kapila through his disciple Āsuri to Āsuri's disciple Pañcaśikhacārya who wrote many treatises on Sāṃkhya. Pañcaśikha's disciple Īśwara Kṛṣṇa composed seventy verses in which he has ably condensed the main teachings of Sāṃkhya. These verses are known as the Kārikās. Vācaspati Miśra the celebrated commentator of different systems of philosophy has written a commentary on the Kārikās which is known as Tatvakaumudī. Śaṅkara in refuting

44. या तु श्रुतिर्वपिलस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रदर्शयन्ती प्रदर्शिता न तथा श्रुतिविरुद्धमपि कपिलं मतं श्रद्धातुं शक्यं कपिलमिति शब्दसामान्यमात्रत्वात् । अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुःवासुदेवनाम्नः स्मरणात् । "The passage of the Veda refers to the excellence of the wisdom of Kapila. But from that it cannot be concluded that we should regard as infallible a doctrine which is against the Vedas though it may be attributed to Kapila. Mere similarity of names is not enough. For the Puranas also mention another Kapila who destroyed the sons of Sagara and whose proper name was Vasudeva."

the Sāṅkhya doctrines has quoted only from this Kārikā and not the sūtras which are attributed to Kapila.

There is a controversy on the question whether in Sāṅkhya philosophy the existence of Īśwara (God) is admitted or not. In the 92nd aphorism of the first chapter of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras it is stated that there is no proof of the existence of God.<sup>45</sup> According to some persons it may be inferred from this sūtra that Kapila did not admit the existence of God. According to others this sūtra means that the existence of God can not be proved, but God does exist.<sup>46</sup> Hence according to the latter persons Kapila did believe in God. According to another interpretation<sup>47</sup> as in the 96th and 99th aphorisms<sup>48</sup> following there is mention of God, it cannot be stated in the 92nd aphorism that there is no proof of the existence of God; what the 92nd aphorism means is that as God is not an object of direct preception

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45. ईश्वरसिद्धिः (I 92)

46. That is why Kapila says ईश्वरसिद्धिः instead of saying ईश्वराभावात् (Sri Gopal Basu Mallik Fellowship lecture by Mahamahopadhyaya Durga Charan Samkhya Vedantatirtha Vol III p 2)

47. Darsanika Brahma Vidya by Tarakisore Chaudhuri (Santa Das Babaji) Vol I p 229

48. तत् सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् (I, 96)

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाद्बोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् (I, 99)

(pratyakṣa) the definition of pratyakṣa given in the 89th aphorism preceding is not faulty.

Sāṃkhya philosophy has divided human misery into three categories, — ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika and ādhidaibika. Ādhyātmika misery is that which is due to the illness of the body or disturbance of the mind. Ādhibhautika misery is that caused by other beings — men, beasts or birds. Ādhidaibika is that caused by supernatural beings like gods or yakṣas as *e.g.* flood, earthquake. The aim of life is the complete and permanent emancipation from all these miseries of life.<sup>49</sup> Partial and temporary relief may be obtained by various means. Thus medicine may cure illness, weapons may give protection from animals, sacrifices may propitiate the gods. But even if we succeed in getting rid of our troubles by these means, the trouble may come again.<sup>50</sup> There is only one means of complete and permanent emancipation and that is the realization of the distinction between the animate soul and the inanimate body. Every kind of misery is due to the fact that we mistake the body or the mind as our soul. If we realize that our soul is essentially different from the body, no misery can touch us. If misery or

49. विविध दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ।

50. न दृष्टात् तत् सिद्धिः निवृत्तेऽप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् । सांख्यसूत्र १।२

bondage had been natural to the soul, it could never be completely free therefrom.<sup>51</sup> But the soul is completely isolated from the body and the outside world. Hence nothing can really make it unhappy. It is entirely due to the imaginary connection between the soul and the body that we feel various kinds of misery. Neither time, nor space, nor circumstances, nor acts could cause bondage of the soul.<sup>52</sup> The soul by its nature is everlasting, pure, conscious and free. It could never feel any misery unless there is contact with inanimate nature (prakṛti)<sup>53</sup> There can be no real contact between the two. Due to ignorance we think that there is contact.<sup>54</sup> When there is true knowledge we perceive the difference between the two. The misery is in the mind. It is reflected in the soul. But the soul is not affected thereby. Just as light removes darkness so wisdom removes ignorance<sup>55</sup>. We may know theoretically that the soul is untouched by sufferings which relate to the body and mind, but so long

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51. न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः (Samkhya Sutra 1-7)  
 52. न कालयोगतः व्यापिनी नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् (Do 1-12)  
 न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् (Do 1-13)  
 न अवस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात् तस्याः (Do 1-14)  
 न कर्मणा अन्यधर्मत्वात् अप्रतिप्रसंयक्त (Do 1-16)  
 53. न नित्यशुद्धसुक्तस्वभावस्य तदयोगस्तदयोगादृते (Do 1-19)  
 54. तदयोगोऽप्यविवेकात् (Do 1-55)  
 55. नियतकारणात् तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् (Do 1-56)

as we do not realize it, we cannot be free from suffering. Arguments may be convincing. But mere arguments are not enough. There must be realization. Sometimes there is a confusion of directions. We think that direction to be the east which is really the south. We may have plenty of arguments regarding the correct direction. But so long as we do not feel the right direction the confusion does not go.<sup>56</sup> Same is the case when we have confusion between the soul and the body or mind. So long as the mind is not pure it cannot realize the true nature of the soul. In order to have true self-realization it is necessary to purify the mind by performing acts without expectation of any reward.<sup>57</sup>

The following subjects have been discussed in the Sāṃkhya philosophy as preliminary to the attainment of knowledge :—

- (1) The soul (puruṣa)
- (2) Nature and its derivatives of 24 kinds (prakṛti)
- (3) Means of knowledge (pramāṇa)

The process of knowledge has been described thus in Sāṃkhya philosophy. When there is proximity between an organ of sense and an

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56. युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोच्चादते (Do 1-59)

57. Sri Gopal Basu Mallik Fellowship lecture by Mahamahopadhyaya Durga Charan Samkhya Vedantatirtha Vol III p. 29

object which is fit to be received by that particular sense organ, there is union between the two. Then the satva attribute of the mind increases. The soul is then reflected in the mind in which satva predominates. Though the mind is inanimate, due to the presence of the soul, the mind becomes luminous and capable of revealing other objects. It is like a mirror placed near a lamp when the mirror can light up other objects. The luminous mind flows to the object with which the organ of sense has become united, and the mind takes the shape of the object. Such configuration of the mind may be called its function (vṛtti). The mind which has taken the shape of the object is then reflected in the soul. The result is knowledge of the object (Pramā). There is thus mutual reflection between the soul and the mind. When the soul is reflected in the mind the inanimate mind becomes capable of revealing other objects. When the mind is reflected in the soul, the soul which by its nature is without action and free from feelings of pleasure and pain, becomes active and capable of feeling pleasure and pain. This is the opinion of Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator of the Sāṃkhyasūtras.<sup>58</sup>

58. प्रमाता चेतनः शुद्धः प्रमाणं वृत्तिरेव नः ।

प्रमार्थाकारवृत्तीनां चेतने प्रतिबिम्बनम् ॥ (continued on next page)

But Vācaspatimiśra, the commentator of the Sāmkhyakārikā, holds a somewhat different view. He says that there is no reflection of the mind in the soul, but that the consciousness of the soul enters the mind which then becomes animate like the soul. The consciousness of the soul not only animates the mind but also reveals the objects with which the organs of the senses come into contact and which are reflected in the mind. As the mind becomes animated like the soul, there is a popular confusion between the mind and the soul. It is the mind which is happy or unhappy. But people think that their soul is happy or unhappy, although the soul remains untouched.

As stated before Sāmkhya philosophy admits three kinds of proof,—perception, inference and testimony. Perception arises from the contact between a sense and an object and consequence configuration of the mind

प्रतिबिम्बितवृत्तीनां विषयो मेय उच्यते ।

साक्षाद्दर्शनरूपं च साक्षित्वं वक्ष्यति फुटम् ॥ भाष्य ६।८३

“The knower is the pure soul, the means of knowledge is a function of the mind, knowledge consists of the reflection in the soul of the function of the mind which has taken the shape of an object ; the thing known is the object the form of which has been taken by the mind ; ultimate knowledge is direct perception.”

in 'the form of the object.'<sup>59</sup> Some objects are, however, too fine or for other reasons cannot be perceived by the senses.<sup>60</sup> Prakṛti (nature) and Puruṣa (soul) are such objects. Their existence is known from the other proofs, *viz.* anumāna (inference) and āpta (testimony)<sup>61</sup> Sāṃkhya philosophy admits that the Vedas are apauruṣeya (*i.e.* not composed by any person) and hence free from the possibility of mistakes. The Vedas are the source of knowledge of things which cannot be perceived by the senses.<sup>62</sup>

The creation of the various objects of the universe is thus explained in the Sāṃkhya philosophy : Prakṛti (inanimate nature) is the

59. यत् सञ्चक्ष्यं सत् तदाकारीक्षं विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षं

(Samkhya Sutra 1-8-9)

60. अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातात् मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्माद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥

Samkhyakarika 7

Some objects cannot be perceived because they are (1) too far (2) too near (3) our senses are defective (4) the mind is restless (5) the objects are too fine (6) they are covered by other objects (7) they are overpowered by other objects and (8) they are mixed with others.

61. सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिः ।

तस्यादपि चासिद्धं परीक्षमात्रागमात् सिद्धं ॥ (Samkhyakarika 6)

"Things which cannot be perceived by the senses can be known by inference ; where they cannot be known even by inference they can be known from reliable testimony."

62. Sri Gopal Fellowship lecture by Mahamahopadhyaya Durga Charan Samkhatirtha part III p. 46.

state of equipoise of the three attributes satva, rajas and tamas ; when this equipoise is disturbed, mahat (intelligence) is produced from prakṛti, from mahat is produced ahaṁkāra (the feeling that I am), from ahaṁkāra are produced pancatanmātra, the five basic objects *viz.* earth, water, fire, air and sky and the various indriyas or senses of knowledge and action (they are eleven in all, *viz.* five senses of knowledge, five senses of action, and mind which is both a sense of knowledge and of action.) From the five basic objects (which are fine) are produced the five gross objects. These along with puruṣa make up the twenty five objects of the universe.<sup>63</sup>

Īśvarakṛṣṇa has divided these 25 objects into four categories (1) that which is only a cause (prakṛti) (2) those which are both cause and effect (they are seven in number, *viz.* mahat, ahaṁkāra, and five basic elements) (3) those which are only effects. They are 16 in number, *viz.* the five gross objects, earth, water, fire, air and sky, the eleven organs of sense, (5 organs of action, 5 organs of knowledge and mind.) and (4) that which is neither cause nor effect (*viz.* puruṣa.)<sup>64</sup>

63. सत्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः, प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतीऽहंकारीऽहंकारात्-  
पञ्चतन्मावाणि, उभयमिन्द्रियम् तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ।

Samkhya Sutra 1-6-1

64. मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

घोडशकस्तु विकारी न प्रकृति न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ सांख्यकारिका ३

When one object is produced from another, the second object may be called the cause (kāraṇa) and the first object the effect (kārya). According to Sāṃkhya philosophy the kārya existed before its appearance, although in a fine condition. Milk turns into curd. The curd existed in the milk. The particles of matter which constituted milk were rearranged when it became curd. Similarly when a tree grows from a seed the particles of matter which existed in the seed, earth, water and air are rearranged in the form of a tree. Before the tree was manifested it existed in the seed, earth, water and air. This doctrine is called satkāryavāda or pariṇāmavāda. According to this doctrine the effects are sat or nitya (everlasting) even as the cause. Sat (everlasting) objects are divided into two categories, those which change (pariṇāmī) and those which do not change (kūṭastha). In the first category are prakṛti and the objects which are produced therefrom. In the second category is puruṣa. Those objects which are liable to change are always changing.<sup>65</sup>

As against the satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya there are two other doctrines known as asatkāryavāda and vivartavāda. According to asatkāryavāda, effects (kārya) do not exist

65. परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नापरिणम्य चणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते ।

(Samkhya-tatva-kaumudi -16)

before they are produced. If they existed before, there is no significance of the instruments (kāraṇa). The followers of Nyāya philosophy and the Buddhists hold this view. There is a further distinction between the two latter views. According to Nyāya philosophy even after the effect is produced the cause exists (in the form of the effect). The paramāṇus which produce the universe exist even after the universe is produced. They exist in a new form. According to the Buddhists the cause is first destroyed and then the effect is produced. At first there is the cause, then there is absence (abhāva) of the cause, then there is the effect. The effect comes out of the absence of cause. Sāṃkhya says that nothing can be produced from absence of anything. If the absence of the mango seed can produce a mango tree, why can it not produce a plantain tree? Both these trees are equally related to the absence of the mango seed. According to vivartavāda, all objects except Brahman are asat (false), Brahman is the only sat (true) object. Due to ignorance Brahman appears as the world, even as the rope appears as the snake due to insufficient light. In pariṇāmavāda the cause changes as the effect. In vivartavāda the cause does not change, even after the effect appears. Even after the creation of the world

Brahman remains as He existed before. The world really does not exist. Due to our ignorance we think that there is the world. The follower of the Sāṃkhya does not accept this doctrine. He says that the world has been accepted as true by innumerable generations of men, even now it is accepted as true, hence its existence cannot be denied. Before creation the world existed in prakṛti in a fine state ; due to proximity to puruṣa the same object takes a new form *viz.* that of the universe.

Prakṛti consists of three objects—satva, rajas and tamas—which though called guṇas are not qualities but the substance of Prakṛti.<sup>66</sup> They are called guṇas as they remain together twisted like the fibres of a rope (guṇa means rope) or because they bind the puruṣa to the world. Satva is light and luminous, rajas is forceful and active, tamas is heavy and blinding<sup>67</sup> The nature of these three objects is curious. They always remain all together and never separated ; none of them can act without the help of the other two ; and yet each of them tries to overpower the others. So long as one of them does not

66. सत्त्वादीनामतद्गमत्वं तद्रूपत्वात् Samkhya Sutra 6-39

67. सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकनिष्ठमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरुवरणकमेव च तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतोदृतिः ॥ Samkhyakarika 13

succeed in overpowering the other two, it is the state of pralaya (non-existence of the universe). But as soon as one of them succeeds in overpowering the other two, the creation of the universe begins. The cause of the activities of these three guṇas is adṛṣṭa (*i.e.* the accumulated acts of all beings). Each of these guṇas is infinite in quantity and is present everywhere. Prakṛti which is nothing but the sum total of these three guṇas is also of course infinite and present everywhere. Prakṛti is also everlasting. It is neither produced nor destroyed. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has expressed the nature of Prakṛti in the following verse.

“It consists of the three qualities satva, rajas and tamas which are never dissociated from each other ; it is an object of knowledge ; it is universal ; it produces all the objects of the world ; it is manifest. Puruṣa is its reverse”<sup>68</sup>.

Prakṛti is inanimate and cannot enjoy the objects of the world which it produces. These objects are enjoyed by a subject which is animate and is called puruṣa which is different from the three guṇas. The existence of puruṣa has to be inferred not only because it is necessary to have a subject which would enjoy the objects of the world but also because it is necessary to

68. त्रिगुणमभिवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपर्येतस्तथा च प्रमान् ॥ सांख्यकारिका ११

have an animate subject which would be the cause of activity of the inanimate prakṛti. No inanimate object can move unless it is actuated by an animate object. The objects of the world are generally associated with misery. There must be something which is different from the objects of the world and which may desire to be free from misery and be actually free or liberated<sup>69</sup>. Buddhi or intelligence is an inanimate object. By association with puruṣa it becomes luminous and can reveal other objects of the world. Knowledge is not a quality of puruṣa but is the essence of puruṣa.<sup>70</sup> Joy cannot be the nature of puruṣa for (according Sāṅkhya) knowledge and joy cannot remain together<sup>71</sup>. It is true that the Vedas have described puruṣa as knowledge and joy<sup>72</sup>. But there absence of misery has been described as joy<sup>73</sup>. Puruṣa is not one but many because birth, death and organs of sense are different for different persons, because all persons do not act together, and because the guṇas are different

69. संहतपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादि विपर्ययात् अधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः ॥ सांख्यकारिका १७

70. ज्ञानं नैवात्मनो धर्मो न गुणो वा कथंचन ।

ज्ञानस्वरूप एवात्मा नित्यः पूर्णः सदाशिवः ॥ सांख्यभाष्य १।१४६

71. न एकस्य आनन्दचिद्रूपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात् । सांख्यभाष्य ५।६६

72. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । आनन्दी ब्रह्म इति व्यजानात् ।

73. दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः । सांख्यभाष्य ५।६७

for different persons<sup>74</sup>. Prakṛti has the capacity to move but is inanimate. Puruṣa is animate but incapable of action. Neither of them by themselves can create the world. Creation is possible from association between these two objects. A blind man can walk but cannot see. A lame man can see but cannot walk. If the blind man carries the lame man, the lame man can direct and the two can move. In the same manner creation proceeds from the association between the puruṣa and the prakṛti<sup>75</sup>. Buddhi is the first object produced from prakṛti, all other objects of the universe are produced from buddhi. Buddhi means definite knowledge. By means of the organs of sense we perceive the size, shape, colour etc. of an object and then, we have the definite knowledge, "It is a cow". This definite knowledge is buddhi. Pleasure and pain are present in the buddhi and not in the puruṣa. Because puruṣa does not realize its difference from buddhi the puruṣa considers itself happy or miserable. From buddhi is created ahaṁkāra. Ahaṁkāra is the cause of the feeling I or mine. The creation of the various

74. जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

पुरुषवद्वत् सिद्धं वैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ सांख्यकारिका १८

75. पञ्चबन्धवद्भूयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः

"The union of the two is like that of the lame and the blind. Creation proceeds therefrom."

objects of the world from ahaṁkāra has been referred to above.

The organs of sense are, according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, material objects being produced from the fine particles of the various basic objects,—earth, water, fire air and sky. But according to Sāṁkhya philosophy the organs of sense are not produced from these basic elements but from ahaṁkāra.<sup>76</sup> On the authority of a passage of the Mahābhārata it is held in Sāṁkhya philosophy that the mind was created before the organs and that as regards the organs the first organ to be created was the organ of hearing, then the organ of sight, then the organ of smell.<sup>77</sup> Ahaṁkāra in which the tamas preponderates produces sound. This sound is the fine state of space and from sound is created space. Similarly from ahaṁkāra are produced touch, figure, taste and smell which are the fine forms of air, fire, water and earth and from

76. अहङ्कारिकलञ्चतेन भौतिकानि Samkhya Sutra 2-20

77. शब्दरागात् श्रोत्रमस्य जायते भाषितात्मनः ।

रूपरागादभुञ्जतः प्राणो गन्धजिह्वया ॥

Mahabharata Moksadharma

"The Great Being wanted to hear and the organ of hearing was created. He wanted to see and the eye was created. He wanted to smell and the ear was created and so on." There was first the desire and then the organ. There could not be desire without the mind. So the mind was created before the organs.

which are produced gross air, fire, water and earth. Different organs of sense may produce simultaneously different kinds of knowledge of sound, touch, figure etc. The puruṣa (soul) is like the king, buddhi (intelligence) is like the chief minister, mind is like the provincial ruler and the organs of sense are like the village chiefs. Sāṃkhya does not recognize the existence of any separate object as prāṇa and considers that it is a function of the mind, or intelligence or egoism.<sup>78</sup>

Each puruṣa (soul) is associated with a sūkṣma śarīra (fine body). The fine body consists of seventeen parts (1) buddhi (intelligence) (2) manas (mind) (3—12) ten indriyas (5 organs of sense and 5 organs of action) and (13—17) five tanmātras (fine elements). At first there is one sūkṣma śarīra encompassing the entire world. Then it is divided into as many parts as there are souls. The puruṣa associated with the universal sūkṣma śarīra is called sūtrātmā or hiraṇyagarbha. The puruṣas who are associated with the individual sūkṣma śarīras are called men, or gods or animals. The size of the sūkṣma śarīra is equal to the thumb of the gross body. It is stated in the Mahābhārata that at the time of the death of Satyavān, Yama extracted from his body a puruṣa of the size

78. सामान्या करणवृत्तिः सायवः पञ्च Samkhya Sutra 2-31

of the thumb.<sup>79</sup> The soul being all-pervading cannot leave the body at the time of death. It is the sūkṣma śarīra which leaves the body. In ordinary usage this sūkṣma śarīra is called the puruṣa (soul).

At the time of death the fine body (sūkṣma śarīra) leaves the gross body (sthūla śarīra). According to the nature of his previous karma he gets another body by means of which he feels pleasure or pain. This new body may be that of a god, or a man or a beast. There is an interval between the time when he leaves the gross body and gets another body. During this interval he gets a body which is called ātibāhika body which consists mostly of air. So long as he possesses such a body he has the desire for enjoyment and also the organs of sense but he cannot enjoy external objects due to the want of a suitable body. This period is painful and lasts for a year. During this period the only means of his satisfaction is the offering of water and food (piṇḍa) made by his son or other relative. After this period he gets a body either for enjoying the pleasures of heaven, or suffering the pangs of hell, or he is born again. Such to and fro movements between the earth and other worlds continues till the soul attains true knowledge which can

79. अथ सत्यवतः कायात् पाशवद् भगवतं ।  
अंगुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्कर्षं यमो वलात् ॥

distinguish between the animate self (*puruṣa*) and inanimate material world (*prakṛti*). This knowledge is called *viveka*. When this knowledge is attained the fine body (*sūksma śarīra*) dissolves and there is no more rebirth.

The means of attaining true knowledge are *śravaṇa* (listening the *śāstras*), *manana* (thinking) and *nididhyāsana* (uninterrupted thinking about the soul for a long time). Other means are Yoga or keeping the mind free from all thought.<sup>80</sup> The means of attaining Yoga are *dhyāna* (thinking of the image of a holy person), *dhāraṇa* (always remembering absolute truth or true wisdom) *abhyāsa* (constant practice) and *vairāgya* (want of attachment for worldly objects).<sup>81</sup> By these means the mind is prevented either from falling asleep or from being diverted to other objects.<sup>82</sup> On attaining Yoga all objects are seen in their true light, there is no more any confusion between the self and the inanimate objects and there is no more any feeling of pleasure or pain.

According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy the number of souls (*puruṣa*) is infinite. All souls are of the same size (infinite), also of the same form and nature. They are all animate as distinguished from inanimate objects which

80. ध्यानं निर्वचयन् मनः (Samkhya Sutra 6-25)

81. ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिस्तन्निरोधः (Samkhya Sutra 6-29)

82. लयविक्षेपयोर्व्यावृत्ता इत्याचार्याः (Samkhya Sutra 6-30)

consist of prakṛti and the objects into which prakṛti is converted. All such objects are, like prakṛti, everchanging.

Due to ignorance there is a sort of contact between puruṣa and prakṛti. As a result of such contact there appears mahat (intelligence or buddhi), then ahaṁkāra (mistaking the body etc. for the soul). The feelings of pleasure and pain which belong to the body are reflected in the puruṣa who thinks that the feelings are his.

As stated before there is difference of opinion as to whether Kapila did or did not believe in the existence of God. But even if God exists, He has nothing to do (according to Sāṁkhya philosophy) with the creation of the world and the happiness and sufferings of people. For God must be free from attachment and prejudice. The inequalities which exist in the universe cannot come from such a God. The inequalities are due to acts (karma) of human beings. As inequalities can be explained by karma, there is no necessity of introducing God to explain creation.

Some of the doctrines of the Sāṁkhya philosophy have been accepted in the Vedānta philosophy while others have been rejected. Whereas, according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, inanimate matter is the material cause of the world, according to the Vedānta philosophy

Brahman is the material cause of the universe. It has been stated in chapter IV how the objections raised by the Sāṃkhya school on this point have been replied to by the Vedāntist. Another objection raised by the Sāṃkhya school is that if at the time of destruction the world merges in Brahman then the defects of the world (*e.g.* misery and impurity) would stick to Brahman. The reply according to Śaṅkara is that the world is false. So the defects referred to do not exist. According to Rāmānuja, Brahman is like the soul, and the universe is like the body. As the defects of the body do not affect the soul, so the defects of the world do not affect Brahman. The Vedāntist has noticed some defects of the Sāṃkhya school. According to Sāṃkhya there are many puruṣas and each puruṣa is all pervading. All puruṣas are therefore equally related to a particular human body and should feel the pleasure and pain pertaining to that body. But such is not the case. Again if proximity of puruṣa and prakṛti is enough to cause disturbance of prakṛti, there would never be pralaya, as there would be always disturbance. According to Sāṃkhya prakṛti which is inanimate is converted into the world without the help of puruṣa or any sentient object. But an inanimate object can never be converted into another object without the help of a sentient being. It may be thought

that grass when eaten by the cow is converted into milk. But such conversion requires the intervention of the living cow. If grass by itself could be converted into milk, grass not eaten by the cow but lying on the field would also be converted into milk. According to Sāṃkhya, puruṣa is changeless and yet enjoys prakṛti. This is self-contradictory. If it is changeless it cannot enjoy. Some objects are assumed to exist in Sāṃkhya philosophy, but no mention of them is found in the Vedas, nor can the existence of such objects be proved with the help of pratyakṣa or anumāna,—for example, prakṛti which is said to exist independently and is the material cause of the universe. According to the Vedas, prakṛti has no independent existence, but exists as the power of Brahman. Sāṃkhya assumes the existence of mahat. But mahat is neither mentioned in the Vedas nor can be proved to exist by means of arguments. A similar object buddhi (intelligence) is mentioned in Vedānta. But it is not exactly the same as mahat.

### Yoga Philosophy

The Yoga is a very old system. Its methods are peaceful and free from hostility to other systems. Mention of this system is found not only in the Purāṇas, the Rāmāyaṇa and the

Mahābhārata, but also in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The Kathopaniṣad says, "When the organs of sense are kept still, it is called the state of Yoga".<sup>83</sup> The Śvetāśvataropaniṣad says, "The chest, the neck and the head are to be held up and the body kept straight; with the help of the mind the organs of sense are to be kept in the heart"<sup>84</sup>. The word nididhyāsana ( निदिध्यासन or deep contemplation ) referred to as a means for the attainment of Brahman<sup>85</sup> is in fact Yoga.

The Yoga system was originally propounded by Hiranyagarbha, the first form assumed by the Supreme Being at the time of the creation of the universe. Patañjali who learned it from Him composed the aphorisms and hence the system is known by his name. The ultimate aim of the Yoga philosophy is to realize the soul by concentrating the mind on the soul. The power of concentration has to be developed by practising concentration from grosser to gradually finer objects. The finest inanimate object of the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika schools is the atom. But the Sāṃkhya system postulates still finer objects of which parkṛti

83. तां योगमित्याहु स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् (Ka U 6-11)

84. विरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरं

हृदोन्द्रियाणि मनसा सन्निधाप्य (Sve U 2-8)

85. श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (Bri U 4, 5, 6)

is the finest. Hence the Yoga system is more allied to the Sāṃkhya than to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But the admission of the existence of Īśvara (God) in the Yoga philosophy distinguishes it from the Sāṃkhya. It is said that Śeṣanāga (the mighty serpent of the Purāṇas lying on the ocean on whom Viṣṇu rests at the time of universal pralaya) was incarnated as Patañjali, the author of the Yoga sūtras. This Śeṣanāga is mentioned as the author of Yoga philosophy in the introductory verse of Vyāsa's commentary on the Yoga aphorisms as well as in the introductory verse of the commentary on Vyāsa's commentary by Bhoja, the king of Dhara.

Patañjali is reputed not only as the author of Yoga philosophy, but also of the celebrated commentary (Mahābhāṣya) of Pāṇini's aphorisms on grammar and of a treatise on medicine.<sup>86</sup> This last work however has not yet been discovered in full.

The aphorisms of Yoga philosophy have an excellent commentary which is attributed to Vyāsa (Vyāsa-bhāṣya). This Vyāsa is generally identified with Vedavyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata. The celebrated commentator Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary on the Vyāsa-bhāṣya has offered his obeisance to Veda

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86. वाक् चेतो वपुषां मलः कलभतां भवेव येनोद्धतः ।

Vyāsa as the author of the Vyāsa-bhāṣya.<sup>87</sup> It may be observed that the aphorisms of the Vedānta philosophy known as Brahma sūtras are also attributed to Vyāsa and the Brahma sūtras contain a refutation of the Yoga philosophy.<sup>88</sup> To reconcile this discrepancy some say that Patañjali the author of the Yoga philosophy is different from Patañjali the commentator of Pāṇini. Others reconcile it by saying that Vyāsa is reputed to be one of the seven immortals and that is why he is said also to have met S'āṅkarācārya and discussed with him the true meaning of a particular Brahma-Sutra.<sup>89</sup> It may also be said that the Yoga philosophy refuted in the Brahmasūtras is not the aphorisms of Patañjali but the more ancient work of the Hiraṇyagarbha, the original author of Yoga philosophy.

The aphorisms of Patañjali are 195 in number. They are divided into four parts (pādas). The first part is known as Samādhi-pāda, the second as the Sādhana-pāda, the third as the Bibhūti-pāda and the fourth as the Kaibalya-pāda. The first part deals mainly with the nature of concentration and its means, the second with the sufferings of the world

87. नत्वा पतञ्जलिस्तपि वेदव्यासेन भाषिते ।

संक्षिप्तस्यष्टवङ्गस्यो भाष्ये व्याख्या विधास्यते ॥

88. एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः (Bra Su 2-1-3)

89. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् (Bra Su 1-1-13)

deliverance from which is the aim, the third deals with the special powers acquired through selfcontrol and the fourth deals with emancipation, life after death and so on.

The word Yoga is derived from the root yuj (युज). This root has two meanings (1) to unite and (2) to keep the mind in a state in which it ceases to function. Samādhi is the technical word for this state of mind. It is in the latter sense that the root has to be interpreted in the expression "Yoga philosophy". Yoga accepts the conclusion of Sāṃkhya philosophy that prakṛti consists of the three qualities satva, rajas and tamas. The satva quality is converted into citta (mind). As waves are formed constantly on the surface of the sea, so various thoughts arise constantly in the mind. These thoughts may be called the functions of the mind. The state of mind in which the thoughts are wholly or mostly removed is called samādhi or yoga. During this state of the mind, there is no suffering in the mind, placidity of the mind increases, and complete elimination of thought becomes possible.

Samādhi is of two kinds, samprajñāta and asamprajñāta. Samprajñāta means concentration of the mind. Asamprajñāta means complete cessation of functions of mind. For samprajñāta samadhi one has to concentrate on three things,

*viz.* (1) on an external object, (2) the means of knowledge and (3) the knower. The external object may be perceptible (*sthūla*) or imperceptible (*sūkṣma*). The means of knowing the object consists of our senses (*indriya*). The knower or the subject which knows consists of a combination of the soul and the intelligence. Just as the archer practises to shoot his arrows at first on a comparatively big object and then gradually on smaller and still smaller objects, so the yogī first tries to concentrate his mind on perceptible external objects, then on imperceptible external objects (*e.g.* atoms), then on the organs of sense (eyes, ears etc.) and finally on his own self (soul undistinguished from intelligence). Just as pure crystal receives the reflection of an object and appears as that object, so also the mind when concentrated on an object becomes like that object. This adoption by the mind of the form of the object which is thought about (whether an external object, or an organ of sense or the knowing subject) is technically called *samāpatti*<sup>90</sup> (conversion of the mind into the object of thought). *Samprajñāta samādhi* has been divided into four kinds.<sup>91</sup> When the mind is concentrated on an external

90. चोणवर्त्तेरभिजातस्यैव मणेः गृहीत-ग्रहण-गाह्ये बु तत्स्थितदञ्जनता समापत्तिः  
(Yoga Sutra 1-41)

91. वितर्क-विचारानन्दाश्रितानुगमात् सम्प्रज्ञातः (Yoga Sutra 1-17)

perceptible object (sthūla) it is called savitarka. When the mind is concentrated on an external imperceptible object (sūkṣma, *e.g.* fine matter, or atom) it is called savicāra. When the mind is concentrated on an organ of sense it is called sānanda. When it is concentrated on the self it is called sāsmita. In each case samādhi is not accomplished till there is preception of the object on which the mind is concentrated.

During samprajñāta samādhi although the mind is principally concentrated on the object of concentration one thinks about three things, the object, the subject and the act of concentration. This process is therefore insufficient for the attainment of complete knowledge. It is specially unsuitable for the perception of the soul. For this reason it is necessary for the yogī to make further progress till he attains asamprajñāta samādhi. For the complete cessation of the functioning of the mind he has to practise repeatedly (abhyāsa). He has also to keep the mind detached (vairāgya). During the asamprajñāta stage there are no functions of the mind, there are only the impressions (saṃskāra) of previous thoughts. For want of fresh impetus the impressions also fade away.

When there are no functions of the mind the soul appears in its own form.<sup>92</sup> When there

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92. तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् (Yoga Sutra 1-3)

are functions of the mind the soul appears undistinguished from those functions<sup>93</sup> Although the nature of the soul is that of a seer, the soul cannot see anything except functions of the mind. No object, whether external or internal, can be seen by the soul unless that object is grasped by a function of the mind. These objects are reflected in the soul along with the functions of the mind. The soul does not realize its difference from those objects and considers itself identical with them. When, as a result of repeated practice the mind stops functioning, the soul does not perceive anything and remains in its true nature unmixed with anything else. This state of the soul is called Kaibalya or Mukti.

Functions of the mind have been divided into five classes, each such class being divided into two categories, agreeable or disagreeable.<sup>94</sup> These five classes are (1) correct knowledge (2) incorrect knowledge (3) imagination (4) sleep and (5) memory.<sup>95</sup> There are three sources of correct knowledge (a) direct perception (b) inference and (c) testimony of a reliable person.<sup>96</sup> When an object at first appears in a particular form and subsequently

93. इति सारूप्यमितरत्र (Yoga Sutra 1-4)

94. इत्यथो पंचतयः क्लृष्टाक्लिष्टाः (Yoga Sutra 1-5)

95. प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्राश्चतयः (Yoga Sutra 1-6)

96. प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि (Yoga Sutra 1-7)

appears in a different form the first form is called incorrect knowledge<sup>97</sup> Examples of incorrect knowledge are rope mistaken for a snake or shell mistaken for silver. Doubt is to be included in incorrect knowledge, for if there had been correct knowledge there could not be any doubt. When on hearing a word there is a function of the mind without any object of that function it is called imagination (vikalpa).<sup>98</sup> Examples are flower in the sky or horns of a hare. Sleep is a function of the mind resting on absence of any object.<sup>99</sup> During sleep various objects are seen but those objects do not exist. Even when no objects are seen in sleep (as in deep slumber) there is a recollection "I was sleeping happily. I did not feel anything."<sup>100</sup> It indicates that there is function of the mind even in deep slumber. All the above functions are associated with attachment or prejudice or ignorance. Hence these functions are sources of suffering.

Practice and detachment are the two means by which the mind can be prevented from functioning.<sup>101</sup> When the mind functions it is

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97. विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् (Yoga Sutra 1-8)  
 98. शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः (Yoga Sutra 1-9)  
 99. अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना इति निर्द्रा (Yoga Sutra 1-10)  
 100. सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिद्वेदिषम् (Upanishads)  
 101. अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः (Yoga Su 1-12)

The Bhagavadgita also says in the following verse that the mind can be controlled by practice and detachment ;—

called the state of pravṛtti; when it does not function it is called the state of nivṛtti. By constant practice the mind has to be brought to the state of nivṛtti. There should be no desire for the objects of enjoyment either in this world or in heaven. There are four steps in the practice of detachment. By nature we have desire for some objects and aversion towards others. We should first try to avoid the feelings of desire and aversion. Then we should distinguish between the objects for which we have desire, and the objects towards which we have aversion. In the third stage enjoyment of objects is avoided, but there is still some desire in the mind. In the fourth stage the desire also is avoided. The supreme detachment is that which arises when there is direct perception of the soul and its clear distinction from inanimate nature and all objects produced by nature.<sup>102</sup> At first we should think about the trouble which we have to incur in procuring the objects of sense, in protecting them, in seeing them

असंशयं महाबाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चलम् ।

अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येन च गृह्यते ॥ 6-15

102. The Gita also says that when we give up the objects of sense, the desire for them still lurks in our mind. It is only when we perceive the soul that the desire also goes.

विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनी ।

रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते ॥ Gita 2-59

wear away and even in enjoying them. We should then try to realize the soul according to the Śāstras and reasoning. Gradually the mind is purified and becomes able to perceive things as they really are and not as they appear to us being coloured by our desires and aversion. The evils of the objects of sense become quite clear and it becomes impossible to have in our mind any desire for them. Emancipation then comes as a matter of course. Where there is intense desire for samādhi it can be achieved early. Where the desire is not so intense it may be delayed according to the degree of intensity.

Just as a man can prevent his mind from functioning by means of practice and detachment, so also he can achieve the same object by concentrating his mind on God. One can concentrate his mind on God if one worships God with devotion. In the Bhagavadgīta Śrī Kṛṣṇa says "To those who always think of me and worship me with love I give such a turn of mind that they can attain me"<sup>103</sup>

103. तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकं ।

ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥ Gita 10-10

In the Srimadbhagavatam also it has been said that Sri Krishna enters the mind of those who are fond of hearing about Him and removes the impurities of their mind.

श्रवतां स्वकथां कृष्णः पुण्यश्रवणकीर्तनः ।

हृद्यन्तःस्थो ह्यभद्रानि विधुनीति सुहृत् सतां ॥ Bhagavatam 1-2-17

it is no doubt remarkable that although Yoga closely follows Sāṃkhya and although Sāṃkhya does not to all intents believe in the existence of God, yet Yoga definitely asserts the existence of God and states that contemplation on God helps in the attainment of Samādhi.<sup>104</sup> As to the nature of God Patañjali says that He is a soul of a special type (puruṣa-viśeṣa) who is altogether free from suffering, who has not to enjoy the fruit of good or bad acts done and has no desire which remains to be fulfilled.<sup>105</sup> He is also omniscient<sup>106</sup> and is the original preceptor from whom subsequent preceptors derived their knowledge.<sup>107</sup> According to Yoga the original (or rather eternal) name of God is praṇava (Om).<sup>108</sup> The devotee should repeat this name and think of God.<sup>109</sup> By the grace of God he can directly perceive the soul and all impediments in the path of attaining samādhi are removed.<sup>110</sup> The impediments are mainly illness, inertia of the mind, doubt, inattention, idleness, desire for the enjoyment of the senses, mistaken know-

104. ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् वा (Yoga Sutra 1-23)

105. क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरासृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः (Yoga Sutra 1-24)

106. तव निरातिशयं सर्वज्ञवीजम् (Yoga Sutra 1-25)

107. स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालिनानवच्छेदात् (Yoga Sutra 1-26)

108. तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः (Yoga Sutra 1-27)

• 109. तच्चपक्षद्वयभावनम् (Yoga Sutra 1-28)

110. ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावाच्च (Yoga Sutra 1-29)

ledge, inability to attain the state of mind congenial to samādhi or retain such a state of mind.<sup>111</sup>

Other means for the purification of the mind are (1) friendly feeling for those who are happy (instead of envy) (2) sympathy for those who are unhappy (3) joy at meeting pious persons and (4) ignoring those who are wicked.<sup>112</sup> The practice of prāṇāyāma is also helpful in controlling the mind. It consists of breathing in deeply, holding the breath for a little while and then gradually breathing out fully.<sup>113</sup> Constant practice of prāṇāyāma reduces the element of rajas and tamas and increases the stock of satva. By the practice of prāṇāyāma the breath is controlled ; when the breath is controlled the mind is controlled and it is easier to control the organs of sense. The best means of attaining control over the mind is dhyāna or uninterrupted contemplation. The yogi should take as the object of contemplation some object which is pleasing to the eye and the mind. A beautiful image of God (Viṣṇu or Śiva) is very suitable for this purpose.

111. व्याधिसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकात्मानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपाः ते चत्तरायाः (Yoga Sutra 1-30)

112. मैत्रीकरुणामुदितीपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्त-प्रसादनम् (Yoga Sutra 1-33)

113. श्वासप्रश्वासयोगेतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः (Yoga Sutra 2-49)

The impediments in the way of concentration and control of the mind are the impurities of the mind due to evil acts done in this and previous births. For the removal of these impurities the Yoga system prescribes three remedies (1) *tapas* (austerities) (2) *svādhyāya* (recitation of holy texts) and (3) contemplation of God.<sup>114</sup> *Tapas* (austerities) has been defined as the performance, accordance to the *Śāstras*, of work involving labour or suffering. Authority of the *Śāstras* is thus tacitly accepted in the Yoga philosophy. The form of *svādhyāya* specially recommended in Yoga system is the repetition of *Om* which is a Vedic name of Brahman. These practices enable a person to reduce five kinds of trouble, *viz.*, mistaken knowledge (mistaking the unreal for the real), confusion (between the soul and intelligence), attachment, prejudice and fear.<sup>115</sup> These five troubles are the cause of all activities.<sup>116</sup> The acts of a man determine his caste in the next birth his longevity and the experience of pleasure or pain.<sup>117</sup> We ordinarily regard either as pleasure or pain the result of the contact between our senses and the objects of the world. But Yoga philosophy regards all such experiences as

114. तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः (Yoga Sutra 2-10)

115. अविद्या-अभिज्ञता-राग-द्वेष-अभिनिवेशाः (Yoga Sutra 2-3)

116. क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनौघः (Yoga Sutra 2-12)

117. सति-मूले तद्विपाकी जात्यायुर्भोगाः (Yoga Sutra 2-13)

pain, in as much as our so-called pleasures also end in pain when we are deprived of the objects of pleasure.<sup>118</sup> We can avoid all future suffering if we can prevent the contact between the soul (the seer) and the object seen.<sup>119</sup> The soul can see only such objects as are reflected in the mind or intelligence. When we see an object, our mind takes the shape of the object and our soul feels that shape or function of the mind. Although there is no real contact between the soul and the outside object, the soul thinks that there is contact. Mistake or wrong knowledge is the cause of the supposed contact between the soul and the outside objects.<sup>120</sup> True knowledge is the means of destroying wrong knowledge.<sup>121</sup> When wrong knowledge is destroyed there is end of all suffering and the soul remains alone, *i.e.* free from all contact with outside objects. This state of the soul is according to Yoga philosophy emancipation<sup>122</sup> which is called kaibalya (state of being alone).

There are eight steps or limbs in the practice of Yoga. They are called yama, niyama,

118. परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखेर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेष सर्वे विवेकिनः  
(Yoga Sutra 2-15)

119. द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो ह्येहेतुः (Yoga Sutra 2-17)

120. तस्य हेतुरविद्या (Yoga Sutra 2-24)

121. विवेकख्यातिरभिप्राया हानौपायः (Yoga Sutra 2-26)

122. तदभावात् संयोगाभावः ज्ञानं तददृशेः कैवल्यम् (Yoga Sutra 2-25)

āsana, prāṇāyama, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇa, dhyāna and samādhi.<sup>123</sup> Yama means control over the external and internal organs of sense. Yama again consists of five parts, ahimsā, satyam, brahmacaryam and aparigraha.<sup>124</sup> Ahimsā, means absence of any wish to cause harm to others. If one can attain perfect ahimsā, others remaining near him also become free from himsa.<sup>125</sup> Satyam means truth. Untruth is associated with sin. Asteyam means want of desire to appropriate what belongs to others. Brahmacharya means control over the organs of sense, specially the sex organ, and avoiding the spilling of semen. One who wastes the semen cannot engage in that laborious practice which is necessary for mastering yoga. The last item of yoga is aparigraha, *i.e.* non-acceptance of gifts made by others. By such non-acceptance desire for enjoyment is curbed.

Niyama is of 5 kinds (1) cleanliness of the body and mind, (2) satisfaction with the particular means of realization which has been adopted, (3) tapas (austerities) (4) svādhyāya (reading holy texts) (5) contemplation of God.

The ultimate aim of yama and niyama is the attainment of samādhi. But there are

123. यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टाङ्गानि

(Yoga Sutra 2-29)

124. अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः यमाः (Yoga Sutra 2-30)

125. अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः (Yoga Sutra 2-35)

some by-products called siddhi. Thus for example a yogi who has made considerable progress in the practice of yama and niyama can attain desired objects by mere wish,<sup>126</sup> can acquire the most valuable objects,<sup>127</sup> can know the events of past and future births,<sup>128</sup> can attain inexpressible delight<sup>129</sup> and can get a vision of Brahman in the particular form in which He is worshipped.<sup>130</sup> The seeker after truth should not pay any heed to these attractive things but should continue in his attempts to attain perfection. If he is attached to these powers he will fall from the path of progress. These powers can be acquired by comparatively less efforts and will remove the doubt about the truth of the science of yoga.

Āsana is of some importance in the practice of yoga. Āsana literally means sitting. One should sit in such a way and keep the various limbs in such positions that one can comfortably remain in that position without the movement of any limb for a long time. Prāṇāyāma or control of breath has been explained before. Pratyāhāra means the control

126. सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाद्यत्वम् (Yoga Sutra 2-36)

127. अस्तेयं प्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरक्षोपस्थानम् (Yoga Sutra 2-37)

128. अपरियहस्यैर्योऽ जन्मकथन्तासं बोधः (Yoga Sutra 2-39)

129. सन्तोषादनुत्तमसुखलाभः (Yoga Sutra 2-42)

130. स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासंयोगः (Yoga Sutra 2-44)

of the senses and the adoption by the senses of the form of the mind.<sup>131</sup>

Dhāraṇā is the concentration of the mind on a particular object or at a particular place. The mind is habitually restless. In order to make it quiet one should practise to keep it fixed on an object for a long time. Examples of places where one may try to keep the mind fixed are the navel, or the heart, or the forehead, or the tip of the nose, or of the tongue of one's own body, or some outside object.<sup>132</sup> Dhyāna is continuous contemplation of the object on which the mind is kept fixed.<sup>133</sup> When dhyāna is mature it is called samādhi. In dhyāna one is conscious of both the object and the act of contemplation. In samādhi one is conscious only of the object, not of the act of contemplation.<sup>134</sup> It is advisable that all the three processes dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi should be practised with reference to the same object. When this is done it is called saṁyama.<sup>135</sup> Out of the eight

131. स्वविषयासम्पत्तौ चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इव इन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः

(Yoga Sutra 2-54)

132. नाभिचक्रे हृदयपुण्डरीके मूर्ध्ज्योतिषि नासिकायाम् जिह्वायाम् इत्यादिषु देशेषु बाह्ये वा विषये चित्तस्य वृत्तिमात्रेण बन्ध इति धारणा (Vyasa Bhasya on Yoga Sutra 3-1)

133. तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् (Yoga Sutra 3-2)

134. तदेव अर्थमात्र निर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः (Yoga Sutra 3-3)

135. त्रयमेकत्र संयमः (Yoga Sutra 3-5)

processes mentioned above, the first five (yama niyama, āsana, prāṇāyama, pratyāhāra) are external means of attaining samādhi, while the last three (dhāraṇa, dhyāna and samādhi) are internal means.

Siddhi or success may be attained by five different ways. It may be that in one life adequate efforts are made for attaining success but the person dies before attaining samādhi. He may attain it in the next birth. By the help of medicines one may attain success. It may also be attained by repetition of a mantra.<sup>136</sup> The best result is attained through samādhi. On attaining samādhi one can get rid of attachment and prejudice (rāga and dveṣa). One has therefore no incentive to do any work in the hope of enjoying its fruits. Excepting the work the fruit of which one has to enjoy in this life, all other work is burnt up by the fire of knowledge. There is then no desire for enjoyment and no incentive for work with such purpose.

The highest form of emancipation is called dharma-megha in which the truth is constantly perceived and there is no distraction of the mind. It is the state of jīvan-mukti when the yogi attains emancipation even during this life. As there is no obstruction to his

knowledge he can know everything.<sup>137</sup> There is complete and permanent estrangement between puruṣa and prakṛti.

The principles of Yoga as expounded by Patañjali are accepted practically by all schools of philosophy. The Yoga system of philosophy is popularly known as a branch of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the reason being that the objects mentioned in the Sāṃkhya system have been referred to in the Yoga where necessary. But Patañjali has not confined himself to the objects mentioned in Sāṃkhya. Thus for example he has introduced Īśvara who is not found in Sāṃkhya. Like Sāṃkhya, Yoga also says that souls are many and infinite in number. The souls are by nature free from contact with pleasure or pain. It is because the soul identifies itself with intelligence or the functions of intelligence that it considers itself to be happy or unhappy. When by the process of Yoga the soul perceives its own nature and the nature of intelligence it perceives the difference between the two, and attains emancipation.

The proper means of attaining samādhi are (1) practice (2) renunciation and (3) contemplation of God. But those who find themselves unable to follow these, should first try

137. तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्य आनन्त्यात् ज्ञेयमन्व' भवति

(Yoga Sutra 4-31)

the eight-fold procedure (1) yama (control of senses) (2) niyama (cleanliness, satisfaction, austerities, reciting holy books and contemplation of God) (3) āsana (proper way of sitting) (4) prāṇāyama (control of breath) (5) pratyāhāra (absence of function of senses) (6) dhāraṇa (fixing the mind on an object) (7) dhyāna (uninterrupted contemplation of an object) and (8) samādhi (absence of function of mind) which have been referred to above.

### Purva Mimamsa Philosophy

We now come to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy of Jaimini. The Vedas are divided into two parts, the first part being called Mantra and the second part Brāhmaṇa.<sup>138</sup> As this philosophy is based on the first (pūrva) part of the Vedas it is called Pūrva Mīmāṃsā philosophy, the Vedānta philosophy being called the Uttara Mīmāṃsā philosophy because it is based on the Vedānta or Upaniṣads which are mainly included in the Brāhmaṇas which form the second or subsequent (uttara) portion of the Vedas. After Vyāsa had divided the Vedas into four parts he gave special charge of each part to different disciples. His disciple Jaimini received charge of the Sāma Veda.<sup>139</sup>

138. मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोर्बेदनामधेयम् ( यज्ञ-परिभाषासूत्रम् by आपस्तम्ब )

139. तत्सर्वेदधरः पौलः सामगो जैमिनिः कविः ।

बैशम्पायन एवैको निष्ठाती यजुषामुत ॥ श्रीमद्भागवतम् १।४।२१

According to the direction of Vyāsa, Jaimini wrote this philosophy in order to explain the purport of the first part of the Vedas which may be called the Karma Kāṇḍa. In this philosophy valuable contributions have been made towards the methods of correctly interpreting the meaning of the Vedas.

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā philosophy flourished towards the end of the Buddhist period. Some master minds appeared at this time and wrote a number of books of this school.

The original treatise consists of 2,744 aphorisms and is divided into 12 chapters. Śabara Svāmī wrote an excellent commentary on the aphorisms. The celebrated Kumārila Bhatta also wrote two commentaries known as Vārtika and Tūptikā. Nyāyamālāvistāra of Mādhavācārya, Śāstradīpika and Nyāyaratnamālā by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra, Nyāyaprakāśa by Āpodeva, Arthasaṅgraha by Laugākṣi Bhāskara, Mīmāṃsā-paribhāṣā, by Kṛṣṇayajva are other books worth mention.

According to this philosophy, acts performed by men produce good or bad results. No intervention by God (Īsvara) is necessary. In fact the existence of God is not admitted in this philosophy. Mantras are considered to be identical with minor gods (devatās). The existence of minor gods with separate duties and definite bodies is not admitted. Letters and the sounds

(śabda) to which they refer are considered to be eternal (nitya). Sometimes, when they are manifested, they became audible. When they are not manifested they are not heard. The Vedas are eternal. They are apauruṣeya, *i.e.* they were not composed by any men, not even by God. Not being human compositions there is no possibility of any mistake in them. The aim of the Vedas is to describe acts by the performance of which men can attain good and avoid evil. Those passages of the Vedas which do not describe any acts are useless<sup>140</sup> Examples of such passages are : He (God Agni) wept<sup>141</sup> (when he was obstructed by the other gods) ; Fire is the medicine of cold.<sup>142</sup> As regards the passages of the Upaniṣads referring to the soul or Brahman (*e.g.* "Brahman is truth, knowledge and joy"<sup>143</sup> or "This soul is Brahman"<sup>144</sup> "Thou art that"<sup>145</sup>) the view of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is that either they are useless, or they may have some sort of significance if they are considered in connection with, or as part of, those passages of the Vedas which refer to the act of worshipping Brahman, or the performance

140. आन्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम् । जैमिनिस्त्वम् १।२।२

141. सोऽरीदोत्

142. अग्निर्हिमस्य मेषजम्

143. सत्यं ज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म

144. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म

145. तत् त्वम् असि

of Vedic sacrifices.<sup>146</sup> The Upaniṣads say that Brahman should be worshipped. Worship is an act. Hence the passage which prescribes such worship fulfils the aim of the Vedas which is to prescribe acts. In such passages Brahman comes in as the object of worship and hence there is occasion for describing the nature of Brahman. Again the Karmakāṇḍa of the Vedas prescribes the performance of Vedic sacrifices, which is of course in accordance with the aim of the Vedas. The performer of the sacrifice is the soul, and hence it is relevant to describe the nature of the soul. In this way those passages of the Upaniṣads which describe the nature of the soul or of Brahman can be brought into accordance with the aim of the Vedas as recognized in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā philosophy. Of course Vedānta does not accept this view. According to Vedānta the true knowledge of Brahman or of the soul enables a person to get rid of the sufferings of the world, which are due to ignorance about their nature. As stated before the most valuable contribution made by Pūrvamīmāṃsā philosophy relates to the method of interpreting the meaning of Vedic passages. These methods have also been applied to the interpretation of passages in the Upaniṣads and also of passages in Śāstras other than the Vedas. The

146. विधिना तु एकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः (Jai Su 1-2-7)

following considerations should be taken into account in arriving at the correct interpretation of a passage, a consideration which is mentioned earlier being recognized to be superior in value to a consideration which is mentioned later,—<sup>147</sup>

- (1) the ordinary meaning of the word,
- (2) other possible meanings of the word,
- (3) the sentence in which the word occurs,
- (4) the context,
- (5) the order of mention of the word,
- (6) the meaning according to the derivation of the word.

According to this philosophy the soul is different from the body and the organs of sense. The number of souls is infinite. The soul is born as a god or a man or a beast according to its past acts. It enjoys pleasure or pain according as the acts are good or bad. When man is exhausted by the sufferings of the world he becomes eager to reach a stage which is free from the miseries of the world. He learns from this philosophy that, by performing sacrifices, man can attain such a stage in svarga (heaven) which is a place free from suffering and the possibility of future suffering and is a place desired by everybody.<sup>148</sup> There can be nothing

147. स्मृति-लिंग-वाक्य-प्रकरण-स्थान-समाख्यानां पारदीर्घल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात्

(Jai Su 3-3-14)

148. यन्न दुःखिनः सन्निवृत्तं न च यस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं यत् तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम् ॥

more desirable than heaven. This of course is not the view of Vedānta. It may be mentioned that the Gīta deprecates the philosophy of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in the following passage which is often wrongly considered to be a condemnation of the Vedas.

“Those who are not wise say many fine things (about heaven). They attach too much importance to those passages of the Vedas which describe the good things which one can attain by the performance of Vedic rituals. They say that there is nothing better than heaven. They engage in elaborate rituals of which the results are enjoyment and wealth. Being too much attached to enjoyment and wealth they cannot fix their mind on God with the determination to attain Him”.<sup>149</sup>

After studying the Vedas the student will have the desire to know what is the exact nature of dharma,<sup>150</sup> by the performance of which one can attain heaven. Dharma has been defined to be that which is an injunction of the Vedas and which gives as its result

149. यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्ताविपश्चितः ।  
वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीतिवादिनः ॥  
कामात्मानः खर्गपरा जन्मकर्मफलप्रदा ।  
क्रियाविशेषबहुलां भोगैश्वर्यगतिं प्रति ॥  
भोगैश्वर्यप्रसक्तानां तयापहतचेतसां ।  
व्यवसायात्मिका बुद्धिः समाधौ न विधीयते ॥

Gita 2-42, 43, 44

150. अथातो धर्मनिष्ठासा (Jai Su 1-1-1)

something which is desirable.<sup>151</sup> The words of the Vedas are the means for knowing what dharma is. Dharma is an object which cannot be perceived by the senses. It is not an object of *pratyakṣa*. Neither can it be known by means of *anumāna* (inference). When the Vedas say "Do this" or "One should do this" it is dharma. When the Vedas prohibit an act, it is *adharma*. There is a sacrifice called *Śyenayāga* by the performance of which one can kill another person. Although such a sacrifice is laid down in the Vedas, it is not dharma because killing a person ordinarily involves a sin for which one has to go to hell. We say "ordinarily" because it is not a sin to kill persons in exceptional circumstances *e.g.* when that person wants to kill us or to set fire to our house etc. Two conditions have therefore to be fulfilled in order that an act may be called dharma (1) there must be a command of the Vedas to perform that act and (2) it should give a desirable result (*e.g.* heaven).

Vedic texts have been divided into two main divisions (1) *mantra* and (2) *brāhmaṇa*. Mantras are mainly for the purpose of recitation at the time of sacrifice, or separately, and generally consist of hymns addressed to various gods. The *Brāhmaṇa* texts are divided into

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151. चोदनालक्षणीयं धर्मः ॥ (Jai Su 1-1-2)

two main divisions (1) vidhi and (2) arthavāda. Vidhi means a direction to perform some act. Sometimes the emphasis in a vidhi is not so much on the performance of an act, as on the non-performance of some other act. Thus there is a vidhi "You should eat the flesh of those animals which have five nails."<sup>152</sup> The intention is that if you eat meat, you should eat such meat; it is however not necessary that you should eat meat; in fact it would be better not to take meat at all. Such vidhis are called parisamkhyā vidhi.

Arthavāda means a passage which is intended to praise or condemn an act.<sup>153</sup> The literal meaning of the passage is not what is really meant. Some vidhi is to be praised or some prohibition (niṣedha) is to be condemned. This is the intention of the arthavāda. As according to this philosophy nothing is significant in the Vedas unless it refers to an act, the arthavādas would ordinarily lose their significance. But they derive their value from the fact that they are part of the vidhi as they praise the vidhi.<sup>154</sup>

Arthavāda has been divided into three classes guṇavāda, anuvāda and bhūtārthavāda. When

152. पंच पंचनखान् भुञ्जीत

153. प्रशंसानिन्दान्वतरपरवाक्यम् अर्थवादः (Arthasamgraha 65)

154. विधिना तु एकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थत्वेन विधीनां स्युः (Jai Su 1-2-7)

the statement made in the arthavāda is contrary to what is otherwise known, it is called guṇavāda. "The yūpa (the post to which the animals is tied) is the sun." We know that the yūpa is not the sun. But it should be considered to be bright like the sun. This is guṇavāda. "Fire is the medicine of cold." This is no new truth. We know that cold is removed by fire. This is anuvāda. "Indra threw the thunderbolt at Vṛtra." This is neither contradicted by anything we know, nor is it a statement of what we already know. This is bhūtārthavāda.

The Smṛtis are also considered authoritative in this philosophy unless they go against the Vedas.<sup>155</sup>

### General Remarks

We shall conclude this chapter by quoting some passages from the writings of Indian scholars who have tried to explain why different schools of Indian philosophy contain conflicting passages although they were all propounded by Ṛṣis who are supposed to have attained complete wisdom.

Vācaspati Miśra says that the various Śāstras have been written so as to fit in with the capacities of different learners. The

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155. विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति हि अनुमानम् (Jai Su 1-4-3)

various current views on the problems of life have just been mentioned in the different Śāstras. The intention is that those differences should be reconciled and final truth should thus be arrived at.<sup>156</sup>

Madhusūdana Sarasvati says, Those sages cannot make mistakes, because all of them attained complete knowledge. The fact is that men ordinarily desire to enjoy the objects of sense. They can not readily realize the highest truth. In order to combat heresy the sages have mentioned different views of life so that one of them might appeal to the enquirer of truth. The intention of all the sages who have written the Śāstras is that there is one Brahman as laid down in the Vedānta and that the existence of other objects is only apparent and not real.<sup>157</sup>

Vijñānavikṣu says, It is the aim of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies to establish as the first stage (as it is impossible to realize the highest truth by one single effort,) the existence of a soul separate from the body,

156. अधिकारिविभेदेन शास्त्राणां क्तान्यशेषतः भेदो लोकसिद्धत्वादनूयते अभेदस्तदपवादेन प्रतिपादनमर्हति ।

157. न हि ते मुनयो भ्रान्ताः सर्वज्ञत्वात् तेषां । किन्तु कश्चिद्विषयप्रवणानां आपाततः परमपुरुषार्थं प्रविशी न भवतीति नास्तिक्य निवारणाय तैः प्रकारभेदाः प्रदर्शिताः । सर्वेषां प्रस्थानकर्तॄणां विवर्तवादपर्यावसानेन अद्वितीयं परमेश्वरं एव वेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं तात्पर्यम् ।

the mind etc, the feelings of happiness and unhappiness being merely attributed to the soul according to popular conceptions.<sup>158</sup>

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158. न्यायवैशेषिकाभ्यां हि सुखौदुःखाद्यनुवादतः देहादिमात्रविवेकेन आत्मा प्रथमभूमिकायामनुमापितः । एकदा परमसूक्ष्मे प्रविशाद्युक्तत्वात् ।

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## CHAPTER XII

### Complete truth in Vedic Religion

If we compare the philosophy of the Vedas with the philosophy of other religions we cannot but be struck by the superiority of the former. In this chapter we shall collect together some of the observations made before in order to show that the philosophy of the Vedas contains complete truth while the philosophy of other religions contains only partial truth.

In this connection it may be observed that Vedic philosophy alone has propounded a theory of knowledge according to which it is possible to obtain complete truth. All other religions are based on the testimony of particular individuals. Buddhism rests on the testimony of the Buddha, Jainism on that of Mahāvīra, Christianity on that of Jesus, Mahommedanism on that of Mahommed. Either the truth was revealed to them or some angel of God communicated His words to them. In either case it is possible that there might be some misapprehension on the part of the medium. It is wellknown that Mahommed ordered that a particular *Sura* (chapter) should be expunged from the Koran because he afterwards discovered that Satan had communicated it to

him taking the shape of an angel. All religions based on the testimony of a particular individual are open to the possibility of similar mistakes. As Hinduism is not based on the testimony of any particular individual there is no possibility of any mistake in Hinduism. Hinduism is based on the Vedas no portion of which was composed by any man. The words of the Vedas are eternal, existing from time immemorial. As the Vedas were not composed by any men they are free from the possibility of mistakes. Different portions of the Vedas were revealed to different sages all of whom could not have been mistaken. It is thus possible for complete truth to be contained in the Vedas. All other religions were preached at particular times. Hinduism was not preached at any particular time. It is the Sanātana Dharma or Eternal Religion existing from the beginning of creation. In fact it existed in the previous creation also as the same Vedas existed in the previous creation. All things which have a beginning have also an end. All other religions having had a beginning are likely to have an end also. As many religions have perished in the past, so many present religions may also perish in future. Hinduism had no beginning. It will have no end. It has existed in the eternal past. It will exist in the eternal future.

That is because it contains the complete truth.

We have already noticed the defects of Buddhism and Jainism, both of which do not admit the existence of God as the creator of the Universe. We are aware that an erudite scholar, the late Hirendra Nath Dutt, took much pain to prove that Buddha did not deny the existence of God. But the idea of God should be so prominent in a religion that the most ignorant man should know it. It is surely a defect in a religion if the idea of God is so hidden that it requires the researches of a great scholar to find it out. So far as we are aware no scholar maintains that Jainism also believes in the existence of God as the creator of the universe. There is no doubt much that is admirable in Buddhism and Jainism. Thus, for example, both of them accept the doctrine of Karma, that a man gets pleasure or pain according as he has done good or bad acts in the past, just as he will have to feel in future the consequences of the acts which he does now. In this respect Jainism and Buddhism are superior to Christianity and Mahommedanism which, as will be explained below, believe in only a crude form of the doctrine of Karma.

But Christianity and Mahommedanism are superior to Jainism and Buddhism in so far

as the former two religions declare in clear and unmistakable terms that there is one Almighty God who has created the universe and who will reward or punish us for all our deeds. It is only Vedic religion which includes the best features of all other religions by declaring the existence of God as the creator and regulator of the universe, and enunciating the law of Karma in its most perfect form. We say the most perfect form because the law of Karma, as stated in Buddhism and Jainism, suffers from the defect that these religions do not say that it is God who gives us reward or punishment for our acts. They seem to say that acts of themselves produce their consequences. But according to Vedic philosophy acts being inanimate cannot create good or bad results. It is God who gives us the results of acts done by us. (vide pp. 112—113) The Vedic law, besides being more satisfactory in this respect, also provides for the exceptions to the working of the law according to the pleasure of God. Thus though the ordinary law is that a man who drinks poison dies, yet when Prahlāda was made to drink poison because he refused to give up his belief in God and when Prahlāda drank the poison after offering it to God Prahlāda did not die. Miracles which are found in Hinduism as well as in other religions

are due to the fact that the power of God is superior to the so-called laws of nature which are made by God and are always subject to the pleasure of God.

Buddhism and Jainism are also superior to Christianity and Mahommedanism in so far as the treatment of the doctrine of Ahimsā is concerned. The commandment of Christianity "Thou shalt not kill" refers only to the killing of man. Christianity does not consider it a sin to kill an animal and eat its meat. Such is also the doctrine of Mahommedanism which in several matters follows Christianity. Buddhism is better, as it considers it a sin to kill an animal for its meat although Buddhism does not carry the doctrine of ahimsā to its logical conclusion by prohibiting meat-eating. In this respect Jainism is superior to Buddhism as Jainism totally prohibits meat-eating.

It has been already observed before that Christianity and Mahommedanism also believe in the law of Karma (though in a crude form) in as much as according to these religions a man who does good acts goes to heaven and a man who does bad acts goes to hell. This doctrine presumes that good acts produce pleasure and bad acts produce pain and that such pleasure or pain comes either in this life or after death. It is crude because the heaven

and hell are said to be everlasting, thus ignoring the rule that they are proportionate to the acts. The acts being finite, the heaven or hell should also be finite. It is crude also because it ignores the working of this rule in the past. Just as acts done now produce pleasure or pain in the future, so also acts done in the past have produced the pleasure and pain which we are experiencing now. The Vedic doctrine of Karma alone can give a satisfactory explanation why some people are born happy while others are born unhappy. This doctrine also explains why two boys brought up from birth in the same manner react differently to the same stimulus from outside. One boy may show the nobility of his nature in circumstances in which the other boy shows meanness. It shows that the minds of the two are different. Eugenics says that different tendencies are inherited from forefathers. But it does not explain why one boy gets a particular set of forefathers, or in others words,—why one is born at a place where one inherits good qualities while another is born at a place where bad qualities are inherited. To say that it depends upon chance or accident amounts to denying that there is a just and omnipotent God who controls the affairs of the world. Vedic philosophy explains the difference satisfactorily by saying that the place where a soul

is born is determined by the acts performed in the previous birth.

Dr. Annie Besant's daughter was ill from her birth and died very young. She asked the Christian priests why the child suffered so much although the child committed no sin, but could not get a satisfactory reply. She read the books on Christian and other religions but was not satisfied. When she read Hindu philosophy she learnt that the child suffered because of her sins in the previous birth. She realized the superiority of Hindu religion and devoted her life to the preaching of Hinduism.

The superiority of the Vedic philosophy is also clear in the Vedic doctrine of the nature of the soul. I shall here refer to two characteristic features of this doctrine, one distinguishing the soul from the mind and the other proclaiming that it has an infinite past as it has an infinite future. The Christian and Mahomedan philosophies do not distinguish the soul from the mind. The Vedic philosophy declares that the mind is inanimate, while the soul is animate. It is because the mind is very closely associated with the soul that mind appears to be conscious. But the consciousness really belongs to the soul. It is possible for the mind to wander from one desire to another without being conscious of doing so. Consciousness is an attribute of the soul.

According to Śaṅkara, it is identical with the soul.

According to Christianity and Mahomedanism animals have no soul. But, according to Vedic philosophy, as consciousness is the characteristic of the soul, animals also possess the soul, even as men do. To say that men have the power to reason but animals have not, is not correct. As stated before (vide p. 125) animals also have the power to reason. There are of course varying degrees of the power to reason. Animals no doubt generally possess less power of reasoning than men. But some men also may possess even less power of reasoning than animals. An insane person may jump from the roof of a house injuring his body. An animal would not do so. An insane person has in fact little power of reasoning. But no one would say that he has no soul.

Probably the reason why in Christianity and Mahomedanism the existence of the soul is denied is their inability to say where the souls of animals would go after their death. As they possess little power of reasoning and almost wholly act under the impetus of instinct it would be unreasonable to say that they should go to heaven or hell according as they do good or bad acts. But this difficulty has been satisfactorily settled in Hinduism. According to Hinduism souls are born as animals

in order to experience the consequences of evil acts done in the past. They have not to reap the fruits of the acts which they do as animals as they have little reason in their animal life. The state of their existence after death depends upon the acts done by them in their previous births as men.

Christianity and Mahommedanism declare that the soul is immortal, by which it is meant that the soul can never be destroyed. It is however overlooked in these religions that everything that is created is also liable to be destroyed and hence if the soul is to be such that it cannot be destroyed, it should also never have been created. In other words if it is to have an infinite future it should also have an infinite past. The Upaniṣads have said clearly that the soul is neither created nor destroyed. Another reason why it should be held that we had a past life is that such a theory can alone explain why some people are born with good tendencies and some with bad, why some people are born in happy circumstances while others are born in unhappy circumstances. This point has been already dealt with in this chapter.

While Christianity and Mahommedanism assert that the world was created by God, they cannot reply satisfactorily to the question—what is the material out of which God created the world. To say that the world was created out

of nothing is unsatisfactory. We see in the world that everything comes out of something—nothing comes out of nothing. It would be logical to argue that the same law should hold good when the world was created and to conclude that the world also should have come out of something. Before creation God alone existed. Hence the conclusion becomes irresistible that the world comes out of God. Hinduism has definitely said so, while other religions have not. One cannot argue that if the world came out of God, then God must have been touched by the evil and the impure which we see in the world and which must have existed with the world in God before the world was created. The evil and the impure might, before creation, exist in God without affecting God, even as poison might exist in the serpent without affecting the serpent. Or the evil and the impure might not have remained in the world in the state in which it existed in God before creation, and might have appeared after creation in order to make the souls experience the evil results of their previous acts.

Another special feature of Hindu Philosophy is the endless chain of creation and destruction. Christianity and Mahomedanism say that the world was created once for all and will be destroyed once for all. But we find that in the world nothing happens once for all,—everywhere

there is a tendency for repetition. Day is followed by night, night by day. The cycle of seasons,—summer, rain, autumn, winter, and spring,—appears again and again. Out of the seed comes the tree, out of the tree comes the seed. So also the Vedas say that creation is followed by destruction which again is followed by creation. The cycle of creation and destruction has had no beginning. Creation and destruction are not acts for which God felt an impulse once only in His infinite life. From time without beginning He has again and again felt such impulses. Although the universe is almost infinite in expanse, although it contains various kinds of objects and living beings, although objects are made up of infinitely small particles, although there is an infinite variety of devices in the bodies and manners of living beings,—God does not feel the slightest exertion for the creation of such an inconceivably vast universe. Creation and destruction which to us appear formidable events are to God like sport to the child<sup>1</sup>.

Another superior feature of the religion of the Vedas is its liberal character. While Christianity says that a man is doomed to eternal damnation unless he believes in Jesus Christ, the Upaniṣads declare that a man

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1. लोकवत्, लीलाकैवल्य (Bra Su 2-2-32)

will attain after death whatever he tried to attain in his life.<sup>2</sup> In the Gītā which is the kernel of the Upaniṣads, the Lord says more explicitly. "In whatever way one may try to attain me, in that particular way I show favour to the devotee."<sup>3</sup> In a well-known ancient hymn it is clearly stated that different religions are but different means of attaining the same God, the means being different because the mentalities of different persons are different.<sup>4</sup> It is not difficult for a Hindu to believe that if a Christian devoutly worships Christ in the manner laid down in Christianity he can realize God as Christ and that if a man worships God as Alla he can realize God as Alla even as a Hindu can realize God as Śiva or Rāma or Kṛṣṇa by worshipping Him in one of these forms. It is not an accident that Hinduism has produced a saint like Rāma Kṛṣṇa Paramahansa who declared, "I have practised the means of God-realisation prescribed in Hinduism, Mahomedanism and

2. यथाकतुरन्मि ह्रीके पुरुषो भवति तथा इतः प्रेत्य भवति

Chha Upa 3-14-1

3. ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहं (Gita 4-11)

4. तथैव सांख्यं योगः पश्यतिमतं वैष्णवमिति

प्रभिन्ने प्रस्थाने परनिदमदः पश्यमिति च ।

रुचौणा वैचित्र्याहलुकुटिल नानापथजुषां

नृणामिकी गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसासर्णव इव ॥ शिव महिम्न स्तोत्र

Christianity and have found that all the paths lead to God."

The diversity of creeds in Hinduism which at first sight might appear to be a defect will on closer examination reveal itself as a superior feature absent in other religions. It is well-known that the natures of different persons are different. The diversity in creeds satisfies the diversity in human temperament. Some would like to worship God as father, some as mother, some as child, some as husband. There are different creeds in Hinduism suitable for all these different temperaments. While the path of devotion is suitable to some, the path of wisdom satisfies others. The devotee loves to contemplate on God with a definite form and definite qualities. Even when he attains salvation he would not like to merge in God but would like to remain in constant and unending communion with God in that form and with those qualities. There is the Vaiṣṇava school to satisfy such a devotee. The wise man might love to merge himself in unmanifested Brahman without any qualities. The Advaita school would satisfy him.

From a consideration of the special features of the Vedic religion it would appear that the Vedic religion commands a much fuller grasp of the complete truth than other religions.

In fact complete truth is contained in Vedic philosophy while, in other philosophies, only partial truth is manifested.

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